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Visible patrols in residential areas

Adam Crawford and Stuart Lister
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We would like to thank Kathryn Munn for her research assistance throughout this project. The research has benefited considerably from the guidance, counsel and support of our Advisory Board members who at various time have included, Gary Barnett, Richard Best, Grahame Bullock, Jacque Dale, Kevin Doyle, Greg Dyche, Alastair Flint, Susan Hartshorne, Deborah Ilot, Bethan Jones, John Lacey, Mark Little, Ian Loader, Bob Mowat, Jane Mowat and Mark Nockels. For various kind acts of assistance we also wish to thank Neil Bowden, Nick Blitz, David Bray-Smith, John Cook, Ian Crawford, Chris Hale, Howard Harding, Janet Harris, Jonathan House, Graham Johnstone, Tanya Lyon, John Marshall, Andy Mills, Jane Mills, Andy Parkinson, Jason Singh and Richard York.

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Organisations engaged in providing and managing housing are increasingly aware of, and responding to, concerns over community safety. One growing response has been the purchase of forms of additional policing or patrol dedicated to specific residential areas. It has become acceptable, and to some degree expected, for organisations other than central government both to take control of their own policing needs and to select the providers. The contemporary message that local authorities, housing associations and residents’ groups are beginning to acknowledge is that, if they want a visible presence in their area, they have to pay for it. Reassurance policing is increasingly becoming additional – provided through a diversity of policing auspices. In this context, the authorisation and provision of policing have become fragmented and multi-tiered.

This report highlights the existence of a reasonably well established mixed economy of residential patrols. This includes the purchase of police officers, special constables or community support officers, neighbourhood wardens, local authority guards and commercial security patrols. The division of labour within this economy is neither well organised nor effectively co-ordinated. The boundaries between the diverse providers, their respective responsibilities, roles and limitations are often unclear. This can leave the public uncertain as to the identity, functions and powers of different policing providers and unsure about what can legitimately be expected of them.

This report explores and seeks to make sense of the contemporary mixed economy and the diverse personnel employed as well as their similarities and differences.

Housing survey

The majority of housing associations and departments surveyed in the Yorkshire and Humberside region (57 per cent) said that they had become significantly or a lot more concerned with crime and disorder issues in recent years. The principal reason for this was due to residents’ demands and increased fear of crime (identified by 47 per cent and 45 per cent respectively). However, nearly a third of respondents also identified a limited police presence as an influential factor. Consequently, over half indicated that responding to residents’ demands for some form of visible policing/patrol presence was an important issue.

Police survey

Two-thirds of police divisional commanders and finance directors across the four forces in the region said that income generation through the provision of additional policing was an important issue for the police within their division/force. All those surveyed agreed with the statement that ‘responding to public demands for a patrolling presence is one of the most difficult challenges facing policing today’, of which 60 per cent strongly agreed. Whereas nearly half of respondents agreed with the statement that the police have established valuable and productive relationships with council-run patrols and warden schemes, less than one in ten agreed that the same could be said of private security patrols. Three-quarters of respondents agreed that the police need to co-ordinate better and accredit the work of other providers of security and patrols.

Private security survey

A first national survey of manned security companies offered a number of insights into the provision of commercial patrols. ‘Residential areas’ were identified as the field of manned security business with the greatest potential for growth across the sector over the next five years. The survey data show that, of private security companies engaged in the provision of patrols in residential areas:
Executive summary

- the main activities conducted by patrols relate to responding to alarms and residents’ calls, providing patrol reports to contractors, providing information to the police and monitoring void properties
- communication skills were identified as the most important skill required of a security officer engaged in residential patrols
- two-thirds of firms said that their patrol officers received between 24 and 48 hours’ training.

Respondents’ views on relations with local police revealed the following.

- Over half (55 per cent) said that they were well received by local police, as against 16 per cent mixed and 11 per cent not well received.
- Sixty-four per cent said the level of cooperation with the local police was good, 19 per cent not very good and 17 per cent poor.
- Some 67 per cent of respondents said that cooperation was variable, as against 19 per cent that it was quite consistent and 12 per cent that it was very consistent.
- While 64 per cent agreed that national licensing would improve relations with the police, some 13 per cent disagreed.

Models of policing

Reassurance patrol initiatives tend to differ in their relative focus on incidents of crime and disorder; working with, and through, local residents; or improvements to the physical environment as a way of revitalising neighbourhoods and reconnecting people. For some schemes, responding directly to incidents as they arise or targeting ‘hot spots’ of crime are a priority; for others, community engagement and social cohesion, or addressing the local environment and the link between ‘grime and crime’ are more pressing priorities. Many initiatives involve a blend of all three foci.

Initiatives also exhibit differing styles of policing and approaches to reassurance, often in a combination of enforcement, patrol and problem solving through partnerships. Enforcement emphasises compliance through resort to the coercive powers of given policing personnel, such as fixed penalty notices. Patrol places emphasis on the visibility of policing personnel as a reassuring presence and as a ‘mobile scarecrow’. Problem solving, by contrast, is more concerned with seeking to address the causes of local problems through prevention as well as through partnerships with wider stakeholders.

