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October 2004 - Ref 074 Reducing the impact of 'green' taxes and charges on low-income households Environmental or 'green' taxes and charges send signals to consumers by making consumption of environmental resources more expensive. However, there are concerns that their effect could be 'regressive', by hitting lower income households disproportionately. This research, by Paul Ekins and Simon Dresner of the Policy Studies Institute, investigated the possible impact on low-income households in four areas of environmental and social importance: domestic use of energy, water and transport, and domestic generation of waste. It also considered whether any negative impacts could be reduced if the tax or charge were designed appropriately, or if a compensation scheme were introduced. The study found that:
Background The study explored the possible impacts on low-income households of the introduction of environmental taxes and charges in four key areas of environmental and social concern: the use by households of energy, water and transport, and their generation of waste. In each of these areas, taxes or charges have been discussed or implemented, and their impact on those on low incomes has been an important part of the policy debate. Household energy use There is enormous variation in household energy use between households with similar incomes, including those with low incomes. The variation in carbon emissions is not as great, but is still very substantial. Low-income households also pay substantially more per unit of energy than richer households. A carbon tax imposed equally across the board, without any compensation for poor households, would therefore add to the unfair price burden these households are already experiencing. The research explored thirteen tax plus compensation packages, compensating poor households through some combination of means-tested benefits, child benefit, adjustments to pensioners' Winter Fuel Allowance (WFA) and varying the rate of carbon tax. Figure 1 shows that it was not difficult to design packages which on average benefited poor households.
However, the enormously skewed distribution of energy consumption among households with similar incomes means that the average result conceals great differences in net gains and losses. In fact, none of the investigated compensation packages managed to reduce the proportion of losing households in the poorest ten per cent of households much below twenty per cent (see Figure 2). Many of these households are among those that are deepest in fuel poverty.
Many UK homes are very inefficient in terms of their energy use. An alternative approach to reducing energy use and carbon emissions would be to introduce incentives for households to implement cost-effective energy efficiency measures. The research explored the potential of such a scheme and concluded that adopting such an approach - described in some detail in the report - offers a relatively rare opportunity for public policy success in its generation and distribution of economic, social and environmental benefits. Household use of water The distributional effect of eleven alternative tariff designs was examined with three variables in mind: the average effect on low-income households; the effect on high-water-using low-income households; and the overall redistributive effect (i.e. the transfer from richer to poorer households). This research found that:
Household use of transport The study examined the effect on low-income households of several measures to restrain the likely future increase in emissions from transport. Results showed that, if fuel duties were increased, the most effective means of compensating low-income motorists would be to abolish vehicle excise duty (VED). If, instead, a revenue-neutral congestion charging system was introduced, this would lead to a redistribution of money from urban to rural drivers. Congestion charging that could both reduce traffic growth and fund improvements in public transport would need to be revenue raising. That would inevitably mean that low-income urban households would have to pay more if they continued to drive. An alternative approach might be to use domestic tradable quotas
(DTQs). Household waste generation Households presently pay for waste collection and disposal through the Council Tax. Because this is itself regressive, increasing Council Tax to pay for higher waste costs will also bear disproportionately on low-income households. An alternative approach, recommended by the government's Strategy Unit, could be to allow local authorities to introduce variable waste charging. This could be expected to result in both waste reduction and an increase in the separation of recyclables. But this too could be regressive, because, as the project data made clear, the generation of household waste bears little relation to income, and more affluent households tend to recycle more, thereby reducing their residual waste which would bear the charge. Because the Council Tax is regressive, removing waste charging from it by reducing it for all households by the same amount would make low-income households proportionately better off. If a revenue-neutral variable weight-based charge was then introduced for all households - and there was no waste reduction - ninety-two per cent of single-person households, and seventy-six per cent of two-person households, would still be better off. Although larger households would be net losers, they could reduce their waste disposal costs by reducing the amount of residual waste they generate. Compensation for extra waste disposal costs could be given through the benefits system. The research found that the cost of fully compensating all but the twenty per cent of these households that produce most waste would be £365 million per annum. This is comparable to the £375 million that central Government will have to find to fund the increased costs of local authority recycling, if this continues to be funded as at present. Thus, if variable charging were to significantly reduce the generation of household waste, the resulting lower waste disposal expenditure by government could offset partially or completely the extra benefits needed to protect low-income households. General conclusions However, the consumption of key environmental resources tends to vary widely within a given income group. This means that under any practicable compensation system (and assuming no change in household behaviour), some low-income households will end up as net losers from any charging-plus-compensation scheme, even when most low-income households end up as significant gainers. In practice, households will be able to change their behaviour in response to charging (thereby reducing the consumption of the environmental resource in question). This should greatly reduce both the number and extent of net losing, low-income households. Where even this would lead to unacceptable hardship, either further special measures could be implemented, or the underlying cause of the hardship could be addressed. The results from this research could help ensure that, if environmental taxes and charges are introduced, they are designed so that they do not have unintended social consequences. About the project The impact of an environmental tax or charge on households was calculated from data which showed the household use of the environmentally-related service according to household income. New datasets relating household characteristics to their water use and waste generation allowed the implications of other elements of the compensation schemes in these areas to be calculated. For transport, the main data source for the calculations was the Family Expenditure Survey. For energy use, both the English House Condition Survey and the Family Expenditure Survey were used. The implications of that element of the compensation schemes that involved the benefits system were calculated using the POLIMOD model maintained by Holly Sutherland at the University of Cambridge. How to get further
information Detailed working papers in each of the four areas studied are being produced and will be put on the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) website (www.psi.org.uk). Further information about the details of the work carried may be obtained from Simon Dresner at PSI (s.dresner@psi.org.uk). Click on the 'order report' icon in the left margin to order online. Click on the 'report .pdf' icon in the left margin to download a pdf of the full report free of charge. (File size is 0.28MB). |
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