British-Pakistani men from Bradford

Linking narratives to policy

M. Y. Alam and Charles Husband

This report sheds light on the experiences of Bradford-born Pakistani men.

Muslims comprise the UK’s largest religious minority, and are the object of analysis and concern within various policy arenas and popular debates, including immigration, marriage and partner selection, social cohesion and integration. This study gathered insights, experiences and narratives from 25 men aged 16 to 38 that shed light on being a Bradfordian of Pakistani and Muslim heritage. It also highlights the policy context surrounding the men’s attitudes toward various facets of their lives, including marriage, family, work, the city in general, and the neighbourhood in which they live. While there was some generational continuity of cultural values and norms, significant changes also appeared to be taking place.

The report will be of interest to a wide ranging audience including local and national policy makers, academics and students as well as politicians and those who work in the community.
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1 Introduction

In the development of British inter-ethnic sensibilities, the specific historical relationships between arriving immigrant populations and their home countries, expressed in past patterns of contact with British people and British power, laid down quite distinct stereotypes and the supporting narratives that made them unobtrusively routine (Gilroy, 1987; Kabbani, 1994; Cannadine, 2002). The broad sweep of colonialism and empire may have employed common modes of exploitation and ideologies of racial classification, but they were in each instance uniquely employed and uniquely experienced. Consequently, the concepts we currently come to use in describing the negative elements in the relationship between majority ethnic British citizens and minority ethnic citizens and communities are dangerously generic. *Racism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism* may indeed have common core social-psychological dynamics (Brown, 1995; Douglas, 1995; Abrams and Hogg, 1999a, 1999b), but the ideologies of difference and the specific historical ‘facts’ that are the building blocks of feeling and action are typically highly specific. Gilroy (1987, 2000, 2005), for example, has cumulatively sought to trace the complex historical, political and cultural biography of persistent ideologies of nationhood and racialised identities. Thus, for example, while colour has a long history as a foundational signifier of difference and inferiority in ‘white’ racisms, it has also had quite distinct historical routes to sedimentation into specific national ideologies (Hage, 1998; Jacobson, 1998). As Winthrop D. Jordan (1965) illustrated in his seminal analysis of early North American contacts in *White over Black*, the specific nature of the initial and developing relationships between ‘white’ and ‘black’ populations significantly shaped the practices and beliefs that became the bedrock of early variants of colour-linked racism.

So too in contemporary Britain, the dynamics of majority–minority relations continue to reveal the continuing power of historically determined inter-group beliefs and feelings. The fracturing of a united front of black politics in Britain demonstrated that white racism was not homogeneous in its construction nor in the ways in which it was experienced. As Modood (1990, p. 2) argued:

… contemporary anti-racism in Britain defines people in terms of their colour; Muslims – suffering all the problems that anti-racists identify – hardly ever think of themselves in terms of their colour. And so, in terms of their own being, Muslims feel most acutely those problems that the anti-racists are blind to; and respond weakly to those challenges that the anti-racists want to meet with most force.
The particularity of racism and processes of exclusion have been recognised in the British context by the increasing attention given to the nature and impact of Islamophobia (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997).

Faith, rather than national identity, is the defining feature of boundary definition in Islamophobia, but it should not be thought of as being exclusively so. The Pakistani populations of Britain can still anticipate the likelihood of being called ‘black bastards’ by unembarrassed racists, whatever Modood’s political analysis may suggest. Historically, in the 1960s and 1970s, the physical street violence of ‘paki-bashing’ made this same population vulnerable to racist assault, although the limited ethnic and national discernment of white racists also meant that Indians and others were likely to be included in the target group. Thus colour, historical national identity, minority ethnic identity, cultural identity and Islam are unequally and unstably fused in contemporary British Islamophobia.

The continuing legacy of Imperial British conceptions of the Indian sub-continent are still operative in nuancing national and local majority perceptions of Bradford’s (Pakistani) Muslim communities. Where, as in Bradford, the demographics of migration and settlement have created distinct Pakistani/Muslim communities, national Islamophobia has found a convenient focus. The convergence of class profile, Asian ethnicity, Muslim faith and demographic concentration has triggered a catalytic mix of anxieties that have found expression in elite and popular discussion.

The radical populist conservatism of Thatcherism in which all Britons notionally became equal as consumers and its subsequent variant in Blair’s communitarian-infused ‘opportunity society’ have eroded class politics, but not class inequalities or class-based neuroses (Sociology, 2005). Middle England remains fearful of the great unwashed masses and the inner city has provided the location in which this guilty engagement with those disadvantaged by, and disengaged from, the centre ground of British politics has its sharpest focus.

As the UK has, over the period of Blair’s regime, enjoyed significant economic success relative to its European neighbours, so simultaneously the gap between the haves and the have nots has widened. Thus, the nineteenth-century neurotic fear of urban masses has metamorphosed into a current fixation with inner-city malaise and its social and moral threat (ODPM, 2005). Where the class and demographic challenges of the inner city can be meshed with the reality of distinct concentrations of minority ethnic citizens, there is the basis for a multiplier effect – of algebraic rather than merely cumulative proportions. A series of government reports (Cantle Report, 2001; Ouseley, 2001; Denham Report, 2002) have given political weight to the perceived threat to social cohesion. The Ouseley Report on Bradford provides indicative evidence of the depth of this anxiety.
This report became a key policy statement on ethnic relations in Bradford. Produced under the direction of Sir Herman Ouseley, latterly Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality and with an impressive history of policy- and practice-related responsibilities in the management of ethnic diversity, it had considerable authorial power. Consequently, it was hardly surprising that the bleak picture it painted of Bradford had extensive local and national visibility.

It starts on page 1 with the ‘Overview’ entitled ‘Removing the fears’; and fear is unambiguously presented in this summary statement as the defining feature of Bradford’s ethnic relations. Of the 13 paragraphs on this first page, seven start with the word ‘Fear’. When this page was given to a class of international university students from across Europe and from Latin America, with all the place names blocked out, the consensus was that it must refer to some black-ghettolike area of a city in the USA. In a study based on consultation rather than systematic research, this dominant paradigm of a city living under a generic mantle of fear was a tendentious contribution to policy development.

Since 9/11, Britain has found in Bradford a specific focus for a concentration of anxieties. Not only does the demography of Bradford provide an acute fusion of the themes addressed above, but also Bradford has been the location of a series of political issues around faith and ethnicity that became the focus of national moral panics (see Cohen, 1972). In the mid-1980s, the issue of halal meals in state-school lunchtime provision provided an early instance of faith as a defining feature of Asian ethnicity, challenging the complacent self-satisfaction of a state multiculturalism based on treating everyone equally (i.e. the same). This was echoed in the 1984–85 bitter struggle between Pakistani parents and the local state in Bradford over their refusal to tolerate a headmaster who denigrated the home culture of an ethnically diverse pupil body. The ‘Honeyford Affair’, as it became known, sharply polarised views about the reasonable expectations of cultural sensitivity that could be recognised within British multiculturalism (Halstead, 1988). Margaret Thatcher took a high profile in very visibly and concretely supporting the headmaster. Not so long afterwards, the ‘Rushdie Affair’ (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1989; Ruthven, 1990) again found Bradford’s Pakistani community to be the totemic manifestation of pre-Enlightenment ignorance and religious zealotry. Following Ayatollah Khomeini’s edict calling for the execution of Rushdie and the publishers, the ‘book burning’ in Bradford took on a new significance for the media and, in Akhtar’s words:

Bradford had become, partly as an accident of timing, the newly discovered citadel of Muslim radicalism.

(Akhtar, 1989, p. 43)
In a way that prefigured a more recent construction of the alienness of Islam in Britain triggered by the 'Danish cartoon debacle', the Rushdie Affair was predominantly framed by a consensual 'bottom line' that took it for granted that the defence of freedom of speech was a *sine qua non* of British democratic practice. The media and political interrogation of the dubious 'Britishness' of Bradford's Muslim communities was continued with the Gulf War of 1990–91 where, again, leaders of the Bradford Muslim community were relentlessly required to respond to the challenge: 'Which side are you on?'

The problematic identity and status of Bradford's Muslim communities for majority society have additionally been sustained by the 'race' riots of 1995 and 2001. These events were highly localised within a particular neighbourhood of the inner city, but were dramatic in the degree of physical damage they caused. The more recent rioting resulted in arrests and convictions that were part of a state response that kept the riots in the news long after the event. Like all riots, these riots were far from simple explosions of malevolence (Fogelson, 1971; Benyon, 1984), but they have generated a further negative imagery and rhetoric to be associated with Bradford's Pakistani communities.

This fusion of the generic properties of British racism and Islamophobia with the unique demographics and history of Bradford's Pakistani population may be seen as having constructed a specific pattern of inter-group perceptions. For the majority of British 'white' citizens, it is easy to see Bradford as an extreme demonstration of the social costs of allowing 'ethnic ghettos' to develop in our inner cities. And, for the majority population, the difference and wilful 'self-segregation' of this population are fundamentally linked to their religious faith – Islam.

In a contrary, though complementary way, it has also been the case that the power of this external gaze and representation of their community and identity has reciprocally impacted on the self-definition of the Pakistani population of Bradford. For the current younger generations in their teens and up to their thirties, Islam has become a much more salient element of their self-definition. Their diasporic links to the homeland of their grandparents, or parents, are not denied; but are significantly renegotiated in relation to other elements of their hybrid identities. If young women increasingly choose to wear the hijab in public, as opposed to the *dupatta*,¹ it is likely to be because of their acceptance of Islam as a defining feature of their life. Because Islam, rather than South Asian territorial ancestry, defines their collective family identity, they are able to successfully invoke their textual knowledge of the Qur’an and the Hadith to challenge the traditional ‘cultural’ demands of their elders. Similarly, young men can renegotiate their commitment to traditional obligations of the extended family and *biradari*,² because Pakistan is no longer the axis of their
identity. Meanwhile, they can make common cause with Palestinians and Bosnian Muslims, about whom they may know relatively little, primarily because they are fellow Muslims.

**A brief, but necessary history**

In the nineteenth century, Bradford was a centre of manufacturing and trade that brought tremendous wealth to the city. Its power as a major national producer of textiles generated the wealth that was translated into spacious stone-built detached houses, imposing business premises and expansive architectural statements in the civic buildings that remain today, such as the Town Hall, Cartwright Hall and the Concert Hall. At the same time, the manufacturing base of this wealth created the numerous mills that lined the valleys and the rows of small working-class dwellings that housed the workforce in dense adjacent terraces. Nineteenth-century Bradford was an economic and cultural force in the country.

The twentieth century was not so kind. International competition in textiles grew throughout the century and new technologies required new investment and intensive production regimes. In order to compete for labour, which increasingly sought more congenial working environments in new industries, the mills became more and more reliant on the importation of migrant labour – particularly to staff the night shifts. Just as Bradford attracted skilled technicians from Germany in the nineteenth century, in the twentieth it recruited a manual labour force for the mills from overseas – predominantly from South Asia. The history of this migration is well documented (Shaw, 1988; Lewis, 1994).

The flow of immigration from the mid-1950s until the early 1960s was predominantly of single men. Their common experience of work and their shared negotiation of the difficulties of settlement meant that internal distinctions of region, location within Islam and extended family networks were at this stage less important than collective survival and mutual support. For example, the mosques that were initially established in Bradford were attended without regard to regional, caste or family affiliations. However, the demand for labour was also paralleled by a growing hostility to immigration from the Commonwealth and a series of Commonwealth Immigration Acts progressively, and then in draconian ways, restricted immigration into the UK. This legislation also put an end to the feasibility of chain migration between Britain and the Commonwealth, and generated a surge in immigration of those who sought to enter before the bans took effect. Consequently, immigration into Bradford became supplemented by family reunification and the internal dynamics of the Bradford Pakistani population changed during the 1970s.
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With this change in family structure, village kinship and religious affiliations became more significant as the basis of community formation (Dahye, 1974). Among other things, the internal divisions within Islam became spatially distributed across the urban neighbourhoods of Bradford. Mosques and Islamic schools (madrassahs) that reflected the particular position of communities within Islam were established in differing neighbourhoods within the city and, since these religious internal boundaries were themselves overlaid by linguistic and regional identities, so the distinctive Pakistani communities of contemporary Bradford were laid down across the city. Just as the identities of the majority populations of Bradford are not adequately encapsulated in the label ‘British’, so too ‘Pakistani’ is only the grossest approximation to providing a collective noun for this population. With past, and current, migration from Azad Kashmir, Punjab, North West Frontier Province and other regions of Pakistan, quite distinct sub-national identities have been reproduced in Bradford. With this regional diversity in geographical origin come overlapping variations in community languages. This linguistic variation would include Mirpuri, Pothwaari, Punjabi, Henko, Chaachi and Pushto – with some individuals often having functional competence in more than one of these languages. Given this internal diversity, the majority British and Bradfordian population’s perception of an apparently homogeneous Muslim/Pakistani minority ethnic population in Bradford represents a naive and simplistic understanding of this cohort of fellow citizens.

In a cruel historic joke on the city, and the ‘Pakistani’ workforce in particular, at the same time as the Pakistani communities were establishing themselves within the urban fabric of the city, the textile industry went into a terminal decline. By the late twentieth century, the textile industry in Bradford was almost entirely extinguished and the labour force that had been drawn into service was finding itself with high levels of unemployment and underemployment. The collapse in family incomes for very many members of these communities resulted in changes in family dynamics and modes of income generation. Entrepreneurial innovation and small, family-trading initiatives provided one response to this situation. The taxi and mini-cab business across Bradford, for example, became one visible niche occupied by displaced ‘Pakistani’ labour. Currently, the dense inner-city terrace housing and apparent external urban malaise much favoured by a sensationalist form of television journalism provide quite a misleading and inaccurate impression of the current economic situation of the entirety of the Bradford ‘Pakistani’ population.

However, economic and social indicators reveal that the Bradford ‘Pakistani’ communities do suffer from significant levels of deprivation and disadvantage. A good part of this disadvantage can be attributed to their location in inner-city areas with relatively poor housing stock, educational underachievement, higher than average levels of unemployment and poorer health. Measured against the Index of
Multiple Deprivation, which summarises a number of indicators associated with the relative well-being of an area, in 2001, Bradford as a whole ranked thirtieth most deprived out of 354 local authority areas in England. And, taking much smaller areas of assessment – the Super Output Areas (SOAs) with a population of around 1,500 persons – in 2004, 14 of Bradford’s 307 SOAs, primarily around inner Bradford, were within the most deprived 1 per cent of areas in England. The picture provided by the Bradford Resource Centre and Community Statistics Project 2004 review is one of a city with areas of distinct deprivation (Darlow et al., 2005, p. 6).