Reassurance initiatives accord differing emphasis to the resort to different tools of policing: legal (powers of detention, arrest or fixed penalty notices), physical (equipment and technology), personal (skills, character and competencies) and symbolic (public respect and deference). The capacity to draw on diverse tools, in large part, depends on the different kinds of security personnel employed, their legal powers and their personal competencies.

The balance between the various aspects of policing can easily be disturbed as different audiences place divergent pressures on policing personnel. Proactive social and environmental problem solving can become sidelined by the pressures of incident-based reactive work. Patrol work, given its less tangible or measurable outcomes, can be eclipsed by enforcement or incident-based activities.

Lessons from implementation

Clarifying aims and purposes, as well as how these should be achieved – in line with the different models of policing identified above – from the
outset, are important elements in delivering successful patrolling schemes. So, too, is clarifying the roles, responsibilities and contributions, as well as limitations, of the various partners.

In problem-solving endeavours, it is important that local residents are engaged and consulted. Drawing on communities’ local resources and local knowledge can significantly assist in community safety efforts. Local people’s own policing and security efforts should be nurtured and stimulated rather than marginalised by policing personnel.

There is a tendency to underestimate the necessary intensity of an intervention required to satisfy public demands, notably in relation to visibility. Otherwise, small-scale changes to the level of police patrol will largely go unnoticed by residents.

Harnessing diverse security efforts

This research highlights the following.

- Relations between different plural providers are variable and uneven: ranging along a spectrum from co-production, co-ordination, indifference, competition and hostility.

- There are significant deficits in the co-ordination of the policing efforts of diverse providers.

- Co-ordination deficits not only are a product of the nature of local relations between different policing organisations but also are structured by central government’s lack of genuine joined-up thinking.

There persists a view within some police units that the police alone should provide patrols and others merely get in their way, rather than seeing the policing efforts of others as a resource to be harnessed in the furtherance of public safety. If the local delivery of policing is to become a joined-up and co-ordinated endeavour, then this view needs to be challenged.

There is the scope for much greater mutual understanding and trust between different policing providers. Fostering mutual respect for different types of contributions and the mutual recognition of different interests and values are important in facilitating the co-ordination of diverse efforts.

Local police need to develop closer working relationships with private security patrols and local authority patrols and neighbourhood wardens. The activities of private security patrols should be better harnessed to enhance their contribution to local community safety.

Practical means for achieving better co-ordination of diverse policing efforts include:

- the establishment of information-sharing protocols between the extended policing family, notably the police and private security

- private sector representation on, and involvement in, local crime and disorder partnerships as an important potential channel through which to foster co-ordination and improve information exchange

- joint tasking to ensure a clearer division of local policing endeavours and to reduce duplication.

Intelligence-led patrolling that deploys the most up-to-date information, effectively targeting criminal behaviour, anti-social conduct and insecurity ‘hot spots’, can be facilitated by structured briefing and joint tasking.

Ownership and accountability

Experiences from additional patrols in residential areas suggest that such initiatives invariably:

- raise expectations over the nature and quality of service provision

- require heightened forms of accountability
• raise demands for greater ownership over the service provided
• foster the development of novel forms of contractual and market-based accountability
• enhance the demand for direct accountability to individual residents through responsiveness to incidents, reports on activities and results
• give residents a greater investment in local policing, thereby potentially cultivating renewed bonds between policing personnel and residents.

The initiatives studied all highlighted the importance of engaging with local residents, exploiting their knowledge about local crime and disorder problems, and providing them with a stake in their own community policing efforts.

Regulation and oversight

Different forms of patrol are (or will be) the subject of different regulatory regimes. As such, regulation is compartmentalised and segmented, in contrast to the increasingly networked nature of policing provision. This presents regulation and co-ordination challenges.

As well as private or parochial forms of accountability, such as through contractual arrangements and designated consultation forums, locally tied additional policing arrangements also raise wider public implications, for which few mechanisms of accountability currently exist.

The role of the police simultaneously as accreditor and competitor within the mixed economy of visible patrols – notably through their role in accreditation schemes – places them in an ambiguous position and raises potential conflicts of interests. This highlights the need for an independent co-ordinating and regulatory agency above and outside of the competing parties to ensure fair competition and appropriate standards, and to safeguard the public interest.

We recommend the establishment of oversight arrangements to incorporate the full extended policing family at both local and regional levels.

We recommend that local crime and disorder reduction partnerships should be encouraged to engage more fully with the private sector and assist in the task of co-ordinating the provision of local policing services, as well as providing local oversight of the extended policing family and strengthening local accountability.

We recommend that consideration be given to the establishment of regional policing boards with the responsibility for regulating and co-ordinating service delivery across the extended policing family. Given the uneven co-ordination, weak accountability and segmented regulation of policing, such boards could play a major role in enhancing community safety efforts and encouraging best practice. A regional policing board could also provide an element of democratic accountability where regional assemblies are to be established.

Conclusion

The uneven access to additional policing patrols in residential areas has the potential to impact adversely on social cohesion. The unequal provision of security may leave some areas with a surfeit of policing while others experience a policing deficit.

Solutions to the problems of security and order do not necessarily lie in policing-based responses alone. Building balanced communities may not be best served by an over-dominant focus on insecurities. Ultimately, policing efforts are but a small part in the wider framework of fostering vibrant communities.
Until recently, policing had become synonymous with the activities of the modern professional police alone. The police were understood as the monopolistic guardians of public safety and order, providing a universal service to all regardless of their capacity to pay. However, recent years have seen a significant erosion of this ideal. There has been a considerable pluralisation of ‘policing beyond the police’. As a result, a more complex division of labour in the provision of security has emerged. Governments alone no longer determine what sort of security is needed nor are they the sole providers of policing. It has become acceptable, and to some extent expected, for groups other than governments both to take control of their own policing needs and to select the providers of them. It is becoming increasingly acknowledged that, if local authorities, housing associations and residents’ groups want a dedicated visible presence in their area, then they will need to pay for it. Consequently, both the authorisation and provision of policing are increasingly multi-tiered and dispersed. The police are now part of a varied assortment of organisations with policing functions and a diffuse array of policing and security practices.

This report seeks to provide an overview of the contemporary mixed economy of visible policing in residential areas. It focuses on the manner in which forms of policing seek to provide public reassurance and assesses the nature of recent ‘plural’ policing initiatives and their contribution to community safety. The report concentrates on developments in the Yorkshire and Humberside region but, where relevant, draws on interesting and innovative developments further afield.

The report begins with an overview of recent debates about the complex relationship between public demands and fears, crime and disorder, and reassurance through visible patrols. It locates this within an understanding of the organisational pressures on the police and their limited capacity to meet public demands through traditional forms of policing. Chapter 2 outlines recent legislative changes and policy initiatives that structure the mixed economy of additional policing in residential areas in the UK. Chapter 3 presents the findings of surveys of housing providers and police within the Yorkshire and Humberside region, exploring their views and experiences of visible policing in residential areas. It also presents the findings of the first national survey of private security companies operating patrols in residential areas. Chapter 4 provides an overview of some recent diverse additional policing initiatives (located predominantly within the Yorkshire and Humberside region). These are presented in the form of descriptive pen-pictures that, along with other initiatives, were the focus of the research. Chapter 5 offers an overview of the diverse aims and functions of different policing initiatives, and presents some conceptual models within which to locate similarities and differences between policing personnel. Implementation lessons and challenges arising from the experiences of the initiatives studied and the survey data collected are considered in detail in Chapter 6. We then focus in Chapter 7 on some of the broader normative and social issues, notably with regard to accountability and local control, raised by the research findings. Finally, in Chapter 8, we conclude with some considerations as to the future of reassurance policing and the likely developments in visible patrols in residential areas.

Public policing and citizens’ demands

Public anxieties over crime and disorder have continued to grow over the past 20 years. During much of this period, crime rates increased and public anxieties appeared to mirror them. However, since 1995, both the British Crime Survey (BCS) and recorded police figures have shown a turnaround in the historic long rise of crime. According to the
latest BCS, overall crime rates fell by 35.8 per cent between 1995 and 2003 (Simmons and Dodd, 2003). Furthermore, the risk of becoming a victim of crime is estimated to be at a historic low (around 27 per cent per annum), now one-third lower than the risk in 1995 (40 per cent). Despite these reductions in crime, 73 per cent of respondents to the BCS 2002/03 believed that the national crime rate had increased, more than half of who thought it had increased a lot. Hence, we are faced with a paradox – as general risks have declined, so, too, general perceptions of risk have increased. However, at the same time, risk has become increasingly concentrated, both geographically and socially, such that approximately 2 per cent of the population suffer 41 per cent of property crime and 1 per cent of the population are the victim of 59 per cent of violent crime. Risk, for some, is both immediate and real, but, for most, it is mediated and remote.

Despite this, public demands on police time have grown significantly. The most immediate indicator of this is the increased 999 and non-emergency calls to the police. Driven by greater access to telephones, particularly with the expansion in mobile phone ownership, much public demand requires from the police a reactive response. As demand for policing has grown, so, too, the effectiveness of the police response has diminished because of the congested demands on it.

Public demand for policing tends to take one of three forms:

- to respond promptly to emergencies and incidents
- to tackle crime
- to put as many officers as possible on foot patrol (Audit Commission, 1996).

Satisfying all these simultaneously is not easy, as public expectations are frequently out of step with the service that the police are able to deliver. Public dissatisfaction with the police is highest with regard to the level of foot patrol. While the number of professional police officers in England and Wales currently stands at an all-time record of over 136,000, the cost of increasing this number to meet contemporary demands is largely prohibitive to government.

Despite successive attempts by police forces and governments to promote community policing, the modern pressures on police have largely served to pull officers away from locally based proactive activities into demand-led reactive duties. Burgeoning public demand on the police has left little time for non-incident-based interaction between police and local communities. Moreover, governmental and organisational pressures to monitor performance in the name of efficiency have led the police to prioritise easily measurable activities. In a managerialist culture, in which ‘what gets measured gets done’, public reassurance through locally tied patrols has lost out. This has served to reduce the public’s sense of ownership over, or investment in, formal professional policing.