However, there is significant wealth to be found within the Pakistani communities of Bradford. Some of this is noticeable as a small number of families move out of inner-city locales such as West Bowling and Girlington into the more affluent areas including Heaton, Thornton and Bingley. This affluence is also seen in the types of housing that is being moved into (semi-detached and detached). Even these slight changes in housing indicate communities are now more likely to see themselves as established and settled – a point that is reinforced when conspicuous consumption (house renovation and improvement, money spent on cars and other leisure and luxury items) is factored in. Meanwhile, other families, who have substantial financial resources, choose to live modestly in terrace housing and deploy their assets through their extended family network in a manner that can obscure their affluence from the observer who lacks the cultural insight to read this scenario.

Bradford, as a city, has an economic profile in which migration, class and ethnicity interact complexly to shape life chances. The city has an economic profile that reflects the catastrophic decline from a nineteenth-century affluent textile monoculture to a city seeking to regenerate its economic base in a highly competitive regional and national context (ODPM, 2005).

‘Community’ and demography

Given their history of migration and settlement, followed by the economic collapse of their principal mode of employment, it is not surprising that there has been a prolonged period of relative residential stability for the ‘Pakistani’ population of Bradford. Until very recently, poor educational attainment has not provided a springboard in which the majority of this population could ‘improve’ themselves and move up and out of Bradford. Nor indeed, on the basis of research evidence, is it obvious that movement from Bradford would have been the preferred option of younger members of this community. The dense ‘ethnic infrastructure’ provided by the community’s location in Bradford offers a supportive environment that is positively valued. Yet, the continuing concentration of members of ‘Pakistani’
British-Pakistani men from Bradford has become the centre of a specific political concern, expressed in public debates from the Ouseley Report to recent media coverage of the perceived threat of ‘self-segregation’. (See, for example, the media debate following the speech entitled ‘After 7/7: sleepwalking to segregation’, given by Trevor Phillips, the Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, in Manchester on 22 September 2005 [www.cre.gov.uk].)

In terms of broad statistical data it is clear that inner-city Bradford does have areas of specific concentration of ‘Pakistanis’. In the 2001 Census, 19 per cent of Bradford’s population described themselves as ‘Asian or British Asian’, and a number of wards had a substantial proportion of black and minority ethnic residents: namely, 79 per cent in Manningham, 75 per cent in Toller, 70 per cent in Bradford Moor, 63 per cent in City, 53 per cent in Little Horton and 42 per cent in Keighley Central (Darlow et al., 2005, p. 6). In terms of the academic literature on ethnicity, this concentration of people with similar ethnic backgrounds represents one very significant positive feature of community building. This critical mass of people with a similar cultural background allows for the development of an infrastructure of resources that enable them to express their culture in their daily life. In inner-city Bradford, there are areas in which a well-developed network of shops provide for the dietary, leisure, fashion and clothing preferences of this community. Equally, there is a range of health-related resources where not only may members of the community access the NHS, which should show sensitivity to their cultural needs, but also there are hakims,\(^4\) herbalists and pirs\(^5\) who are able to provide culturally appropriate and valued forms of health aid. Additionally, Bradford has seen the emergence of independent schools that aim to respond specifically to the religious and cultural aspirations of ‘Pakistani’ parents. Also, as we have already noted above, this demography has allowed for the emergence of mosques with specific affiliations within Islam and related NGOs. From this perspective, the concentration of members of a minority ethnic community in a local city ward has plenty of positives that can be associated with it.

**Identity and context**

In the academic analysis of ethnicity there has been a great deal of descriptive writing that has helped reveal the dynamic forces shaping the definition of ethnic identities and the long-term viability of ethnic communities. Within this very extensive literature, the writing of Sandra Wallman (1986) provides an enduringly useful language for understanding these processes. Ethnicity, she argues, could usefully be understood as the interaction of two different processes. For her, ethnicity is an interaction between a self-conscious ethnic identity, a consciousness of kind, and the supporting framework of social and economic resources, the ethnic infrastructure.
In this model, consciousness of kind essentially refers to those *social psychological* processes that allow us to develop and sustain a sense of belonging to a collectivity. Our ethnic identity provides a coherent sense of belonging to a group. It offers a linkage between ‘me’ and ‘us’. Importantly, ethnicity does not exist only as a collective noun whereby we can label ourselves. Each group identity is shaped by the emergence and defence of highly valued *criterial attributes* – that is, beliefs, values and ways of acting that we value as our common culture. Much of the strength of our ethnic identity lies in the fact that it is suffused through many of our other social identities. Typically, ethnic communities have rules about how their male and female members should behave. Consequently, gender and ethnicity are highly interactive. Similar norms about how we participate in specific religions, behave ‘appropriately’ in relation to our age or manage our wealth are found within the cultural expectations of ethnic group membership. We experience our faith, age and class, among other things, through our membership in ethnic communities. This is equally true for majority and minority ethnic communities. It is in the negotiation of multiple intersecting identities that individuals generate the individuality that is so central to contemporary postmodern understandings of identity (Hall and du Gay, 1996; Alexander, 2000). For this reason, ethnicity cannot, and should not, be seen as a fixed property of an individual or group. That sort of essentialist thinking lies at the heart of new racism and *its abuse of cultural difference* (Barker, 1981; Solomos and Back, 1995).

Most people, when they wake up in the morning, do not require a second opinion of who is inhabiting their body. In our daily routines we operate within social roles that are familiarly ours, and which are typically located in a specific time and place – they are *situationally contingent*. We are all engaged in managing many identities that are often played out with quite different sets of neighbours, friends and strangers. We do not have a single all-determining identity. It is in this sense that it is appropriate to see each person as actively *negotiating* their sense of personal integrity and biographical continuity. Identity is an active, creative social process, and not a fixed property of an individual (Burkitt, 1991; Jenkins, 2004).

So, too, ethnic identities are permanently being collectively reconfirmed and regenerated. As Barth (1969) pointed out, the ‘Ain’t they quaint’ external gaze on the customs, artefacts and values of other cultures produces an artificial understanding of ethnic communities. It is frequently no more than a self-congratulatory projection of the need for positive esteem in the observer. Barth (1969) points to the determination of ethnic identities through the social construction of the *boundaries* between ‘us’ and ‘them’. A sensitive ethnographic account of the management of this boundary between specific ethnic groups would reveal the key ‘criterial attributes’ that are at any time central to the recognition of difference. The benefits of adding to this descriptive account the insights available from the social psychology of inter-
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group relations introduced above are that they reveal the additional dynamic energy and psychological processes that can make ethnic identities such a potent force of collective mobilisation.

Identities are sustained through selective comparison. We expect our in-group comparison of ourselves with ‘those like me’ to confirm our values and behaviour by affirming our mutual positive pleasure in, and commitment to, shared norms. In a complementary way, we expect out-group comparison to confirm our identity by demonstrating that we are different – and glad of it (Brewer and Hewstone, 2004).

Approaching these dynamics of identity the other way round, we can note that it is when members of different ethnic communities interact in negotiating their gender, or age, or class, or belief system that ethnic differences become an issue. It is for this reason that the ‘young Asian male’ or the ‘young Asian female wearing the hijab’ have become such stereotypical benchmarks of difference. It is the ‘perceived’ interpretation of their assertive masculinity that is provocative and their ‘perceived denial’ of femininity that is an awkward contrast to the sensualised majority vision of womanhood.

Where these in-group and out-group comparisons fail to provide us with positive feedback, identities become problematic and vulnerable. In such circumstances we are likely to employ one of a range of strategies. If in-group comparison generates negative feedback, we may exit the group. Thus, where older generations retain a commitment to ethnic values rooted in a homeland that is three generations distant from their grandchildren, then the younger generation may seek to reject this ethnic identity or render it marginal in their daily construction of self. Or, in an act of cultural creativity, they may seek to introduce new criterial attributes into the range of variables that define acceptable ethnic affiliation – as, for example, in the definition of their own musical scene (Hyder, 2004).

If commitment to the Qur’an is a core element of a Bradfordian/Muslim/Pakistani identity, then an older member of the community may express this through an oral tradition of Islamic practice. A member of the new, Bradford-born, Pakistani population may fulfil this same obligation of faith through a textual knowledge of the Qur’an. This may not produce a comfortable in-group dialogue, but what might otherwise be an acute internal rupture of identity may be avoided. Different generations, therefore, find a common vehicle for dialogue within the bounds of their common ethnic identity. As different generations of the same ethnic community seek to make sense of their experience of being ethnic minorities within Britain, their different existential experiences are necessarily reflected within the internal dynamics of continuous ethnic identity formation.
In a comparable manner, where out-group social comparison generates negative feedback, a pressure for change is built up. Where this feedback implies or bluntly asserts the inferiority of minority ethnic values and identity, there is a clear psychological pressure to change. Again, one option is to exit from the maligned group. You may reject your ethnic identity and seek to make more salient in your life other, more rewarding, identities. You may become firmly rooted in your ‘professional identity’ or seek to become aligned to some sub-cultural identity where you can become shielded from your ethnicity by being ‘one-of-the-lads’ or ‘a family man’, and immersing yourself in a limited social milieu that you are better able to control.

However, in a society in which racism is a significant force, your colour may seriously disrupt such exit strategies. In such circumstances, strenuously identifying with the norms of the dominant society while seeking to domesticate and limit your ethnic identity’s penetration into your public life may present itself as a viable option. But the harsh epithet, ‘Coconut’: black on the outside – white on the inside, suggests that this option runs a high chance of failure.

The United States of the 1960s and 1970s provides a classic example of another option that may be more positive in its outcome. A minority group could seek to deny that it possessed the externally defined negative characteristic or, as in Black Power, it could vigorously embrace this characteristic and positively value it precisely because it does separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. For the racist white supremacist, ‘black is beautiful’ was political ju-jitsu. The black minority took the power of the majority group to distinguish their defining feature and, instead of trying to reject this imposition, celebrated it. We can see something of this in Britain’s ‘Pakistani’ communities, as growing Islamophobia has made Islam an increasingly central criterial attribute for younger members of the British-Pakistani population.

These dynamics of the creative negotiation of an ethnic ‘consciousness of kind’ are clearly actively in play in contemporary Bradford. As young men and young women of the second generation of the Bradford-born population work out the gender politics of life in Britain, it is apparent they are creatively generating ‘gendered spaces’ expressed in the language and coded practices of their being Bradfordian Muslims. Much of the dialogue revealed in the interviews recorded in Chapter 3 shows elements of the male responses to the challenge of making sense of gender, age, class, faith and ethnicity of a cohort of young men living in specific communities in the very particular demography and circumstances of contemporary Bradford. The active negotiation of their identities forcefully reminds us that ethnicity is not a fixed property of an individual or group. It is an ever-changing social process.
Ethnic identity and the ‘infrastructure’ of ethnic life

While social psychology has much to offer our understanding of the personal and collective processes involved in sustaining a positive and viable ethnic identity, consciousness of kind is only one aspect of ethnicity. As Wallman (1986) pointed out, and very many anthropological and sociological analyses have revealed, ethnicity cannot be sustained ‘in the head’. We need an environment that will enable us to live our ethnicity through action. We need to be able to express our beliefs and values through specific rituals, and in the everyday mundane routines of our life. We need an infrastructure of resources and institutions that will provide the material and social resources that will enable us to experience our ethnicity through our actions.

For example, where commitment to a particular faith is a criterial attribute of a specific ethnicity, then access to an appropriate place of worship is a necessary element of the ethnic infrastructure. For the Muslim/Pakistani/Bradfordian population, the provision of mosques and madrassahs has over the years evolved to address this need in a very real way. As already noted above, in the early years of migrant settlement in the 1960s, a predominantly male Pakistani community established mosques where people of differing affiliations within Islam would come together to share and sustain their common faith. But, with the increasing expansion of this population, it became financially viable and socially preferable for mosques reflecting specific Islamic practices to emerge (Lewis, 1994). The internal religious differentiation within the Pakistani population, and the complementary regional/ethnic sub-divisions, has become concretely expressed in the distribution of specific mosques over Bradford. In effect, the externally perceived homogeneity of the Pakistani community has over the last few decades become more internally differentiated through the physical distribution of faith communities across the city.

It is worth noting that, while many of these mosques were founded through the revitalisation of existing physical structures, ranging from terrace houses to derelict cinemas, increasingly Bradford has acquired the architectural iconography of Islam through the construction of dedicated mosques built in a ‘traditional’ style. Contrary to the experience of other locations in Britain and Europe (Eade, 1997), in Bradford there has been very little organised resistance to the progressive emergence of these ethnically distinct places of worship.

If the religious dimension of ‘Pakistani’ ethnicity in Bradford has been addressed through the incremental development of dedicated mosques and madrassahs, then other infrastructural elements of ‘Pakistani’ ethnicity have similarly prospered. Across the world, a key issue in the politics of ethnic identity has been the capacity of minority ethnic communities to access media that reflect their culture and interests.
In Bradford, the early immigrants, and now older members of the community, have been succoured by access to a London edition of the Pakistani *Daily Jang*. In more recent years, Britain has seen the growth of an ‘Asian press’ that has actively sought to meet the needs of differing generational and ethnic identities within Britain’s ‘Asian’ communities (Husband, 2002). Additionally, video-cassette technology and, more recently, satellite and cable television have provided access to ‘ethnically appropriate’ visual news and entertainment. For the younger generation, the growth of a distinct and viable sub-culture of ‘Asian’ youth music has provided another medium for addressing the diversity within Bradford’s ‘Pakistani’ community (Hyder, 2004). In sum, the media infrastructure available to the Pakistani population is a reflection of their local, and national, demography providing a sufficient audience to make an economically viable basis for a media diversity that is capable of addressing some of the major sub-cultural audiences defined by age, gender and identity within Bradford’s Pakistani population.

As already noted above, the local, and neighbourhood, demography of this population is also a significant factor in shaping the provision of other infrastructural needs. In terms of dietary prohibition and preference, the infrastructure of local shops and large dedicated supermarkets means there is very little difficulty in accessing the common, and rarer, fundamentals of culinary requirements. The same may be said for the infrastructure guaranteeing a wide range of ethnically appropriate clothing and textiles as well as outlets supplying a stream of ever-expanding popular music genres. While the local health authority is cumulatively building a capacity to respect and respond to ethnic diversity in its client population, it is also the case that Bradford has a number of *hakims*, and at least one distinguished *pir*, who service the Pakistani communities with ‘non-Western’ therapies that are frequently utilised along with more mainstream healthcare provision.