Visible presence and patrol

It has become widely accepted that visible patrol, despite its popularity with the public, is not necessarily a particularly efficient or effective means of preventing crime. Patrols do little to enhance prosecutorial effectiveness or the crime-detection capacity of the police. Research from the US and UK has shown that intensified random police patrols have no significant impact on crime rates and are scarcely noted by offenders or the general public (Kelling et al., 1974; Clarke and Hough, 1984). Studies of intelligence-led patrol activities, targeted at crime ‘hot spots’ have produced more positive results (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). Patrols may have benefits that indirectly impact on crime, by enhancing a
community’s capacity to mobilise its own resources of social control or by encouraging a greater flow to the police from the public of information on which the police rely for detection.

Recent research has highlighted the limitations on the police’s capacity to deliver patrols, estimating that police officers spend almost as much time in the police station (43 per cent of their time) as they do on the streets. Only 17 per cent of police officer time is actually spent on reassurance patrol (PA Consulting Group, 2001). Most patrolling is not done on foot but conducted from a car, in part as officers are required to respond rapidly to priority incidents and emergencies. The report concludes that in order ‘to get one more officer permanently out on patrol would require employing an additional five officers’ (PA Consulting Group, 2001, p. vii).

Box 1 Police patrols
Summarising existing research into police patrols provides the following insights (Hough, 1996).

- Police patrols undertake a variety of functions, many of which are unrelated, or only tangentially related, to crime.
- Changes at the margin in patrol presence will probably go unnoticed by the public and would-be offenders, and are unlikely to affect crime rates.
- Substantial increases in patrol presence will be noticed and will prevent opportunistic crimes (while crimes involving planning and preparation are more likely to be displaced over time, space or method).
- Increasing levels of foot (or accessible forms of non-vehicle) patrol can reduce public fear of crime and increase public satisfaction with the police.

- Community policing strategies that assign officers long-term to geographically defined areas, and those that involve high levels of contact with the public, can increase public ratings of the police and reduce fear of crime.

Increasingly, patrol is now justified as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. This has largely meant either emphasising the detection and prevention focus of patrol by targeting it at crime ‘hot spots’ or emphasising the public reassurance aspect of patrol. In this light, the development of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), which seeks to integrate an intelligence-led approach to all aspects of policing, will significantly influence the deployment of police patrols. At the local level, NIM draws together information on crime, criminals, disorder, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and other problems affecting a division or local geographic area. The extent to which reassurance data feed into the model will be crucial if it is to enhance the capacity of police patrols to meet public expectations rather than merely produce organisational efficiency gains. As already noted, crime-related risks do not necessarily accord with public anxieties and subjective assessments of risk.

Fear of crime, anti-social behaviour and disorder
The past two decades have seen an elevated concern with the fear of crime, anti-social behaviour and disorder. Of particular significance has been the finding that public anxieties may provoke changes in individual and collective behaviour patterns, such as not going out alone at certain times, avoiding particular places and people, social withdrawal or, more extremely, moving away from areas perceived to be unsafe.
These reactions and responses by ordinary people may significantly and adversely impact on community life and the nature of informal social control.

Given the apparent paradox that those who are most fearful are not necessarily most likely to be victims of crime, reducing people’s anxieties of crime has become a major policy goal in its own right. However, research has shown the methodological and empirical difficulties associated with reducing fear of crime (Farrall et al., 1997). Expressions of fear and insecurity connect, not only with (personal and vicarious) experience, local knowledge, tradition and folklore, but also with wider, subjective and non-rationalistic elements of social identity and well-being.

Nevertheless, insecurity and the fear of crime remain central dynamics driving both government policy and stimulating a blossoming market in security products and additional policing services that appeal directly to public desires to do something about their concerns over personal security and community safety.

In the light of Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) hugely influential ‘broken windows’ thesis, much concern has focused on the fear-generating capacity of disorder and anti-social behaviour. They argue that disorder and anti-social behaviour are not only problems in themselves but also constitute the harbingers of community breakdown, urban decline and more serious crime. They assert a causal relationship between disorder, fear of crime and more serious crime. Their solution is to prevent the ‘cycle of decline’ in its earliest stages by focusing on ‘order maintenance’ through the policing of incivilities, disorder and other ‘signs of crime’. What is deemed necessary, therefore, is for the community to reassert its ‘natural forces’ of authority and control through early intervention in disorderly conduct. The simple logic drawn from ‘broken windows’ is that, if low-level disorders are tackled, it is possible to impact on more serious types of crime.