There is a concrete rationale behind presenting this all too brief sketch of the material infrastructure that helps to define and sustain the different combinations of faith, gender, regional origin, age and class that collectively constitute Bradford’s ‘Pakistani community’. It is intended to demonstrate the inadequacy of any attempt to discuss Bradford solely in terms of some abstracted struggle around a ‘politics of identity’. While an appreciation of the social-psychological dynamics of ethnic identity construction is essential, it can only be part of an analysis. Behind the ethnic infrastructure sketched above there lies an all too concrete reality of economic determinism. It is, in many instances, the specific demography of Bradford’s ‘Pakistani population’, and its sub-divisions, that makes possible the resources that sustain them. A critical density of consumers is a necessary basis for a viable political economy of ‘ethnic’ media, retail outlets, health provision and religious
infrastructure. From this perspective, ethnic concentration within conurbations is a foundational basis for a viable infrastructure that is capable of sustaining a current lived ethnicity, rather than a nostalgic and romanticised ossified past. Active citizenship as an aspiration of the current Government requires individuals who are living in the present to negotiate their identities and citizenship with a view to their future coexistence. If government policy has a concern for community cohesion, it must first allow for the possibility of viable communities.

The fetish of segregation

Bradford in general, and the inner-city areas of ‘Pakistani’ residence in particular, have been the subject of a concerted political assault as the perceived ‘self-segregation’ of the ‘Pakistani’ population has received widespread critical attention. Following the riots of 2001 in Bradford and elsewhere in the North West, a series of reports have addressed what they see as the unfortunate consequences of self-segregation (Cantle Report, 2001; Ouseley, 2001; Denham Report, 2002). This was expressed dramatically in the Ouseley Report:

We have focussed on the very worrying drift towards self-segregation, the necessity of arresting and reversing this process … The Bradford District has witnessed growing divisions among its population along race, ethnic, religious and social class lines – and now finds itself in the grip of fear. (Ouseley, 2001, Foreword)

Regrettably for those who would peddle the myth of self-segregation, detailed demographic analysis of Bradford provides a quite different picture. Simpson (2004) provides just such an analysis. His data demonstrate that there is a flow of ‘Pakistani’ people from the inner city, but that this is masked by the natural increase of the remaining population. He sums up his position in these words:

The broad picture that can be painted from these data is one of dispersal of a growing South Asian population from the inner city. This does not result in lower segregation because the inner city South Asian population is ‘refilled’ by natural growth (more births than deaths) and by immigration: there is some movement of South Asian families into the housing of white populations who move from inner-city areas. Thus the index of segregation for Bradford has been stable, but this stability is the balance between several different trends. (Simpson, 2004, p. 674)
This finding for Bradford is consistent with comparable research for elsewhere in Britain. Phillips (2002), for example, has argued that:

Contrary to the popular perception that South Asians, especially in places like Bradford, prefer to self-segregate, we found evidence of the desire for more mixing on the part of all ethnic/religious groups. Almost all respondents who talked about mixing characterised this as a process of Asian integration into ethnically mixed neighbourhoods rather than dispersal to white areas … Movement to the outer areas of Leeds and Bradford was motivated by a better quality of physical environment … better housing … better schools … a safer environment … a more independent lifestyle, away from the sanctions and gossip of the ethnic cluster.


This quotation suggests that, within the South Asian community, there is a willingness to explore a balance between the infrastructural benefits of inner-city demographic concentration and the class-related benefits of moving to more affluent areas. Being the isolated ‘Asian’ in a ‘white ghetto’ does not, however, appear to be a desirable option. The initial logics of settlement, and a preference for extended family cohabitation, are now also being challenged by the generation of young people establishing their own families, who may prefer nuclear family households accompanied by the close proximity of the extended family.

The Bradford in which the young men in this study live is a city that has seen three generations, and more, of people of Pakistani heritage make a life and create quite distinct communities within it. Like the German, the Jewish, the Polish and the Italian immigrants before them they have become distinct communities with the fused components of their ethnic identity and their English/Yorkshire socialisation producing very distinctive local identities. The inner city has, for the majority of these Bradfordians, been the crucible in which they have forged their personal identities and their collective means of maintaining a coherent community presence in the city.

As we have seen above, there is a dynamic relationship between the social-psychological processes of identity formation and maintenance, and the concrete realisation of ethnicity through a supportive ethnic infrastructure. Central to this process is the demographic profile of an ethnic community, which significantly determines its purchasing power in a commercial market of service provision and determines its political leverage in local and national politics. We should be careful not to confuse a current political neurosis with the ‘self-segregation’ of ethnic
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communities with the entirely logical and necessary process of building an ethnic demography capable of creating an appropriate ethnic infrastructure. It would be well to remember that, in Britain, we have a whole profession of people highly paid to facilitate differing orders of segregation – they are called estate agents. Class segregation and its political and social consequences do not, it seems, attract the same political anxiety as ethnic demographies.

The differentness of difference

If the perceived ‘self-segregation’ of minority ethnic communities has become a contemporary political issue, then the specific identity of Bradford’s ‘Pakistani’ community has amplified this concern. There are distinctive features of ‘Pakistani’ identity that have emerged as particularly problematic for some vociferous majority ethnic commentators. A general theme running through much of this style of argument might be seen as Islamophobic. Islamophobia has been identified as a phenomenon that has emerged and become increasingly dispersed through British public debate and consciousness in the last two decades (Parekh, 2006). It is a specific form of ethnocentrism in which the religious identity of Muslims is seen by some members of the majority ethnic community as sufficient to guarantee that Muslims must remain alien to British culture. It is a way of thinking that owes much to Orientalism, a historic package of powerful images and ideas that presented ‘the Orient’ as exotic, incapable of modernisation, irrational and untrustworthy (Said, 1978). In this historical, stereotypical construct, the values and imagery of Islam played a key role in confirming this ‘inevitable’ difference from Christendom.

Importantly for the experiences of the young men in this study, British racism with strong roots in colour prejudice (Husband, 1987) has been complemented by an antipathy to Islam. Put crudely, ‘paki bashing’ has been outflanked by Islamophobia. Racism based on colour, and a colonial vision of Asian identities, has not been eliminated or replaced. Islamophobia has produced a new language, a new package of ‘concerns’, which has enabled the majority community to reject the values and practices of Bradford’s ‘Pakistani’ community. From the perspective of Islamophobia, the internal ethnic distinctions within the ‘Pakistani’ community are irrelevant. It is their common identity as Muslims that makes this population problematic and a cause for anxiety.

As we have already noted above, ethnic identities are constructed around specific criterial attributes, and so it is with Bradford’s ‘Pakistani community’; certain behaviours, beliefs and practices have emerged as the key definers of their difference.
Nationally, internationally and in Bradford, young women wearing the veil are perceived by the majority ethnic communities as making a particularly strong ethnic statement of identity, which some observers choose to interpret as a rejection of ‘British’ values. Continued use of community languages is interpreted as a demonstration of resistance to becoming properly English and as a means of excluding majority understanding. Young ‘Pakistani’ men and ‘their cars’ seem capable of generating visceral resentment and suspicion in specific settings. The empirically accurate perception of the larger family units within this community becomes easily translated into accusations of welfare scrounging as benefits are collected at local post offices. For the ‘Pakistani community’ in Bradford currently, as for other minority ethnic communities historically, specific facets of their culture and demography become lightning conductors for majority hostility.

The untheorised and barely articulate resentments of popular Islamophobia have, in the context of Bradford, an unanticipated, but nonetheless significant, form of support. In the very public expression of the ‘genuine concerns’ of liberal political and academic commentators, the ethnocentric hostilities of popular Islamophobia have found seemingly ‘legitimate’ critiques of Bradford’s ‘Pakistani community’, which have offered support for their perception of Bradford’s Muslim culture as fundamentally flawed.

Part of the problem here is that such commentators are not able to control the media reportage of their utterances. Another part of the problem is that the self-conceived legitimacy of their personal commitment allows them to assertively generate arguments lacking in the balancing qualifications that might have pre-empted some of the misuse of their polemics. For the young men in this study, the real differences between populist Islamophobia and the powerful critiques of ‘concerned liberals’ may, in their effect, be seen as functional equivalents.
2 Methodology – listening and understanding – the challenge of social research

The social sciences have developed an extensive repertoire of research methods and a range of sophisticated languages for analysing the data these methods generate. Quite often the people who are the object of analysis are the least powerful players in this process. In the worst instances, they are regarded by the researchers as lacking the analytic tools and intellectual sophistication that would allow them to accurately describe their circumstances. In other cases, it is the research subject’s view of the world that is valued, but, while attempting to tap into this reality, it is transformed by researchers – through their analysis – into the alien language of social science.

This report is one output drawn from a 21-month qualitative research project that sought to gather and present insights into the lives of ‘ordinary’ young men of Bradfordian Pakistani Muslim heritage. From the outset, indeed, the project’s rationale has hinged around a desire to retain the direct voice of our research subjects. This is not a novel innovation although the means by which this aim has been met are unique and to a large extent rely on the politics, backgrounds and various types of psychological baggage carried by the researchers. This chapter of the report illustrates how personal political and professional attributes have combined, not only to frame the research issues in the first place, but also to have an effect on the means by which data have been generated and subsequently presented. In doing this, we offer discussion of our methodology, including thoughts on research ideology, process and outcomes.

Ethnographic study has a long-established place in the social sciences (Alasuutari, 1998; Denzin, 2001; Roberts, 2002) and, although a concern with everyday consciousness has often been lost in academic analysis, there have been powerful instances where the voice of the actors remains directly accessible. This project was inspired by the work of Studs Terkel. An important and arguably overarching feature of Terkel’s philosophy is the way in which he used himself, not as interpreter, analyst or even social commentator, but instead saw the benefits of acting as a conduit through which the people he interviewed were in effect enabled to speak for themselves. With Terkel’s work, there is a fundamental outcome; the reader is given the opportunity to access that which would otherwise remain hidden. But even Terkel cannot remove himself from the process of identifying the topic to be addressed, the persons to be interviewed and the quotations to be published.
Accessing those who own ‘data’ – in the form of opinions, experiences and stories – is a necessary but varied activity for social researchers of whatever strain. However, what is initially done in accessing and generating data – and indeed what then happens as they are interpreted, analysed, theorised and presented – can become a less than straightforward matter, never devoid of political and ethical considerations. Throughout data-generation processes, things are being done with and to data in isolation of the research subjects. Informed consent, safety from harm and the right to withdraw are all clauses that allow us the benefit of claiming to be practising ethically. We, as the researchers, are working within the norms, conventions and values defined as part of our community of practice as social scientists. Within this context, the practice of acquiring data followed by a layering of social sciences analysis, no matter how thoughtful, sensitive or insight rich, does present something of a conflict – one that is further complicated when more detail is painted into the contextual landscape. We have ‘framed’ the accounts of our participants with an introduction and conclusion they may have influenced, but did not write.

Our awareness of the politics of ‘race research’ has continued to develop through involvement with a number of research projects located within Bradford and elsewhere that have been linked with ethnicity as a defining feature. A further source of insights and encouragement comes through a growing body of literature that aims to deal with the politics and practice of social research. Back and Solomos (1993), for example, make vital contributions to the discourse of not only the debates surrounding ‘partisan’ research (see Hammersley, 2000) but also the wider world of social research practice itself. Back and Solomos (1993, p. 197) are likely to see social research itself as a political tool through which social change can be instigated. While exploring the theory and practice of feminist research, Letherby’s (2003) treatment of various subject matters – including power, authority and ethics – has a great deal of resonance with our experience and philosophy. In particular, her concern with ‘the process and the product’ (Letherby, 2003, p. 3) tallies with our own in as much as we have aimed to ensure our data emerged due to a particular, but evolving, set of research processes. In developing this research we were acutely aware of the long history of Bradfordian/Pakistani communities as objects of social research and political commentary.

In venues where there is a historical memory of research activity having taken place over whatever length of time – and inner-city Bradford is certainly one of these – the idea of research is much more pronounced and refined. Psychological, ideological and even imagined barriers between researcher and the researched hinge essentially on what the idea of ‘research’ connotes. Given this fact of research life, a near tacit objective of our methodological stance was to help redefine the idea of research within the minds of those we encountered as initially potential and later
actual research subjects. Principally, this involved deconstructing traditional models of research activity for the purpose of formulating an alternative model, which addresses power relations within research, the utility of outcomes and the audience to which research outputs present themselves. The ambition underlying this was a hope of seeing/hearing data that have a greater capacity to claim not only authenticity but also integrity and validity. Validity in this sense is not just about how the data are produced but refers to the extent to which – ultimately – silences are disrupted through voices being heard.

Doing research, to whatever extent, exploits. For the research subject, privacy is invaded, some degree of intrusion into and interruption of life occurs and ‘data’ are accessed for the purposes of academic activity. Of course, research subjects may well consent to all this. As researchers, we are eager to practise according to our belief that research is a privilege, not a right. However, relationships that arise because of a research event or project have the added burden (or benefit) of a pre-existing, normative set of general rules and values that help define both practice and practitioners. Potential research subjects without any knowledge and especially experience of ‘research’ are just as liable to succumb to these latent pressures as those who are in the throes of research fatigue.

Typically, research subjects receive information that is essentially geared to helping them make an informed decision about their participation. But, at the same time, they are given the chance to ask questions, to opt in or out, or simply to consider further the offer of participation. While the relationship between researcher and subject is in its early stages, and before any ‘new’ knowledge is generated, interactions and decision-making capacities are subject to existing ideas about power relations within research. These ideas continue to help define and develop the dynamics of ‘research relations’ as they work through whatever processes are put in place. Traditionally, ‘getting in/getting on/getting out’ (see Darlington and Scott, 2002, p. 39) fairly accurately describes what the researcher needs to do in order to end up with enough data from which to draw analysis and conclusions. We locate and access potential subjects who we may co-opt into the project. These subjects are then mined for data. Once this activity has been fulfilled, the research relationship can either end or mutate into a longer-term acquaintance – or, in some cases, friendship.

The description offered above can and perhaps ought to be viewed as a rather brutal, perhaps even exaggerated and unfair, depiction of research practice. Regardless of which approach it happens to be couched in, research of a social nature cannot be detached from its dependency on the research subject – a fact that relates directly to the rationale underpinning this project. Our research rationale started from a preparedness on the part of the researcher to be open and usually
critical about prevailing research practice and ideology. Additionally, at the point of engaging potential research subjects, the shared biographical identities of researched and researcher were explicitly relevant. Empathy through identity is not only an obvious strategy, it is also a naturally occurring one. Research literature and research experience suggest the researcher’s personality and biography can either make or break an interaction:

... the researcher is not neutral, distant or emotionally uninvolved ... The researcher’s empathy, sensitivity, humor, and sincerity are important tools for the research. The researcher is asking for a lot of openness from the interviews; he or she is unlikely to get that openness from being closed and impersonal.

(Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 12)

Establishing trust played a vital systemic role in our research process – if people trust you, they are more likely to paint a broader but at the same time more detailed picture about themselves. Trust therefore leads to greater disclosure, which signals higher validity of data. How trust is established and cultivated again relies on the researcher’s identity – personality, politics, cultural background and so on. Trust is especially significant if we are aware of, wish to acknowledge and then respond to the power imbalances between the researcher and the subject. Rubin and Rubin (1995) go into some depth around the idea of ‘listening, hearing and sharing social experiences’ (pp. 1–16) and, while doing so, explore the utility of treating research participants as ‘conversational partners’ as opposed to more passive ‘objects of research’ (pp. 10–12).

There is no doubt that, especially in qualitative research, this kind of approach that seeks to install a sense and practice of equity is not only fruitful, as it may well help unearth more valid data, but is also an ethically sound basis on which to conduct research. In this project, practices that sought to equalise the research relationship were employed reasonably consistently and, we like to think, to good effect. In the early to middle stages of the fieldwork, for example, sessions where the researcher more or less ‘hung around’ were ends unto themselves. If conversation happened, it happened and, if not, then the researcher made the most of the venue, which could have been a pool hall, sports centre, restaurant, takeaway, car, the researcher’s/subject’s living room or, indeed, place of work.

Despite issues and ideas that help frame and then develop relationships between researcher and researched, within this project, there are some relationships that have lived on beyond the scope of the project and, indeed, have developed into more than mere acquaintanceships. This has become an interesting aspect of personal and professional life, albeit a challenging one to conceptualise. Of course, we may have work colleagues and clients who come to be friends but those are
often relationships that form ‘naturally’ and without any agenda or specific purpose – other than a desire to get on, be friendly or make friends. Setting out to make friends through the vehicle of research is perhaps a contradiction in terms. With our project, the idea wasn’t exactly ‘to make friends’ but establishing a fairly close relationship was vital. How this played out in practice varied according to the individuals. In some cases, the frequency of interaction became regular (a weekly game of five-a-side football), while, with others, meeting up could depend on need (being needed to give a lift). It’s worthwhile noting that the absence of a traditional exit strategy was a half-anticipated consequence of our overall fieldwork approach – not an end unto itself, nor was it something we had particularly planned for. In itself, this is neither problematic nor of particular benefit to the project, but it does suggest the thinking behind the routines that we employed in order to gain trust – which would in turn help elicit frankness, depth and scope of narratives – has been fruitful.

In entering into this research, the persona of the two researchers has been an explicit ethical, methodological and personal issue. M. Y. Alam is a Bradford-born member of the community that is the focus of the research. He is a peer of those who have participated in the research. He has an ‘insider’s’ credentials, insight and communicative facility in building a relationship between the researcher and researched. But he is not a representative of this ethnic population, which is itself internally fragmented. This is a conflictual research role that has its own acknowledged problems.

As a majority ethnic, white professor of social analysis, Charles Husband explicitly makes no claims of ethnic insider status. On the contrary, as an ethnic ‘outsider’ and an academic, he carried different problematics into this research. From the outset it was decided that he would play no direct part in the interview process. Additionally, as the interviews accumulated, he became a sounding board in the determination of the themes, rather than an originator of them. The existential interpersonal dynamic that was present in the collection of the interview data was recognised and respected as having continued relevance in our shared understanding of the transcribed tapes.

In identifying the research participants, a framework of expectations shaped the recruitment process. There was a clear wish to have geographical dispersal of participants so that the peculiarities of one community and one locale would not limit the experiences that were tapped. Early in the research process a decision was taken to extend the age range of participants into the mid-to-late thirties because generational differences, even over a seemingly narrow age range, became a significant issue. Additionally, a diversity of techniques was employed in approaching and rejecting potential participants. In recruiting the participants it was explicit from
the beginning that the resources and method of this project would not allow even a thin variation on a representative sample of the target population to be generated. However, diversity was a reasonable aspiration.

While we will in a companion publication be able to present the accounts of each young man in a more continuous way, here we have selected and focused their experiences and opinions around common linking themes. We the researchers have identified these themes and selected the illustrative quotations. In doing this we are only touching the unique way in which these issues were linked, or left hanging loose, in the accounts of each participant. But, in drawing out these themes, we hope that the distinctive individuality of each respondent can still be sensed as they express their distinctive view. The themes and the statements expressed within and across them provide a particular form of data. It invites you, the reader, to have access to facets of the world view of these young men. It invites you to make the imaginative connections that will allow you to develop insight into how these young men make sense of their world. In giving us, the researchers, access to their lives, and permission to directly quote their words, they have had no guarantee that we can control how you, the reader, will interpret them.
3 Revealing the participants’ voice

This chapter of the report relies principally on segments that have been drawn from interview transcripts with our research subjects. This is complemented with limited though necessary commentary. The decision to take a near hands-off approach with regard to presenting, and especially attempting to interpret, data fits in with our overarching research idea – that of aiming to ensure our research subjects maintain a significant presence in the report.

From the outset, our purpose has been to produce a research report that is framed around the views of our sample – members of a demographic population that continues to remain visible in public, academic and policy discourse. Research subjects, across the board, are articulate about themselves, those around them and their take on the world. For us it is important to acknowledge and respond to this reality. Making sense of the world around us is not a monopoly held by academia; as individuals, we have agency, but in the world of social research it is all too easy, perhaps even an expectation, to hand this over to those with expertise and licence. In themselves, these are not ground-breaking assertions to make. However, they do sit very comfortably with a research philosophy that places great value on the voice of the researched.

The chapter is broken down into four sections, each covering a range of themes including masculinity, work, religion, heritage and locale. The segments of transcript, loosely held together with thematic threads, are taken from unstructured and semi-structured interviews that took place over approximately 21 months’ worth of fieldwork, a process that included accessing gatekeepers, developing networks, scoping out, shadowing subjects and periods of formal interviewing.

The original empirical basis of this project was to recruit 20 research subjects matching the following criteria: male, British-born Pakistani Muslims, aged between 16 and 25, and living in one of two neighbourhoods. However, it became apparent fairly early on that a broadening of the age range and locales could be advantageous to the project and so the age range was increased to 38 and recruitment became city wide. This broadening was useful for two reasons. First, increasing the age range meant we had, by default, opened up the research to include some generational diversity, which in turn yielded a wider and more interesting range of data. Second, and pragmatically, recruitment and retention of research subjects became a much less burdensome and time-consuming facet of the research. Furthermore, locating subjects in two locales, which were in theory defined along socio-economic lines, became highly complex and burdensome as an operational issue. While a locale, on
paper and according to statistical evidence, may appear to be suffering from various indices of deprivation, attempting to locate individuals within that locale who 'represent' its distinctive features is highly problematic. Any social measurement about any locale is an aggregate; individuals are not.

In total, over 40 research subjects were recruited through a range of sampling techniques and strategies, which were purposive in the early phases but a much more random and opportunistic strategy became employed as the project developed. On account of an acceptably high drop-out rate (fatigue, relocation, withdrawal and loss of contact), the final number of research subjects who have contributed directly to this report is 25. Since the method was based on building trust and accessing the respondents' views over an extended period of time, anyone who withdrew from the project at an earlier stage, for whatever reason, was not used in the sample.

The technique of employing themes as a means of framing data is useful and appropriate, as it allows for the voice of the research subjects to remain a core feature. The lines of distinction between themes, however, are in some cases broad and permeable. Indeed, rather than using a greater range of much more descriptive headings in order to break up and organise this chapter, we have employed a less concrete and more flexible approach, which helps account for a multitude of themes that can crop up in even a single utterance.

Each section is introduced and some of the issues within are briefly discussed.

**Comfort zone**

One of the most striking, but perhaps with hindsight not so surprising, findings that became apparent early on in the course of the project was and is the extent to which our sample enjoyed the idea and reality of living in Bradford. Given the range of existing research and commentary about the city, the social and economic deprivations and disadvantages suffered by many of its citizens across the board, this finding is still refreshingly optimistic and in some ways is an alternative to the prevailing, mostly external, perceptions of the city.

This section explores sense of belonging and attachment to the local neighbourhood, the region and, indeed, to Britain. However, there is by no means a universal feeling about this; each of the segments is a viewpoint that can conflict or complement what comes before or after it. There are, for example, segments that are reflective of identity and belonging that bring in wider questions of Britishness, as well as how cultural background and heritage is or is not relevant. For most, however, it is
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Bradford and the immediate neighbourhood that comes to be such an important facet of identity; in some cases, the environment – complete with a richness of narrative, politics and memory – is more than a place where home happens to be. For many, Bradford, despite suffering from several well-acknowledged problems (including the impact of drugs, what is perceived to be unfair policing practice, educational underachievement), remains and will continue to be a positive and integrated part of life.

I've never lied. I tell them I'm from Bradford. They're always saying: 'It's a shit hole', but they've heard it from somebody else. They haven't lived or been in Bradford. There are very few whites here in West Bowling. You talk to them and they don't have a problem living in Bradford. But if you talk to a white person that doesn't live in Bradford, it's bad; not a nice area. I've got a few white friends and quite a few Afro-Caribbean friends. I don't have a problem, and I don't think a lot of Asians have a problem, but it's what people make out: 'They don't get on with white people', or 'white people won't get on with Asians'.

(AA)

Some people support a footy team, I support what's around me. Bradford's my city, Undercliffe is my own backyard. I can't see myself leaving here for anywhere else. A lot of people do move out, though. White people – rich white people and rich Asians – they escape to nice, posher places. Like my uncle and his family, they lived next door to us for years but even they moved out to Thornton last year. My cousin, my uncle's son, he got sorted with a nice computering job so they decided to move. Nicer but smaller house. I suppose that's bound to happen: earn more, want more.

(RAZ)

For me, Bradford and this area – Manningham – is the zone. You can't beat it. I know I'm only saying that because I live here but that's what it is to me – it's home and it's where my heart is. I know I couldn't live in Pakistan. Couldn't live anywhere else, either. I wouldn't move for anything. I know it's sort of selfish, but I really should be thinking about moving out of the town altogether. I can't see things getting better for my son and for schools, that's the only reason, really. I want him to do well. Even a crap school will do its best but I don't want to take that chance. With me it's too late but my son, he's still got time.

(YAS)
Leeds Road, it’s more traditional, like back home, like Pakistan. If you live in a village, everyone knows everyone else. They come up to your house, you go to theirs, they have time for you; it’s at that level. Where I live now, everything’s a bit more spaced out, more of a boundary. Me, in my street, hardly anybody knows me. At first I used to think it was security but it’s not, you’re more secure in an environment where everyone knows each other. So if your house got robbed the chances are somebody would see it or do something about it. Stuff like drugs and kids messing about on the streets, you don’t get so much of that in my area; you don’t have it to the same extent as you do there. I don’t know why it’s different because you’ve got the same people, the same communities but living in different areas.

(KR)

I live in Marshfields, Little Horton ward. West Bowling is on the other side of the road. The neighbourhood round here is brilliant for us who live here. This is my home, I’d struggle to move out of here. I’ve got a takeaway next door to me, on the other side I’ve got a newsagent’s, I’ve got a chip shop, a video shop, a butcher’s round the corner, Morrisons five minutes up the road. We run off each other. I buy chicken and chips off a Pakistani, I go and get my hair cut from an Asian guy – he relies on me. I’ve got a mosque, one a hundred yards there, and another one a hundred yards in front of me – you can’t go wrong. All the family, all friends and everything, you don’t even have to be home and you know your house is safe with everybody around you. When we moved in here, I think there was only about two or three Pakistanis around in this area. Now probably there’s only about two or three goray left. I’m talking over 500 houses now. People get better off, they try to move out or try to have a change.

(CB)

I don’t have a lot of respect for lads in Bradford. If you go anywhere and say you’re from Keighley, they laugh at you. When you go to football tournaments and you come up against a team from Bradford you know for a fact that if you start with one you’re going to have 300 coming down. I stay away, I don’t have owt to do with it. I can’t do with the tracky bottoms with Rockport shoes.

(SG)
The place, the reputation that has been ruined all over the world, is Manningham. Manningham isn’t half as bad as what people make it out to be. Look at Buttershaw, look at flipping Wibsey, at Ravenscliffe. I wouldn’t let my cat walk through Ravenscliffe because I know he wouldn’t come back out. Look at Eccleshill – supposed to be a good area – look at the state of that. Thackley, Windhill, Shipley, all supposed to be good areas. What’s good about them? I know what they’re really like, but they don’t get media priority. (SB)

I were born here but I don’t belong. I don’t feel like I belong like some people feel they belong. I don’t belong to Pakistan, either. I never been to Pakistan so how can I belong to it? I’m more at home here than anywhere else because this is the only place I know but I don’t belong here like I’d belong to a club or like a clique. When I say I don’t belong here, it’s not me that says that; it’s not down to me. I might want to belong but that doesn’t mean people will let me. When we say British, you think white people. You’re still not made to feel it, that you’re a part of it all – being British. I’m an outsider. We’re outsiders. I don’t want to say we’re left out or no one likes us or anything like that but we’re like aliens from another planet. Some people treat us or see us that way and we might as well be. (SJA)

The benefit of Bradford is that everything’s at hand. You’ve lived here all your life, you know people, you feel comfortable. A small close-knit community – even if you farted they know you farted. You don’t have to tell anyone anything, they’ll find out anyway. (AS)

For the first time I actually felt, ‘I love that place’. Not just Bradford but UK – Britain – as a whole. My mates, when they’ve gone abroad, they always say they’re from Leeds, not from Bradford. It sort of pisses me off. What’s Leeds? You live in Bradford. I got back: *Customs – Nothing to Declare*. The guy here, the Customs guy, he comes up to me, and the way he addressed me, I just felt like kissing him. The guy, he goes: ‘Excuse me, mate? Are you alright? Have you had a nice holiday? Are you travelling on your own?’ I actually felt good. The guy’s asked me nicely. I had more than enough cigs, I’d lots of DVDs and that, I even had some display Samurai swords. I didn’t think they’d get through. He put them through,
and I think in the end he was so relieved that I didn’t have drugs on me – the guy’s clean – that he actually let everything go. He just said, ‘I’ll let them go, it’s your property but the police might have a problem with it’. I just wanted to hug the guy.