Some subsequent research has lent credence to the idea that the failure to act against low-level disorder may promote a process in which communities ‘tip’ from low- to high-crime areas (Skogan, 1990); suggesting that, as neighbourhoods decline, so disorder, fear and crime spiral upwards. However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest a causal relationship between disorder and increased crime. Taylor’s (1997) research data challenge the assumption that signs of incivility (particularly physical signs) influence crime and fear of crime in any simplistic manner. Furthermore, ‘broken windows’ and incivilities do not necessarily have the same effects or meaning in different neighbourhoods. Simply put, they may be interpreted in different ways. Contrary to the assumption that crime is associated with a lack of informal control, research on two crime-prone public-sector housing estates in England found that informal control mechanisms were not absent in all high-crime areas and that other mediating factors may cushion the impact of crime and disorder on local communities (Hope and Foster, 1992). As such, high-crime communities can be both disorganised and differently organised.

Levels of disorder tend to be highest in areas with high poverty, as well as heterogeneous and transient populations. In this light, Sampson and Raudenbusch (1999) offer a nuanced analysis of the disorder and crime nexus, in which they argue that disorder and crime both stem from certain neighbourhood structural qualities, notably concentrated poverty. They point out that socio-economic disadvantage is overlaid with a lack of ‘collective efficacy’ among neighbourhood residents. This is defined as the presence or absence of social cohesion, mutual trust and a willingness to intervene in support of informal social control. Disorder does not directly promote crime, rather they both stem from a lack of ‘collective efficacy’, which is itself conditioned by the structural characteristics of neighbourhoods. Many elements of disorder are part and parcel of crime itself.
Sampson and Raudenbusch’s findings imply that, although reducing disorder may reduce crime, this happens indirectly by stabilising communities through collective efficacy.

The legacy of the ‘broken windows’ thesis has been pervasive. It has fostered a focus on the policing of anti-social behaviour, disorder and sub-criminal activities, in large part because of its tenuous linkage between low-level disorder and serious crime. It suggests that the policing of disorder is a good thing not only because it responds to people’s demands – as this is the kind of activity that particularly troubles people about their local neighbourhood – but also because low-level disorder is assumed to lead to more serious crime. Public perceptions matter even if they relate to trivial incidents, in that real consequences may follow and, thus, should be of concern to the police. The implication has been to lower the threshold of toleration – as captured in the notion of ‘zero tolerance policing’ to which ‘broken windows’ gave birth. Perversely, this may serve to stimulate a more extensive demand for policing solutions to problems of disorder. This in turn can leave public policing more congested. Nevertheless, it is clear that disorder and visual signs of decay convey messages about a locality that trigger assessments and assumptions in the minds of residents and visitors alike concerning safety and security.

**Reassurance**

The reassurance that visible policing seeks to provide has been defined in a Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) thematic inspection report *Open All Hours* as ‘the extent to which individuals perceive that order and security exist within their local environment’ (Povey, 2001, p. viii). This is useful, as it highlights that security is both symbolic and material in that it is concerned simultaneously with subjective perceptions of risk and objective incidents of harm. Perceptions of order may be filtered through broader experiences of insecurity, people’s lived realities and wider anxieties, as well as direct ‘signs of crime’ and environmental neglect. The Povey report goes on to identify three essential components of reassurance: visibility, accessibility and familiarity. These are useful criteria around which to assess reassurance policing initiatives.

In an attempt to conceptualise further the subjective and objective elements of reassurance, recent research has sought to show how particular acts or ‘signals’ of crime and social control have a disproportionate impact on how individuals and communities experience and construct their beliefs about crime, disorder and control (Fielding et al., 2002). ‘Signal crimes’ or ‘signal events’ are criminal incidents or physical and social disorders that are interpreted by individuals or communities as warning signals. People read these and infer perceptions of risk. Exposure to these signals produces a modification of beliefs or actions in response to the increased risk that people perceive themselves to be subject to. By contrast, ‘control signals’ refer to the ways in which the actions performed by the police, local authorities or others may be interpreted by individuals or communities in order to inform their judgements about risks to which they believe themselves to be exposed.

In advancing the signal crimes theory, limited empirical research suggests that a number of local problems may produce particularly strong signals (Innes et al., 2002). These include: alcohol-related problems; drug-related problems and signs of drug use; young people loitering; aggressive begging; graffiti; and vandalism to telephone and bus shelters. While some of these are not crimes in themselves, they may be perceived as potentially causing more serious crime problems. A more interesting finding is that the failure of the police to engage with those incidents and problems perceived by the public as serious may be interpreted as a powerful signal of a control deficit increasing people’s feelings of isolation and undermining public confidence.
The extended policing family

The implication for policing is that certain responses and interventions by the police or other authorities may be better than others at communicating signals that neutralise or counteract the crime signals such that they provide reassurance and security enhancement. The researchers suggest that uniformed police foot patrols are a ‘primary’ control signal, more reassuring than motorised patrols. In addition, the physical design of environments, particularly street lighting, may foster reassurance.