(IH)

I remember talking to this solicitor once. He said, ‘What do you classify yourself as? Think about this carefully. Tell me what you think you are. Are you British? Are you Pakistani? Are you British Muslim? What are you? Are you somebody who doesn’t want nothing to do with Britain?’

I didn’t really think about it. ‘There’s two things here’, I said. ‘I was born and bred in this country, I’ve lived here all my life. Where you’re born, that’s the country you grow to like. I’ve also been going to Pakistan to study my roots and where I’m from. If I was to live in Pakistan for eight months I’d miss England, because this is what I’ve known. This is my country. But you can’t forget your roots. That’s where my parents are from, that’s where my background is.’

So this guy, the solicitor, he turns round and says to me, ‘Yeah, but how long will that last?’

I said, ‘I can’t guarantee anything. That’s not in my hands.’

It’s up to the parents. I’ve got three kids and I wouldn’t want them to forget their roots. They are born in this country and this is their country, there’s no doubt about that. I’d say you’re still a Pakistani. It’s the roots, it’s part of your heritage, it’s part of what you are. You should not forget what you are and who you are. When you miss those lines, that’s when you don’t know.

(AC)

Am I British? I’ve asked myself that enough times. Am I British? I think I am. When I was younger, teenage years, it was different. As you get older, you change. You grow for the better, you like to think. When you’re younger, everything’s a problem if you’re a rebel. I used to be a rebel so I rebelled against everything: especially about being British. Being British? No way. But now it’s different. I’ve been around a bit longer. Might have got a bit wiser.

(ZH)
British-Pakistani men from Bradford

Same difference

This section can be viewed as an extension of the themes above. Again, a sense of belonging is apparent. Some of this is couched in the everyday – the moments that help us realise who we are through seeing what we are not. As much as we learn who we are by being with others, it is through the differences we notice that will help us identify our selves. Being settled, being Bradfordian, being British, being Pakistani, being young, being married, being a father, being a son. Once again, it's the being here, however, that seems to be the thing that keeps it all together.

Many segments are authored by individuals who see themselves as stakeholders, not only as members of particular communities (locale as much as culture oriented), but also as operational and active members of civic society. References to crime and criminality – the threats posed by the drugs trade at the heart of this – reinforce the notion that our sample not only are deeply aware of and sensitive to the various aspects of key debates, but also get to see them day in, day out.

You’ve got drug dealers flying up and down streets at two or three o’clock in the morning. Then you’ve got people coming down on pills, got the music on six o’clock in the morning. I don’t give a monkey’s chuff! I’ve been banging on doors saying, ‘Get out or I’ll break his legs! I’ve got nieces and nephews in my house. I’m going to drag you in my house and you’re going to rock them to sleep because I aren’t doing it!’

(SG)

The difference is now we’re settled here so we’re alright to spend it as well. My dad sends money back to the family in Pakistan and we just have this sort of big family pot. We don’t really have my money and his money – we all sort of contribute to everything. In effect we all end up sending money back to Pakistan. As long as my dad’s alive we don’t really have a choice. I wouldn’t send it back if it was up to me because they’re not worthy of it. If something happened to one of my friends, I’d feel more hurt or emotionally upset than I would if my cousin died in Pakistan. We don’t know them. You don’t know them by saying, ‘He’s my cousin’.

(AS)

My dad’s still got it in his head that he’s gonna go back or we’re gonna go back at some stage. When he says that or goes on about the houses he’s built in Pakistan, I think, ‘Yeah, Dad. Sure – keep dreaming’. 
The only way I’ll ever go back to live for good to Pakistan is if I’m kicked out of this country. Daft as it sounds, it might happen. You never know. Before, that wasn’t even on my mind but all this 9/11 has really put pressure on us, not because we’re Pakistani, but as Muslims. Government’s always questioning everything we do, these days. What goes on in mosques, in homes, in schools – everywhere. It’s like us, as Muslims, we’re Public Enemy Number One. It gets to you. It’s bound to get to you. You try to shrug it off but it keeps coming back at you, keeps getting worse.

(YAS)

I’m going through Customs and I’m trekking these DVDs. I say they are for myself and for my mates, gifts and stuff like that. They won’t let me go. I go: ‘You deal with this however you want to deal with it, yeah’.

He goes, ‘Thhree pownd’.

I said: ‘We earn it as well. If you wanted, you could just let me go right now. It won’t mean fuck-all to you. You’re just using this to bully me.’

I ended up giving him money. He goes: ‘I’m not going to have any problem ahead’.

Next man stops me. I give him some money.

A third guy stopped me. I just blew up. I’d just had it to there with everything going on at home: proper fired up. I just flipped on him. I started saying: ‘You let goray go. In that country, I get the same shit – they get treated better than I do. Why do you think that people don’t like this country? It’s because of fuckers like you.’

(IH)

Cabbing’s something easy, something that you can do. It’s too easy for me not to do it. I want to do something else but then I think, ‘There’s nothing that I can do’. Taxiing to me – easy money. If somebody says to me, ‘What are you doing these days?’ And I say, ‘Taxi’, they look and me and think – they look like, ‘Oops! I didn’t mean to ask’. They’re thinking, ‘You’re a taxi driver’, and I’m thinking, ‘Yeah, I know you’re thinking that I’m a taxi driver but you don’t know. You – don’t – know. I’m not what you think. You don’t know what I know. You think I’m a taxi driver but I’m not daft. I work four hours a day, I’ve no stress. You might be a businessman
or whatever, you might be clocking it but I might be making just as much as you sat on my arse in a car. I’ve got an easy life. I do what I want.’

(TH)

I’ve been to Pakistan three or four times. The first time, I went when my sister got married. The second time, I enjoyed myself. I went because my mates went and we had a right laugh. That time we went just for a doss around. I was only home for about two or three days. For about six weeks, I had the time of my life. Following that I went because my dad wanted to build some houses, for whenever he goes. He can’t go no more, he’s poorly now. The houses, they’re just there. No nothing, just locked up, they’re not even fully completed yet. Going to Pakistan is like going to visit family. Never mind visiting family there, I don’t like visiting family here. If you come from a big family, people are buzzing around you. If you went to Europe, nobody knows who you are, you do whatever you want to do, you can be yourself, nobody’s interested in you. Friends, I don’t mind, because they’re neutral. Family friends are a lot better than relatives.

(CB)

There is a difference between Keighley and Bradford in the aapnay³ attitudes. For example, when you go to Bradford, us lot, we see someone we know, we shake hands: Asalamoalaikum–Walaikumsalaam.⁴ Respect and everything. When aapnay come from out of town to Keighley and that, they don’t get no Salaams, no nothing. I’ve got a lot of mates in Bradford and it’s probably different, their way of thinking. It’s maybe because, all the time, they’re aapnay; full-stop. In Bradford they’re always aapnay – 24/7.

(YK)

A drug dealer, he’s not just going to mess himself up. He sells to ten people in a day. It’s messing ten people up as well. In West Bowling there’s a lot of that. A lot of people make out that the guy who’s selling drugs is not doing wrong. It’s got to such a stage that they say it’s the police who are doing wrong for locking them up. That’s the mentality now – a drug dealer is right for selling drugs, but the police are wrong for setting him up. You sit there and they’re talking and they say, ‘Oh, did you hear what happened to Imran? It was bad news when the police set him up and he got caught with heroin and £50,000. Look how bad it was, man. He’s got locked up for nine years. I hate the police, Imran never did anything. Imran’s a good guy.’ And I sit there and I think listen to what you’re saying. Imran isn’t that good a guy because he’s selling seven kilos of heroin in West Bowling and he’s
got £50,000 cash. Where’s that seven kilos going to go? Someone’s going to take it. It’s not just going to disappear. (MET)

All of us used to live together in these streets: my dad and three brothers. All the family used to live in one house. When we were younger we used to hang around together, do our own little thing, sports, snooker. We never used to get in trouble. Nowadays kids of sixteen/seventeen: chest out, bodies out, big-timers walking around the streets about six or seven of them together. When you look at them, you think ‘Come on, man. Just chill out.’ I had mates but they weren’t like that. These guys, they have one dog. Let it loose in the park, get a buzz out of that. Idiots. When they see a gora: ‘You white this, you white that’. Seventeen/eighteen years olds acting big in front of their mates, big time: ‘What are you looking at? Are you looking at me? I’ll sort you out. I’ll do this to you, I’ll do that to you.’ The gora’s there on his own, and he’s saying: ‘No, no, no, look sorry’. I’ve seen it a few times on Oak Lane. It calms down but what’s going on there?

I moved up near the B R I.5 Nice and quiet. Your own garden, privacy, do what you like. You’ve got your own drive. You can’t leave your car outside in these streets. There’s glass from windows getting smashed up, cars getting nicked. The other day there was some guy on Victor Road. His van was on a recovery truck. Overnight someone burned it down. (TT)

There was this proper clown. I don’t know who he was, where he’d come from. For me this was just some idiot. He walks past me, wearing one of those bandanas around his face, over his mouth like a mask, shouting ‘Jihad!’ That’s what he was shouting: ‘Jihad!’ I just looked at him and I thought I bet you don’t even know what that means. A mate of mine, he was really angry about it and he was shouting at all these people, ‘You sons of bitches! Why are you calling us Jihadis!?’ (KA)

I have relatives but I don’t know them like I know my mates. Biradari to me means nothing. I know what it is but it’s not important to me, doesn’t make any difference because I don’t see the world that way. People like my dad, for them it’s important because it’s about who you are. Who you are is who you know and a lot of the ones you know are in your biradari. For me, who I am is who I know as well. I know my friends and I still know...
my family even though they might not want to know me. Us lot, my mates and that, we don’t even mention biradari. Take for example your dad talking to someone and, you know, the word might pop in conversation somewhere, ‘Oh, so and so, he’s our biradari na bandah6 or ‘no, they’re not our biradari’. But us lot, when we’re talking, we’ll say he’s from over Leeds Road way, or from Manningham, or he knows or flexes with someone that we know. That’s how we know who someone is. If I ever said it – ‘Which biradari is he in?’ – my mates, they’d think I’d gone a bit mental.

(KES)

Five-O’s7 worse. Nothing hidden or clever or sly going on there. With teachers and normal people, they try to hide it, disguise it. They might hate your guts, but still they’ll be nice to your face. If you go into a shop or a business or a bank or something, it’s Sir this and Sir that, please, thank you. But them, they don’t even try to hide it. They don’t have to because they got back-up – they’re the law and what they say goes, no questions asked. Some of them are like proper racist: pakistani, pakistani. One even swore at me once just while he was talking to me – just like in normal sort of conversation. ‘Where are you coming from?’

And I said, ‘From school’, because I was.

Then he gives it to me. ‘Oh yeah? What’s a black bastard like you doing in school? How come you’re not out dealing?’

(SJA)

On this programme – Calendar News – there’s this buddee,8 coming out with it, ‘Oh, you can’t walk into some areas’. That’s a load of crap. There’s loads of white people working in our area; they never get grief, they never get trouble. Those ‘no go’ areas, it’s just crap. One white guy probably got beat up for probably coming out with something stupid, or said summat wrong to someone, and that’s it. One goree on there lives in our area, she buys stuff from aapnay, she’s mingling with aapnay all the time, and then she’s got the cheek to say all this stuff about aapnay: they’re like this and they’re like that. That’s politics, that’s what it comes down to. Good news: bad news obviously for us.

(YK)
Changes

Despite some overlap with the previous sections, awareness of social change is a thread that runs throughout this section in particular. There is a clear shift in attitudes towards Pakistani culture as practised by older generations, which is manifest in the evolutions within partnering (and separating) strategies. Arguments for discontinuing remittance payments and transnational marriages are made by some, while others also consider generational differences amongst British-born Pakistanis. There is also interesting argument and analysis which brings in conspicuous consumption as a feature that is symptomatic of changes taking place. People send less money to Pakistan, which means they have more to spend here.

It’s safe for me because all the drug dealers and all the gangsters are my schoolmates from when we were younger. They’re everywhere, man. It bothers me because I live there. My little cousins, and maybe one day my kids, are going to live there. I’m not confident that is going to die out, it seems like it’s getting stronger and stronger at the moment. It’s the money thing, definitely. It’s a culture thing as well, being cool. Fifteen/sixteen year olds, they’re all in that culture where they’re just smoking weed, that’s all they’re doing. Even myself, when it comes to a gig or something like that, I might do a bit, half a joint or something like that. I’m not reliant on it, not addicted to it. It’s not something I enjoy doing all the time. The thing is, it’s something what’s become a part of their life. When they wake up they’re thinking, ‘Okay, tonight we need to make a raise’. A raise as in raise some cash. Then the next thing you do you go and buy your beer, and then you sit round and get smoked out until you’re dropping, and then you go home.

(IH)

My brother and his missus, they’re fond of each other, got kids and a good life together. But, if it were me, I wouldn’t take the chance. That’s why I’m not married, yet. They’ve tried, my mum and my dad, to find someone for me, but I know I’m not ready. I says to my mum: ‘Look, Mum. Me, I can’t look after myself, how am I supposed to look after someone else?’

She gives it, ‘Give over, everyone says that. Even your brother said that when he got married.’

Then I said to her, ‘Yeah but, with him, he had no choice, did he? You made him get married. Can’t do that to me, cos you know what’ll happen!’
Meaning I’ll do a runner on them! I said it jokingly but she sort of knows I’m being serious as well. I don’t believe in that. It’s not right. Even my dad’s on my side. These days, even he has a go at people whose kids or whatever are getting divorced, giving it, *it’s their own fault*. Because, nine times out of ten, it’s because they were forced in the first place. If they hadn’t been forced, they wouldn’t be getting divorced now. Divorce can happen to anyone who gets married, I suppose, but when you force someone, you’re asking for trouble.

(RAZ)

I’ve no time for parents who force their kids. This one guy, I’ve known him all my life, come to me and goes, ‘I’ve met this lass. I’ve not gone out with her or anything, I’ve just talked to her. She’s my cousin, so it’s not as though I’m breaking their tradition. Will you talk to my dad? My big brother won’t help me.’