The concept of ‘signal crimes’ and its implications for reassurance have met with favourable response from senior police managers (notably the Chief Constable of Surrey, Dennis O’Connor). The Police Standards Unit is supporting – to the tune of £6 million over two years – a National Reassurance Project, being piloted in eight police forces. A Home Office ‘Reassurance Section’ has been established to co-ordinate developments within the extended policing family. These reflect the political commitment to address concerns over reassurance from within government and senior police managers.
2 Recent legislative changes and policy initiatives

Filling the gap between public demands for a visible patrol presence to provide reassurance and the capacity of the police to meet public expectations has forced government and police managers to look to different forms of visible patrol presence and novel ways of delivering reassurance. Recent policy initiatives are outlined in this chapter. Before doing so, let us briefly consider two important longer-term social trends that have significantly influenced the current shape of the mixed economy of additional policing, namely the growth of the private security industry and the historic decline of public figures of visible authority.

Private security

In some senses, government and police have been left behind as demand for additional security has produced an increasingly vibrant (and as yet unregulated) market for visible patrol to which private security firms have responded. Estimations as to the size of the private security industry are notoriously difficult to calculate, notably because of the lack of official data. In Britain, it is widely accepted that the number of personnel in the private security industry has surpassed the number of public police officers. According to the British Security Industry Association (BSIA, 2001), there are an estimated 2,000 manned-guarding security companies and over one million CCTV cameras installed in the UK. These figures may be underestimates. De Waard (1999, p. 155) puts the total number of private security personnel in Britain at 160,000, while Jones and Newburn (2002, p. 141) have used Census figures to show that the number of private security guards rose from 66,950 in 1951 to 159,704 in 1991.1 What is clear from these figures is the fact that private security guards are no longer peripheral but key providers of policing. Increasingly, it is the private security market that is driving the provision of visible reassurance, as reassurance policing has become a commodity to be bought and sold.

Figures of visible authority

More fundamentally, the contemporary deficit in the exercise of visible authority is not merely a police problem. There has been a decline in the number of occupations with a secondary social control function. More broadly, this has coincided with a decline in local institutions of civic engagement (such as churches, political parties, trades unions, voluntary organisations, etc.). Traditional (often informal) modes of governing, public spaces in particular, through intermediaries such as park keepers, train guards and bus conductors, have all but disappeared. This withdrawal of intermediaries was often justified in terms of cost-efficiency arguments. Where such ‘capable guardians’ were replaced, it was usually in the form of new technologies rather than people. As Jones and Newburn (2002, p. 140) note, there has been ‘a marked decrease in employment in a range of occupations providing “natural surveillance” and other low level controls as a corollary to their primary functions’. Since the Second World War, Britain has seen a significant reduction in the number of bus and tram conductors, rail guards and ticket inspectors, and a variety of ‘roundsmen’ (the house-to-house delivery of milk, bread and other goods).2

The recent government attempts to revive figures of visible authority (see below) may constitute a belated recognition of the important function that these semi-policing personnel held within communities and as regulators of public space. This echoes the message from the research outlined in Chapter 1 as to the crucial interdependence of formal and informal systems of social control. Visible authority figures may act as
intermediate institutions between the formal structures of police and local authorities, on the one hand, and the informal institutions of civil society, such as families, schools, peer groups and community associations, on the other hand. As such, they may constitute the glue that binds people together and promotes social capital (Putnam, 2000).

Selling police services

In an effort to compete effectively within the emerging security market, the public police are experimenting with new methods of service provision, which involve financial and contractual arrangements with a given ‘purchaser’. Recent changes in legislation have enabled the public police to generate income by selling aspects of professional police services, including the patrolling function. Section 9 of the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994 provides the statutory basis for the police to charge more widely for goods and services that it was previously obliged to provide freely, as part of normal duties. Whereas the police had previously been able to charge for ‘special services’ – such as the policing of football matches, festivals or concerts – on a local basis, the 1994 Act widely extended the scope for this commercial activity. Importantly, the decision on whether or not a service is deemed to be ‘special’ is not defined by statute but rather left to the discretion of the force chief officer.

Given the manner in which the police struggle to provide reassurance patrols, it is precisely this function that has been increasingly drawn into additional policing purchasing arrangements. However, there are considerable variations in the expansion of income-generation developments across different police forces in England and Wales. To some extent, this reflects the lower potential sponsorship base that some forces have with regard to others. But it is also a result of different cultural attitudes towards income generation on the part of senior police officers including those at chief constable level (Bunt et al., 1997).

Regulating private security

The private security industry in Britain, unlike many other countries (De Waard, 1999), has remained, until recently, largely unregulated. The Private Security Industry Act 2001 seeks to shift the industry into the mainstream of UK policing services by encouraging a higher degree of standards and professionalism. The Act introduces a licensing scheme for security officers and their managers as well as directors and partners of contract security companies. Further, it also introduces – on a voluntary basis – an approved companies scheme. The Act establishes the Security Industry Authority (SIA), launched in April 2003. The role of the SIA is to license and regulate all ‘contract’ private security providers. In-house security officers will not be included in the licensing regime, meaning that security staff employed directly by a business, rather than from a security company, are exempt from the licensing requirement. In addition, the SIA will also license door supervisors, wheel-clampers, security consultants, private investigators and keyholders. The licence will be granted only after a full criminal record check has been issued and suitable training undertaken.