But no, because his mum and dad didn’t choose her, he couldn’t. So he said, ‘I’m not getting married then. I’ve met somebody I like who likes me, we’ve got a chance of having a life together. How can they stop us from being happy?’

I sat him down and I said, ‘Right, fella, this is what’s going on in my life. Do you want to be like me? You go home and you tell your big brother get a spine and go and talk to them. And if he hasn’t got one, call me and I’ll go.’

(SG)

My dad’s done whatever he’s done for them but we’re his family. We feel upset that he’ll bend backwards to see they’re Okay. To them, their uncle — their *mawa*[^1] — or whatever he is to them, he doesn’t mean owt. As long as he keeps sending them money. And when he doesn’t send them anything it’s: ‘What have you ever done for us?’ That story goes with all of us. They’ve all built houses back home and propped their brothers and mothers and sisters and uncles and aunts, but they all piss on them in the end. We won’t have no regrets like that. We don’t want to take that privilege away from him. Dad’s lived his life, he’s given us a good upbringing and that, and if he feels happy by helping his family then who are we? Why should we say anything? It’s not as if he’s saying, ‘Give me your money; I’ll send your money’. He’s paid his dues, he’s paid his taxes and he gets his own pension or whatever. Because he’s living with us brothers he’s got no expenditure. So, whether he wants to send £5,000 or

[^1]: *mawa* is a term used in some South Asian communities to refer to an uncle. It can have different meanings depending on the context.
£20,000, he doesn’t need to explain himself. And it’s Okay: ‘But the day you go, the day you go, that’s it: we won’t be sending nothing’.

(AS)

People have gone back to Pakistan and married there, whether it’s a male or a female, and their marriage is successful. As long as there’s compatibility between the two people, fair enough. I got married a couple of years ago. I wanted to get married and I wanted a partner who I could spend my life with. She’s from here, down South, within the family. My wife had to be compatible to me. I knew my wife as a teenager, as a relative and a cousin. So, when the prospect came up, it wasn’t as daunting. I actually knew some of her background and stuff. So that was a positive for me.

(WI)

Kids don’t have language as a problem any more. They’re born speaking English. It’s everywhere, all around them so it comes naturally. Take my kids, all three of them speak perfect English; better than I speak it and better than they speak our own language. With me they speak English but with their mum, it’s all in Pakistani. Best of both worlds. I think there’s no point in learning Urdu as a written language – what use is it? Everyone uses English nowadays, even in Pakistan. My wife, she can read and write it because that’s how she was schooled in Pakistan but, over here, there’s no call for it that I can see. I’m not saying it’s not a good thing – it’s good to learn any language in that way, but, in this country especially, something like Urdu is looked at differently to French, Spanish or Russian. It’s seen as not as a valuable thing. I still want them to speak Punjabi so they can communicate with their elders: a bit of wisdom won’t harm them. It’s another language and it’s about their parents and about themselves, in a way.

(ZH)

Back home, when a son is born they say, ‘My child is going to go to England’. Get on a plane and come over here, and they try to live their lives. Back home mangaythurs¹⁰ don’t work. When they have to go and clean chickens’ arses out at a poultry farm they think, ‘This isn’t what we were promised. Money growing on trees, and honey flowing out of taps and stuff. I didn’t know this was going to happen!’ They think these streets are paved with gold. And here it’s not like that: you work hard for your money, it’s hard graft. Maybe after ten years they get to appreciate the fact: it’s not easy living here. I’ve known mangaythurs that have been
here for over ten years. When they go back, even mangaythurs have problems living over there, because they’ve picked up from us.

(CB)

Life’s so cheap there and, if you’re at the bottom, there’s nothing for you except family, if you have any, and charity if you’re lucky. Seeing Pakistan makes you appreciate what you’ve got here. Here, we want for nothing. Even if you’ve got nothing, there’s someone or some service that you can rely on. That’s why I want my kids to go there – to see a poor country and to see how hard it is and for them to appreciate how easy and good they’ve got it here. There’s that part and I want them to learn a bit about their culture; their other culture. It’s about your roots. To know where you’re going in life, you should know where you’ve come from. It’s not the most important thing but that place is part of us and this place is part of us.

(ZH)

You do see a lot of Asian young lads driving nice cars. It’s their own personal choice: they’ve worked hard, they’ve earned. It’s like my friend who’s a workaholic: he’s earned his money and he’s got a beautiful car, a brand new M3 he’s paid 40 grand for. My mate’s paid 45 for his O2 model: beautiful silver M3. He’s worked hard for a living and he still gets called a dealer because he’s driving an expensive car. There are a lot of young lads in Keighley that have got successful businesses, that drive nice flash cars: still get classed as dealers.

(YK)

Kids have nowhere to go. We used to have a massive park – they’ve built over it. Kids in the street, who do they look up to? They look up to people driving past in flash cars who pull up and say, ‘Alright how you doin’?’ He’s only saying ‘Alright how you doin’?’ because he might know your uncle or your brother. Six months or six years down the line, you’ll be dealing for him. I’ve seen it happen with my own eyes. Their mate is doing it, he’s got money, he’s got a pager, he’s got a telephone, probably going to give him a £600 car. He’s going to get a chain, he’s going to look hard with it, a gold tooth put in, he’s going to get all his hair trimmed off. Kids aspire to be drug dealers. I’ve seen kids at youth clubs, good kids, and now three or four are dead, and the others are dealing. All of them at some point were best mates but are now trying to kill each other. It’s the money, the cash. Got a brand new Impreza parked outside the house, all of a sudden you move to a detached house. Parents are accepting it.

(MET)
A lot of the older generation have worked hard: seven days a week. It was just work and that were it: work and save. The younger generation are probably spending the money on the houses. Before it used to be just any ordinary car, but now, more than whites, the most prestigious cars would be Asians’. I wonder if that’s causing friction. I think *gorays* look at Asians and think, ‘How did they get that car?’ When I see Asians I presume there are some who do work hard and deserve what they’ve got. Some have worked hard for it and some have done it the other way. It’s nice to see Asians with nice cars. It shows the *gorays* that Asians have reached a certain point where they are actually working hard and getting on.

(ZA)

At school there were some teachers who said it, in a sly, clever way, about us being not the same. Still now it happens, this. Even the ones who were okay used to sort of assume it because they were trying to be nice and help out. Some of them, they’re genuinely nice but even them, they can’t help it. Any time anything happened, and they were like: ‘Is it cos you got cultural problems?’; ‘Don’t your parents understand you?’; ‘Yeah, we understand. It’s your culture, isn’t it? It’s hard being in two cultures, innit?’ That kind of stuff. Everything about us was about us as pakis; not normal people because we weren’t normal people, weren’t the same people. Most of them didn’t bother me and I didn’t bother them. I don’t know if they were racist but they just cruised through – they didn’t give a damn so we didn’t, either. I left school with hardly nowt worth writing home about. My own fault. Hold my hands up, but a better school would have made a difference.

(SJA)

**Faith**

In this section, elements of religious practice and doctrine are revealed and referred to within and across the segments, as it is an overarching theme that is more generally related to notions of religious consciousness at political and personal levels. The war on terror, 9/11, 7/7, mass media, community representatives and leaders all have impact and influence that can be seen within the minutiae of work, leisure and family. At the same time, this section, like the others before it, continues with variety and overlap. Forced marriages, argued as problematic earlier on, are now further problematised as being couched in unIslamic practice.
Me, I use spliff – that's it, man, nothing else. Once in a while I'll drink booze, only when you're out with the lads for a laugh. Religion's very important, I understand that. We're not strong enough, yet. If we were strong enough we wouldn't be doing none of this shit. If you always follow Islam, all this trouble we're having, we wouldn't be having it. Drinking's a bit out of the way, it's a bit out of hand. It all comes down to your *iman*.\(^{13}\) If your *iman* is weak then *Shaitan*'s\(^{14}\) going to take control of you. I know what's right and what's wrong and I know what I do. Sometimes, you can't help it. If I go out sober-headed the problems I've got, they're not going to get out of my head. I want to chill out. You drink to forget but the next day that problem's still going to be there.

(JJ)

I'd like to be a bit more religious. You get so bogged down into work and money, not the important things – the really important things – like remembering Allah, like living in the way of Allah. You put those on the back burner. Keep putting it off but you can't keep doing that forever. Our kids do more than me and they know more than me. Over the last year or two I've thought about it more and more. Some of my friends and relatives have been going on *Hajj* and they're all better and happier when they come back.

(ZH)

I haven't always been religious. I learned my religion in terms of what religion is and what it's asking of me to do, and then how I'm going about doing it. It was a long process. I was at the stage in my life. I was comfortable in myself and I didn't have no real goals or ambition. And then in kicked the spiritual side. As youths, we had ambitions like we want to be wealthy, successful. I've lost it. I think my religion has a lot to do with it. I'm content with myself to a certain extent, I've got a certain level of happiness. I would like to live in a Muslim country but I'm happy as long as I can practise my religion. This environment is comfortable for me. I can wear a beard, I can wear Asian dress, comfortably walk the streets, go about and do my business and live my daily life, and it's not an issue. This is something that I have actually put a bit of thought into. I think it is specific to Bradford. Because the same people are living with Asians or have lived with Asians for so many years, they understand. The bridges are a bit closer than maybe some other communities.

(WI)
Forced marriages, it’s not in our religion. It’s more culture of the older generation than religion. The old generation from back over there, from Pakistan, a lot of them are under pressure. If they’ve got the brother over there, they think they’ve got to bring them or their kids over. Lads, them that come over here, the picture I get is they get over here to earn as much money as they can. I don’t see it as an issue, to get married from over there. What I disagree with is forcing someone into getting married. The way our religion has been portrayed outside is like it’s actually forceful; you’ve got to get married and you have no other choice.

(ZA)

I woke up and turned the TV on. At that point they only mentioned Edgeware Road and the bus. I can’t remember them mentioning any of the others at the time. They didn’t actually talk of it as being an explosion. They were unsure so they weren’t really mentioning it. I was worried for my cousin because he travels into London. For that week after, I kept bumping into my mates and talking to them, but it didn’t have that impact, like 9/11 did. It didn’t stir up that same emotion because of the speeches afterwards – and yet, this was only 200 miles away whereas that was in another country, across an ocean. When 9/11 happened, for the next few months I was thinking, ‘Shit! This is really bad. I won’t be able to travel, people will look at me.’ This time around, I don’t feel as much like that, even though it’s happened here. Maybe it’s because the media’s got a bit more objectivity. Because we were getting American feeds with the other one, and you actually see it – the planes going into a tower – with this, you just hear about it. Like they say, a picture paints a thousand words.

(KR)

There was this Muslim group – Muslim Council or something like that. I remember this, I saw it on the telly and I remember having a right argument about it with one of my brothers. It was a little while after 9/11, and this group, they went and gave a sort of apology. I was sick, me. Why apologise? Why lower yourself? Why not apologise for everything else that’s bad and been done by a Muslim? It’s like telling the world: ‘Us Muslims, we’re alright. We won’t bomb you or terrorise you or kill you. And, even though we got fuck-all to do with 9/11, we’re still sorry.’ How stupid was that? My brother, though, he thought it was good because it was trying to show the world that we’re not all like that, we’re not all extreme. But we’re not all extreme in the first place, that’s what got me. Why should anyone take the blame for what someone else has done?
That’s wrong. It’s double standards. I’ll apologise when all Christians start apologising for all the black people that were lynched in America during slavery, or when they apologise for all the people that are still being killed today in Iraq and everywhere else.

(YAS)

Jihad, that’s what they call it, that’s why they do it. They think they’re doing Jihad and they’re gonna go to heaven. I was watching something where they had prisoners in Iraq or Iran or somewhere. They were proper terrorists but they caught them before the bombs went off. When they got them, even they were saying that to do proper Jihad – to be a martyr – if you haven’t got that in your heart, if you’re doing it because you think ‘I’m gonna go do it, gonna go kill myself because I’m gonna go to heaven’, if that’s the reason you’re doing it – to go to heaven – it’s wrong. You’ve got to do it from your heart to say, ‘Yeah, I’m doing it for my country – they’re killing innocent people.’ But the way this lot are doing it, I don’t think it’s right because they’re killing innocent people, Muslims in the process.

The people who got these young lads to do it, they’re from madressay in Britain. Teachers have been talking to these young lads – telling them about it. These people who become terrorists, they go to their own classes and stuff in their own time – people’s houses, try to keep it undercover. So you’re scared because you think your mosques and madressay, what if they start closing them down? Our parents go to mosques to read but they haven’t done nowt wrong. Me, I think they’re just brainwashing these young lads. Most of them are what? Nineteen to 20 – 21, 22? Just young lads, some of them have just left school. Jihad, it might be okay, but for the right reasons.

(AA)

The world’s changed and nowadays it might be an issue. Travelling itself is something: are they going think I’m a terrorist, to bang me up because I’ve got a Qur’an in my bag? I’ve got friends who know about this stuff, and they were telling me the best places to live as a Muslim are the places where Islam is there top to bottom, and also those places where there is no Islam. That’s where you can set an example. I’ve yet to actually read about that country that’s Islamic top to bottom or even know of one. If you’re a Muslim you can probably do more good here than you could as a Muslim in Saudi or somewhere. Now more than ever that’s probably quite necessary.

(KR)
Killing people, civilians, in whatever way, has to be wrong. Myself, I understand why these idiots did what they did but I don’t agree with it. I know how they see it. For them, killing ordinary people – believe it or not – is a part of war. Why they do it is because to them it’s an eye for an eye, tit for tat. You kill our civilians, we’ll kill yours, end of story. It’s a simple way of looking at it because, by doing that, you’re saying you can only fight fire with fire. There has to come a time when you think, ‘Hang on a second, nothing’s happening here. All that’s happening is innocent people – not the ones in power – are getting wasted.’

(YAS)

It has affected me. I think it’s affected everybody I know. You do feel it with people you meet. Somebody asked me – one of the passengers in the cab, ‘What do you think of the bombings?’

I went ballistic on him. I said, ‘What do you mean what do I think of the bombings? What do you think of the bombings?’

He says, ‘You know, they were wrong – this, that and the other – but, you know, what do you think?’

I said, ‘What do you want me to think? What do you want me to say to you? You idiot, I think exactly the same way as what you do.’