The timetable for the SIA is that, in early 2004, pilot schemes for door supervisors and wheel clammers will be in place and then rolled out across the country, by police area. In 2005, the focus will shift to manned guards and keyholders and, in 2006, to private investigators and security consultants. It is expected that the licensing of private security patrol officers will not commence before the end of 2004.

The introduction of this licensing regime is likely to impact significantly on the nature of the market for private security guards, pushing price, working conditions and standards of service
Recent legislative changes and policy initiatives

upwards. The incurred costs associated with licensing and training are likely to have a greater effect on smaller firms and may squeeze some out of the market. It has been estimated that up to 30 per cent of staff in some parts of the industry will need to be replaced because they cannot obtain a licence (Childs, 2003, p. 27). As licences are held for three years, this allows for a gradual raising of the threshold for standards, skills and training within the industry. Yet the impact on the more recalcitrant parts of the industry may depend on the extent to which the SIA is willing to use its enforcement powers from the outset.

New public auxiliaries

Recent years have seen the proliferation of various programmes seeking to introduce a variety of public auxiliaries with a visible patrol presence. The most significant are the various ‘wardens’ that have been promoted by a series of central government initiatives. The aim has been the creation and rebuilding of layers of intermediary personnel within civil society, capable of commanding sufficient authority to act as agents of social control. The idea of neighbourhood wardens drew its inspiration from the lessons of the earlier Dutch experiences of the Stadswacht scheme of civic wardens or city guards. The Dutch model employed young and long-term unemployed people as city wardens to help city centre visitors feel safer, and provide information, as well as intervene in disorderly behaviour. The guards aim to provide a reassuring presence and act as ‘ambassadors of the city’. Research found that the civic wardens had a positive impact on reducing feelings of insecurity and some forms of crime, as well as on the subsequent employability of guards (Hauber et al., 1996).

In the UK, warden schemes have been closely tied to the Government’s agenda of neighbourhood renewal. The origin of recent developments lies in the Social Exclusion Unit report Bringing Britain Together (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998), which proposed a national strategy for improving the conditions of Britain’s poorest neighbourhoods and fostering social inclusion. The National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal emerged from the Policy Action Teams’ studies of 1999–2000. Policy Action Team 6 (PAT6) recommended the development of neighbourhood warden schemes (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000, 2001).

Subsequently, the neighbourhood wardens’ programme was launched as a joint Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)/Home Office initiative in 2000, making available £18.5 million for schemes on a competitive and matched-funding basis in England and Wales. A total of 84 schemes were funded to March 2003 (subsequently extended to March 2004). In 2002, the policy lead for neighbourhood wardens was moved to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) and Home Office funding and involvement ceased at that time.

Neighbourhood wardens patrol, provide concierge duties or act as ‘super caretakers’ and offer a uniformed, semi-official presence in residential areas (Jacobson and Saville, 1999). Their broad aims are: improving ‘quality of life’; the management of housing stock and the local environment; reducing crime, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour; and building community cohesion and community development.

This initiative was followed a year later by a street warden programme, which extended the warden idea beyond residential areas and placed a greater emphasis on tackling environmental problems and caring for the physical appearance of areas. A third wave of ‘street crime’ wardens, introduced in September 2002, focus on crime reduction in ten police force areas with the highest rates of street crime. By the end of December 2002, there were some 419 neighbourhood wardens, 655 street wardens and 380 street crime wardens funded by central government across the country. A recent government report has highlighted the links
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between the environment and public safety, emphasising the potential impact of wardens on ‘liveability’ (ODPM, 2002). The ODPM recently confirmed that the funding for neighbourhood wardens will terminate at the end of March 2004 and likewise for street wardens in 2005. Councils will need to consider alternative sources of funding if the wardens programme is to be sustained over the longer term.

Community support officers

The Police Reform Act (s.38) introduced a new form of patrolling officer known as a community support officer (CSO). Operating under the formal direction and control of the chief officer, CSOs are intended to serve as dedicated patrol officers to support fully trained police officers and release them from certain tasks that do not require their skills. CSOs are designed to provide additional capacity to combat low-level disorder and thereby help reduce the public’s fear of crime. The powers of CSOs are limited to issuing fixed-penalty tickets for minor disorders, requesting the name and address of a person acting in an anti-social manner, stopping vehicles, directing traffic and removing vehicles. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 extends the powers of CSOs with regard to anti-social behaviour, signalling the Government’s intention over how this new resource might best be used.

More controversially, CSOs are able to detain a person for up to 30 minutes pending the arrival of a constable or to accompany that person to a police station with the person’s agreement. Currently, detention powers are being piloted in only six force areas across England and Wales.

CSOs were initially introduced in more than half of police force areas across England and Wales in 2002/03. The Government intends that 4,000 CSOs will be deployed by 2005. To this end, a second wave of recruitment is under way in 2003/04 on the basis of (50 per cent) matched funding between the Home Office and local police forces. As a result of this, all but five police forces will have CSOs by March 2004. A third and fourth round of funding in 2004/05 and 2005/06 will follow a similar pattern. Funding beyond April 2006 will transfer to mainstream police budgets. In the second round of funding in 2003/04, at least some 500 CSOs are to be funded through a variety of local sources.