(SB)

A few mates, about six/seven of us, we used to roll a giro – have a smoke. Go to quiet places, weird places like a forest or a wood, park up, get stoned and have a laugh. One day me and my mate were just sitting down and somehow Islam just cropped up and he goes, ‘Yeah, I’ve been thinking about it a long time, what we are doing now is not right’. About two years ago we were on Manchester Road. There were a few cassettes in this car and we listened and it started getting to us: what we’d done and what we should be doing; stop this crap and get on the right path. After that I started to read namaz,16 started to read more books.

(TT)
I did go to the mosque until I was 14. My kids don’t go to a mosque, they go to a madrassah. They believe in Islam, they treat Islam with love, there’s nowt forced. They tell them values, how to respect your elders, this is good, this is bad, this is how you do this. They tell them all the ways of life as well. In our case it wasn’t like that. Go in with your hat, a Qur’an in your hand or whatever. Didn’t have a clue what it meant. It’s a lot of progress.

(CB)
4 Conclusion

The current policy context

In order to draw out some of the policy implications that may arise from the accounts presented above, it is necessary to first of all provide an account of the current relevant policy context. In recent years, cities have emerged renewed as the engine of British, and European, economic and social policy. In what Buck et al. (2005, p. 6) refer to as ‘The New Conventional Wisdom’, cities have a key role in fusing economic success with wider societal management through the interlinking imperatives of (economic) competitiveness, (social) cohesion and (responsive) governance, sometimes accompanied by concerns for (environmental) sustainability. Starting from a recognition of the new challenge of international markets where neo-liberal deregulation, technological change, new communications systems and an accompanying erosion of protection from competition have undermined the previous status quo, cities now are seen as providing the spatial concentration and clustering of essential competitive assets. In this scenario, social cohesion becomes the necessary handmaiden of economic competitiveness:

Social cohesion, like competitiveness, becomes a significant public issue in the NCW [New Conventional Wisdom] because the arrangements of the old status quo, with their clear divisions between public/private, and economic/social roles, can no longer be counted on to ensure the conditions for competitive success ... Co-ordination functions which had been increasingly undertaken by (and often within) major firms would now more often take place outside them, largely through ‘the market’, though this would have to be underpinned by social capital in the form of networks, trust relations and shared conventions.
(Buck et al., 2005, p. 11, emphasis added)

In this new urban order, social cohesion is no longer a consequence of, and a necessary basis for, a vital civil society; it is to be understood as a key element in guaranteeing economic competitiveness. This synergy between competitiveness and social cohesion will, of course, itself require a form of assertive urban governance. The absence of a clear and unambiguous definition of social cohesion has proved to be no hindrance in the advancement of this new policy objective. As Buck (2005, p. 45) notes in relation to the positioning of social cohesion within this ‘New Conventional Wisdom’:
The model of the social structure of cities in the current paradigm tends to privilege elements which have the clearest demonstrable relationship (in either direction) with economic performance. It is thus close to a tautological system in which social cohesion is that which promotes competitiveness.

Starting from a somewhat different trajectory, it is possible to see how this linkage of social cohesion with economic competitiveness was given an additional and independent emphasis following the civil disturbances of 2001. In this specific context, it can be seen that community cohesion emerged as a policy agenda for Government as they sought to respond to the civil disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001. Central to this policy framework was an acceptance of the rhetoric of the Ouseley (2001) report on the Bradford disturbances regarding ‘the very worrying drift towards self-segregation’. This concern with self-segregation was further elaborated in the Independent Review Team’s document *Community Cohesion* (Cantle Report, 2001) where integration into local ethnic and religious-based communities was regarded as divisive and socially dysfunctional, while community cohesion providing bridging links across specific communities was to be valued. In this emerging conceptual consensus, strong affiliations to bounded ethnic and religious community identities came to be seen as a challenge to the broader civic community identity that was consistent with active citizenship. Ethnic identities were being repositioned in the private sphere where *bonding social capital* could provide individual succour, while a new emphasis on *bridging social capital* would prioritise a revitalised collective civic identity in a shared public sphere.

A recent literature review for the Social Exclusion Unit (Jones, 2005) provides some insight into the potential implications of this conceptual language. Jones (2005, p. 16) provides useful definitions of these convenient categories.

- **Bridging social capital** enables links to new social networks. This can take the form of links to employers and labour markets. Young people with geographically scattered families have a resource they may be able to draw on to escape disadvantage and move to more prosperous areas to study or work.

- **Bonding social capital** may be a characteristic of poor communities, or disadvantaged groups, based on tight bonds and solidarity, but creating boundaries through which it becomes difficult to pass – it can thus act as a barrier to other forms of capital.

Jones (2005) in her review aims to provide a measured review of these, and other, policy-related concepts, but it is difficult to resist the implication that bonding social
capital, while a source of community coherence and individual authenticity, is restrictive and counter-productive to efficient engagement with the current ‘opportunity society’. Hence, a few pages later, Jones (2005, p. 20) observes that:

The cultural norms of a community – relating to bonding social capital described above – can be supportive of beliefs and practices which policy makers would like to change.

This being the case, we might reasonably be concerned to understand the policy framework within which these policy makers are seeking to make their impact. Two intersecting policy paradigms can be seen as directly impacting on the world of the young men present in this report. One is the Blairite nuancing of Labour’s commitment to equality; and the other is the current Government’s retreat from the pluralist model of multiculturalism that Britain has in the past two decades confidently, and even smugly, presented to other European states as an exemplar of best practice.

As Levitas (2005, p. 227) has argued, this British Government has progressively replaced a commitment to equality with an ‘opportunity society where all have an equal chance to succeed’. In this policy context, social inclusion becomes the outcome of the intersection of state provision of ‘opportunity’ with personal responsibility and self-reliance (see Strategy Unit, 2004). If ‘Government cannot achieve social inclusion for people, but it can help them achieve it for themselves’ (Ambitions for Britain [2001 Labour Party Manifesto], p. 20, quoted in Levitas, 2005, p. 227), then we must ask where will citizens find their drive and support? Surely the varieties of collective solidarity revealed in the transcripts above offer one alternative.

But, apparently, the demands for a flexible labour force consistent with economic competitiveness would be better served by the promotion of an individualistic bridging social cohesion that would facilitate mobility.

The emergent preference for, and promotion of, bridging social capital is also consistent with the Labour Government’s retreat from pluralist multiculturalism. As one recent commentator phrased it:

The events of summer 2001 in northern towns and cities, together with the growing Islamophobia and open questioning of the allegiances of British Muslims following the events of September 11, have been recognised as prompting a shift in New Labour policy, away from a valuing of cultural mix and an active embracing of diversity and back to the assimilationist language of the 1960s, exemplified by the introduction of citizenship tests and an oath of allegiance for new immigrants. (Robinson, 2005, p. 1417)
In this new paradigm, ‘respect for ethnic diversity’ is complemented by a distinct expectation that the proper location for the expression of that diversity is within the domestic sphere. The 1980s and 1990s’ multicultural comfort zone that allowed for the growth of plural ethnic public spheres is now extinguished beneath a new concern for an inclusive ‘Britishness’.

The issue of the nature of the connectedness that may be expected within ‘acceptable’ processes of social cohesion is revealed more recently in the Home Office (2005) document *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: The Government’s Strategy to Increase Race Equality and Community*. In a document that admirably reasserts that government policy aims to eradicate racism, there is a parallel discourse of anxiety regarding minority ethnic individual and collective participation in British life in Chapter 4: ‘Building community cohesion’. Something of this sensibility is revealed in paragraph 3, which *inter alia* asserts that:

Fundamentally, national cohesion rests on an inclusive sense of Britishness which couples the offer of fair, mutual support – from security to health to education – with the expectation that people will play their part in society and will respect others. It is important that people feel that this approach works in practice, for everyone in society. When a community feels that some groups are not contributing, divisions will increase. That is one of the reasons why, for example, we have made clearer the expectations we have of new British citizens, including language skills and a test of knowledge of life in the UK.
(Home Office, 2005, p. 42)

The community that feels that some groups are not contributing is not revealed but, as the chapter develops, it is clear that strengthening cohesion *within* groups is not the key policy target. Rather, building links and participation *across* different communities is a clear policy priority. Framed by the wider concerns regarding self-segregation noted above, it is clear that some forms of social cohesion are to be favoured over others. The intersection of the two policy languages and practices of social cohesion located in the ‘New Conventional Wisdom’ on urban policy, and the revisionist agendas on multiculturalism, provides a quite distinct, and worrying, context in which to locate the experiences and statements of the young men reported above.

**Responding to the texts**

In the extensive conversations with these young men in Bradford, a strong sense of identity linked to place and urban territory is a recurrent theme. It is more nuanced
than a simple and rigid identification with neighbourhood in an exclusive claim to ‘our patch’. In one way it can be seen as a progressive narrowing of focus: from Bradford as a generally supportive environment – a locale in which people can make a life – to a specific neighbourhood where the pains and pleasures of everyday living are embedded in the local demography and infrastructure. Alongside distinctions of position within Islam and identity linked to Pakistani heritage, including the degree of reliance on extended family networks, sits the immediate context of a street or of a few streets in which associations – be they based on friendships, animosities or blood ties – have a particular intense reality. When talking, individuals can switch their focus from moment to moment and zoom up and down this territorial trajectory, all the while making their own linkages to being Bradfordian, Pakistani, Muslim, male and ultimately individual. The identity of our sample becomes a self-conscious issue in their lives through their encounters with majority racism, Islamophobia, Bradfordian class antagonisms, the internal dynamics of ‘their own community’ and, indeed, the media spectre of unruliness associated with (Asian) youth. Given this context, it is hardly surprising that concrete realities have appeal and coherence when making sense of life in Bradford.

The dynamic relationship of space, place and identity has become a common agenda in contemporary attempts to make sense of collective identities in urban environments (Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Keith and Pile, 1993; Westwood and Williams, 1997). In conversation with the young men in this study, it is impossible to fail to recognise their experience of Bradford as home and as a viable – and in some cases, only – place to be. Three generations of residence, and their ubiquitous physical presence in the architecture, business and public face of this city, make realistic and legitimate their sense of belonging. It is partly this familiar consensus of being Bradfordian (and all that that entails, including a sense of belonging and ownership and local pride) that allows this cohort to engage so vigorously in making territorial distinctions within Bradford. It is partly this certainty about place and family residence that allows ‘Pakistani’ young men in Keighley (postcode area BD21) to make less than complimentary statements about ‘Pakistani’ young men in Manningham (BD8).

There is a difference between Keighley and Bradford in the aapnay attitudes. For example, when you go to Bradford, us lot, we see someone we know, we shake hands: Asalamoalaikum–Walaikumsalaam. Respect and everything. When aapnay come from out of town to Keighley and that, they don’t get no Salaams, no nothing.

(YK)

And/or:
I don’t have a lot of respect for lads in Bradford. If you go anywhere and say you’re from Keighley, they laugh at you. When you go to football tournaments and you come up against a team from Bradford you know for a fact that if you start with one you’re going to have 300 coming down. I stay away. I don’t have owt to do with it. I can’t do with the tracky bottoms with Rockport shoes.

(SG)

The image of the social and psychic exclusion and alienness of young Muslim, Pakistani men from the Bradfordian norm, that is the pernicious undertow of the Ouseley and Cantle Reports, is mocked by the grounded Bradfordianness of the discourse and social horizons of the young men in this cohort.

While, as we saw in Chapter 1, there are specific wards within Bradford that have particularly high concentrations of ‘Pakistani’ residents, they are in fact widely dispersed across metropolitan Bradford and increasingly so (Simpson, 2004). The earlier German, Polish and Italian migrants into Bradford are now comfortably Bradfordian – to all intents and purposes, visibly integrated – so, too, is the cohort of young people we have encountered in this study.

Of course, their identification with their urban locale in no way adequately defines them. In contemporary social science, the notion of ‘identity’ as a relatively simple and fixed characteristic of an individual has been replaced by an emphasis on the complexity, interconnectedness and uncertainty of any human subjective sense of self. For example, in an analysis of New Ethnicities and Urban Culture, Back (1996) warns the reader that, in order to understand the young people who are discussed in his study, they should note that:

The important point to grasp is that the subjectivities of these young people are multiple … and reflect the diversity of ideologies and discourses that they both consume and engage with.

(Back, 1996, p. 53)

This is obviously true of the young men reported above. In their dialogue can be found an array of expressions of concern including, for example, masculinity, ethnicity, family, faith, employment, sexuality, policing and citizenship. For each individual these issues are experienced and negotiated together in unique ways. Consequently, the themes we have drawn together above merely indicate some of the major dimensions that shape these young men’s world; but these themes do not, in themselves, provide insight into the unique construction and negotiation of identity of any one person in our sample.
Conclusion

As we noted above in our discussion of our methodology, our sample is of men only. In the context of Britain, and Bradford in particular, young Muslim men have found themselves as the focus of a 'moral panic' (Cohen, 1972) about their status as a threatening alien wedge within our cities. They have been associated with an outdated patriarchal dominance of women; with a species of machismo-driven posturing – typically expressed in their cars and driving; and of course, among other things, with drugs, violence and anti-social behaviour. One expression of the power of these stereotypes is found in their emergence as agendas and reference points that the men in this study feel a need to address. The dominant, and negative, majority ethnic construction of their identity and culture is not something they can easily ignore.

The issue of the intersection of ethnicity with the construction of masculinity has routinely been a concern in changing multi-ethnic societies. The predatory, over-sexed minority ethnic male has a long history in fiction and in film (Kabbani, 1994). More recently, the negotiation of ethnicity and masculinity for Asian and Afro-Caribbean men in British society, with its unique combination of racist and sexist ideologies, has received academic attention (Sewell, 1997; Alexander, 2000; O'Donnell and Sharpe, 2000). The men in this study are exploring their fusion of ethnicity and masculinity in a very particular context.

The employment in the textile mills that guaranteed a minimal economic dignity to the earlier generations is long gone. The employment structure of contemporary Bradford has no great demand for unskilled labour, while, at the same time, Pakistani young men have disproportionately failed to thrive in the Bradford educational system. They are being significantly outstripped in terms of educational achievement by their sisters. Thus, the strong affiliation of this cohort of men to their locale, and Bradford, has ambivalent implications for their future employment. The strong social networks and the extensive structure of small ‘Asian’ enterprises provide an employment environment where ‘work can be found’ – an environment in which ‘getting by’ rather than prospering is the more likely outcome. In the interviews there is evidence of a creative and flexible relationship to the world of work that is buoyed up by the strong social milieu in which work is embedded. This suggests a pressure towards continued commitment to the locale and to Bradford. However, given the differential success of their sisters and nieces in schooling and university entrance, there has to be the future possibility of a more geographically mobile female workforce. The relations between work, income, status and family formation seem likely to become more complex.

If the changing dynamics of gender, education and employment may reasonably be seen as likely to shift the processes of marriage and family formation, it might be
expected that this would generate a pressure to continue to bring in brides from the Indian sub-continent for the economically challenged Bradfordian/’Pakistani’ prospective husbands. However, in the dialogues recorded in this research, and briefly echoed in this report, there is clear evidence of a shifting perspective on arranged transnational marriages among these men. In very explicit terms they have rehearsed their personal, and their cohort’s, experience of this process. The resistance of some in this cohort to continuing the tradition of arranged marriages with their children, and the changing balance of educational attainment and employment prospects between the sexes, suggests that in the next decade there are likely to be shifts in the politics and practices of family formation in this community. These changes will be driven by the evolving internal dynamics of their community, rather than by the ‘liberal critiques’ of dominant majority commentators. The bonding social capital of ‘community’ may be crucial to creating the cohesion that can sustain both changing mores and surviving shared identity.

In the lived experience of managing life as a Muslim/Pakistani/Bradfordian male, the creative processes of maintaining and expressing shared identities enjoy the benefits of the accumulated ethnic infrastructure of 50 years of community residence, and expansion, across the urban environment of Bradford. The concrete benefits of community formation sit uncomfortably with the current governmental concerns with ethnic segregation and social cohesion. The demographic concentration of minority ethnic communities is too often presented as a wilful refusal to participate in the wider society. Yet anyone who shops, uses public transport, makes use of health services, consumes café or restaurant food, or any of the core facilities of urban life, knows experientially that Bradford is a functioning multi-ethnic city. There are white working-class estates, white middle-class enclaves and areas of predominantly Pakistani residence. There are also a range of social, institutional and employment settings across Bradford that are routinely multi-ethnic and unproblematic. The question of relative residential segregation, and its significance, is framed by the current political model of social cohesion and its neurotic concern with ‘ethnic self-segregation’.

At the heart of the discussion of social cohesion there routinely lies an ideal of what citizenship in contemporary Britain requires in relation to shared values and collective participation in the life of the city and nation. It invokes an assumed set of reciprocal obligations for all citizens, majority and minority alike, to acknowledge and participate in the institutions of governance; in the major state institutions of education, law, health and welfare; and in the looser networks of civil society. As a general model of the participation of the individual in the collective life of our society, this is agreeably compatible with the British tradition of democracy and, until recently, the particular British conception of multiculturalism.
However, in the concrete expression of current British political debate, this reciprocal essence is increasingly undermined by the unilateral perspective of the majority ethnic rhetoric, which chooses to critically examine the perceived practices of minority ethnic communities. We have already seen the malign influence of this external gaze in the policy reviews of Ouseley, Cantle and Denham. The dominant majority concerns with perceived self-segregation and the wrong sorts of minority ethnic social capital serve to mask the ongoing processes of racial exclusion. In a parallel way, the ease with which political pundits can declaim the virtues of social cohesion, within ‘the New Conventional Wisdom’, is routinely built on a complicit myopia regarding the current levels of class exclusion in limiting majority ‘white’ citizens’ participation in the ‘opportunity society’. Social cohesion as a benchmark for assessing the nature and level of ‘Pakistani/British’ participation in British life is flawed by the evident unevenness of social cohesion within and across the majority population.

Under New Labour, the gap between the rich and the poor in Britain has, on a number of indices, widened. Government concerns with social cohesion and the participation of all citizens in a shared urban life are not compatible with the continuing class inequalities in Britain – particularly given the current class profile of the Pakistani population, where their class as much as their ethnic identity defines their options. Nor is it promoted by governmental anti-immigrant and anti-asylum-seeker rhetoric that bolsters majority ethnic xenophobia and racism.

A shared commitment to common values and to the obligations of citizenship – key elements of social cohesion – is not something that is alien to the young men in this study. As British-‘Asians’ they have an acute sense of their British citizenship. Citizenship is a set of political rights and obligations that can be detached from naive and vulgar nationalism. These young men know they are British. The relation their parents and grandparents had to Pakistan is not one they can have. But, as British citizens, they do not want to be subjected to narrow definitions of Britishness or naive universalist forms of equal treatment. They wish to enjoy the benefits of differentiated citizenship, which has been expressed in the simple phrase ‘If you want to treat me equally, you may have to be prepared to treat me differently’ (Downing and Husband, 2005, Chapter 9). Just as women have insisted that fair treatment requires that the specific gendered realities of their priorities and needs should be reflected in the guaranteeing of their right to different treatment (Young, 1997), so too minority ethnic citizens have a reasonable expectation that their difference should be respected. Treating all people the same is not the same as treating people equally.
For majority ethnic readers and members of other minority ethnic communities in Britain, the differentness of these young men is apparent in their personal accounts. This ‘difference’ is a challenge for them, as for the majority population. However, their experience of their difference is a motor for change as opposed to a fixed, stable marker of identity. Much of the dialogue recorded in this research is a reflection of their anticipation of change and their wish for change. One recent speculative account of the 2001 Bradford riots (Hussain and Baguley, 2005) has suggested that it was the strength of the young people’s conviction of their citizenship status that fuelled their frustration and anger. From that perspective the challenge of social cohesion lies, not in teaching Bradfordian/Pakistani/Muslim males the principles of British citizenship, but rather in opening up their routes to equitable and recognised participation in British life.

The biographies that have been tapped in this research do not speak of ‘postmodern diasporic individuals’ lost in a haze of possibility. On the contrary, the image that emerges is of individuals grounded in Bradford and their own social networks. There is not much space for a victimology of oppressed and culturally schizoid young men in these data. They demonstrate a reflexive understanding of their current location within ‘their community’ and of their relation to wider British society.

Their relation to Islam is varied, but seldom non-committal. Just as patriarchy formed the conditions and the substantive issues that shaped twentieth-century feminism, so too Islamophobia has in a real way generated an Islamic sensibility within this cohort of young men that would not have been present in their grandfathers’ generation. The legitimacy of this perspective is something they collectively take for granted; hoping to swamp it within some revitalised English discourse of social cohesion is naive. At the same time, and to varying degrees, Islam feeds into the day to day at spiritual, political and practical levels. Coupled with this, the loosening of family authority and the progressive disengagement from ‘homeland’ obligations and cultures is creating a British space in which a wide variety of personal engagements with Islam are thriving. Islam is a normative part of British life.

The recent government report State of the Cities: A Progress Report to the Delivering Sustainable Communities Summit (ODPM, 2005) examines social cohesion in cities in terms of:

- **health**: measured life expectancy and changes in life expectancy
- **education**: the proportion of adults with a degree and changes in that proportion
- **employment**: working-age adults collecting benefits associated with worklessness
Conclusion

- **poverty**: average household income and changes
- **housing**: the average housing price and changes in that average price.

It is interesting that social cohesion is here reduced to a set of ‘critical variables’ that can be seen as significantly impacting on your quality of life. The centrality of the role of position in the labour market as a key determinant of social inclusion (Levitas, 2005) is diluted here. But what remains absent is any engagement with the essentially social, convivial, interpersonal and collective participatory nature of social cohesion. It can be spoken of only as a sum of determining variables and not as what it is in itself.

The idea of social cohesion as a social-political relationship is clearly understood in the ODPM (2005) report as being highly dependent on an equitable access to society’s resources. Given that assertion, this report does not make comfortable reading for the cities of the North West. The specific demographies of Bradford, sketched in Chapter 1, serve only to underline the challenge to social cohesion presented by current circumstances in Bradford.

The ‘creative survivability’ displayed by the young men in this study should not be interpreted as reflecting their equitable access to these societal resources of health, education, employment and housing. In the ‘opportunity’ politics of contemporary Bradford-‘Pakistani’ populations, class also clearly powerfully defines their capacity to thrive. The external gaze on this population, which has disproportionately seen them through the lens of ethnicity and Islam, significantly distorts any adequate understanding of their situation. The intersection of class with ethnicity, faith and gender is key to understanding the future trajectory of this population. The internal disparities of class, wealth and power within this population critically shape the manner and pattern of their engagement with the ‘critical variables’ outlined in the ODPM report. The diversity of affiliations and circumstances revealed in the accounts above powerfully demonstrate that we cannot, and should not, speak of a single Bradford-‘Pakistani’ community. The routes to engagement between this population and the institutions and resources of Bradford are multiple and changing. The dangers of developing state policies on the basis of using naive conceptions of ‘community’ with simplistic and rigid ethnic categories are well understood (Anthias and Yuval-Davies, 1993). The relevance of that warning is in no way undermined by the evidence presented above.

It is arguable that the evidence emerging from these data supports the view that it is the variety of social relations and solidarity within the communities of the Bradford-‘Pakistani’ population that sustains their economic resilience, and provides a
foundational basis for social cohesion. Concretely, that it is the social cohesion – of feeling, identification and networks – found within the communities that counterbalances the economic forces of social exclusion generated by their location in the wider labour market and system of social resources. This turns the governmental philosophy of routes to social cohesion led by the labour market on its head. In fact, it is arguable that it is the viability of the communities based on the urban locale that is currently the platform that enables the members of this minority ethnic population to maintain active and positive participation as Bradfordian citizens. Not only a positive ethnic identity, but also ethnic community infrastructural resources are the basis for participation in the active citizenship of contemporary Britain.

We are not here seeking to invent or naively celebrate some vision of a flawless, closed and tight social network that echoes a nostalgic lost innocence. The shared conviviality and limited networks of mutual support reflected in these accounts are much more like a pragmatic ‘limited liability’ set of interlocking relationships. Individuals may be neighbourly, offer quite specific forms of support, share overlapping concerns and rehearse mutual grievances without being friends or being locked into a strong social psychology of shared identity. What there is in these locales is the opportunity for, and the practice of, discrete acts of reciprocity. A valued recognition of individuality is negotiated in the supportive social space of a generational, and gendered, sense of belonging. These occasional, spontaneous acts of recognition and exchange constitute the connective tissue that ties identity to place. And it is the routinised affirmation of self and ‘community’ that is constructed in these locales that fuels the positive social agency that is central to ‘active citizenship’.

This would suggest that the opposition of ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social capital reported above is misplaced. The sense of identity and agency generated through the activities of bonding social capital is not imaginatively or socially ring-fenced in the locale where they are practised. The repertoire of communication, initiative and reciprocity, which are surely necessary components of bonding social capital, has a relevance beyond the local. Additionally, the engagement across social boundaries and with unfamiliar actors, which is intrinsic to the development of bridging social capital, requires not just the relevant social skills but also the impetus for change and the confidence to engage with the new. The experience of the young men in this study does not suggest that strong bonding social capital is a logical blockage to acquiring bridging social capital. Rather, it may be a valuable precursor to engagement in the wider society.

If white middle-class enclaves can be uncontested and unproblematic social engines of aspiration and achievement, should we not respect and nurture the inner-city
milieux that in different ways are current crucibles for building and sustaining the positive identities, and ‘mainstream’ aspirations, that members of this population bring to their circumstances in a city and region that has a demonstrable relative paucity of opportunity. Of course, recognising the vitality and authenticity of community-based resources in Bradford does not sit easily with what has been a predominantly negative majority-society construction of ‘Pakistani’ inner-city Bradford as a retrograde fusion of sub-continental patriarchy and renegade youth, bound together by their affiliation to dangerous variants of radical Islam. The auto-critique of their communities by the young men in this study mocks the certainties and monolithic rhetoric of many of the majority commentaries.

The absence of any coherent local political platform through which these young men may collectively develop their ambitions for change is a concrete expression of their learned disdain for party politics and their breaking away from the traditional constructions of political power within their communities. In this way, they are left peculiarly close to the individualised ‘self-reliant’ and assertive social agent that is modelled in government philosophy. Since the Labour Government has so strongly committed itself to individualism, it finds itself strangely discomforted by the young men in this study. Should these young men mobilise collectively, the ‘State’ would distrust their motivation and be awkwardly placed to institutionally respond to their politics. Given its structural position in the fragmented ‘opportunity society’ of the North West and Bradford, the Government is faced with the prospect that it is exactly those young men most motivated and ambitious who may most bitterly cry foul at the lack of opportunities they find themselves given.

**End note**

A study like this cannot easily be reduced to a set of policy recommendations. If, from the outset, the core ambition was to facilitate access to the ‘voice’ of these young men, then one recommendation must be to listen.

The current proscriptive statements from government departments, in effect telling men like this to ease away from community affiliation – give up bad bonding capital and acquire good bridging capital – in order to thrive in our opportunity society, really requires a serious reality check.

The assimilationist turn in British government multiculturalism is dangerous. It denies the many successes of our pluralist multiculturalism.
It denies the strong regional civic neighbourhood identities that fragment a common Britishness and give vitality to engaging with citizenship.

It is arrogant and complacent in assuming that racial exclusion and Islamophobia are not major determining forces in defining people’s lives.

It demonstrates a profound distrust of British democracy to adequately address the needs of all citizens and to engage them in a diverse civil society.
Notes

Chapter 1

1 *Dupatta*: traditional South Asian (particularly village/rural areas) head covering worn by females.


3 *Madrassah*: Islamic religious school/facility; ‘supplementary school’.

4 *Hakim*: Muslim physician.

5 *Pir*: Muslim spiritual/religious guide and/or leader.

Chapter 2

1 See Mason (1996, pp. 35–59) for an informative and in-depth discussion around qualitative interviewing, which starts with an assertion that data are ‘generated’ – produced – as opposed to merely being ‘collected’, unearthed or found.

2 We would also like to draw the reader’s attention to a forthcoming publication that is built around interview transcripts but can be viewed as having more in common with a literary anthology than it does with traditional outputs that have sociological analysis as a core feature. It is our hope that such a text will offer readers greater opportunity in accessing voices directly.

3 See Terkel (1975). In this volume, Terkel succeeds in painting an occasionally moving, quietly accessible but always meaningful portrait depicting life through the eyes of American workers at various historical moments and across social levels. The vast bulk of this book has little to do with Terkel’s own interjections or analyses. It has been the simplicity of this approach – of talking and listening to people – that we have taken as a starting point with this research project.

Chapter 3

1. *Goray*: white people.
7. ‘Five-O’: slang for police, derived from *Hawaii Five-O*.
10. *Mangaythurs*: (male) marriage partners from Pakistan.
15. *Madrassay*: plural of *madrassah* (see note 3, Chapter 1).
16. *Namaz*: contact prayers (*salat*).
Bibliography


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