According to some police commentators (Blair 2002), CSOs will constitute an important ‘second tier force’ within the police, with significant implications for the provision of other forms of plural policing. Given the wide array of personnel currently involved in patrol, CSOs represent an attempt to maintain this function within the remit and control of the public police. It is to be anticipated that the reception and integration of CSOs into the wider work of local police forces will be instrumental to their success. And, yet, the evidence to date is that, despite some unfavourable press coverage over discipline problems of some CSOs in one area of the Metropolitan Police (Muir 2003), CSOs have been largely well received, both within and beyond the police.

Accredited community safety officers

The Government also wishes to harness the commitment of those personnel already involved in crime reduction activities, such as traffic wardens, neighbourhood and street wardens, and security staff, through the co-ordination of the ‘extended police family’. The Police Reform Act 2002 makes provision for community safety accreditation schemes and, in certain circumstances, the granting of limited powers to accredited members of those schemes. Before establishing a community safety accreditation scheme, the chief police officer must consult with the police authority of that force and all the local authorities that lie within the police area. It is envisaged that local authorities, housing associations or the private sector (such as shopping
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centre security staff) will employ accredited community safety officers. Accredited persons may be empowered to issue fixed-penalty notices for only the very trivial offences, although, like CSOs, these are extended by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. The legislation requires that employers of accredited persons make suitable arrangements to supervise the use of their conferred powers when carrying out community safety functions. For example, employers must have satisfactory arrangements for handling complaints. In addition, individual accredited officers will need to be vetted as a ‘suitable person’ and should be adequately trained before they can take on the accreditation powers.

Unlike CSOs, accredited community safety officers will only partly be under police direction. Accreditation represents a form of ‘arm’s length’ governance through which the police aim to govern at a distance – or steer – the policing work of others. While accredited officers will not be under the same form of control as CSOs by virtue of not being directly employed by the police, this appears to hold some advantages for the police. For example, it potentially allows an acceptable response to public demand for high-visibility reassurance policing without the police incurring the costs associated with undertaking the patrol activity. In fact, the police can make a financial charge for accreditation. Moreover, it means that the police are not liable for any unlawful conduct that may take place in the performance of policing work by accredited officers. Rather, this will fall on their employers.

The accreditation provisions of the legislation came into effect in April 2003 and, to date, very few accreditation schemes are yet in operation. The first schemes became operational at the end of 2003. There has been some difference of approach to accreditation by police forces. While some have been keen to exploit the new powers, others have preferred to wait until nationally agreed protocols are in place with regard to the standards of skills, training and other requirements necessary for accreditation. To this end, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) intend to publish initial guidelines. It is anticipated that all accredited officers will wear a similar national badge, albeit their uniforms and other forms of branding may well look considerably different.
This chapter presents the findings of three surveys to elicit information about the decisions influencing potential purchasers of additional policing and the nature of the services offered by additional policing providers (both public and private). The surveys sought to collect data on the market for visible patrols and the manner in which different organisations have responded to recent policy developments. The first survey was sent to all social housing providers in the Yorkshire and Humberside region and sought to provide data on the growing role of visible patrols and the pressures on housing providers to consider additional forms of policing. The second survey was sent to all police forces in the region to explore the manner in which they have adapted to the growing division of labour in policing residential areas. These surveys, conducted in summer 2002, also provided information on existing initiatives within the region, which were subsequently pursued in more detailed analysis, outlined in Chapter 4. A third survey, conducted in summer 2003, was sent to private security companies with the aim of understanding the growing involvement of the private sector in residential patrols.

Regional survey of registered social landlords and housing departments

A questionnaire was sent to all registered social landlords (RSLs) and local authority housing departments within the region, from which we received 47 replies, a response rate of 57 per cent. We began by asking to what extent the respondent’s organisation had become more concerned with matters of crime, disorder or anti-social behaviour over the past three or four years (roughly equating with the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). Some 57 per cent replied they had become significantly or a lot more concerned with such issues (see Figure 1).

To ascertain which factors most influenced the prominence given to crime and disorder issues, respondents were asked to choose up to three options from a pre-selected list. Unsurprisingly, public demand and the public’s fear of crime were the most common factors, cited by 47 per cent and 45 per cent respectively (see Figure 2). Furthermore, 34 per cent identified perceptions over rising crime and 30 per cent highlighted a limited police presence as influential factors. More than a quarter of respondents (28 per cent) also identified internal organisational pressures and a fifth (19 per cent) highlighted the impact of membership of the local crime and disorder partnership (in particular local authority housing departments).

Against this background, we asked respondents to what extent responding to a local demand to provide some form of visible policing/patrol presence was becoming a priority for their organisation. As Figure 3 indicates, over 50 per cent of respondents indicated that the provision of a patrolling presence was becoming an important issue for them. Responses were broadly consistent across both RSLs and housing departments.

What is clear from the survey findings is that both RSLs and housing departments, because of a
surveys of policing providers and purchasers

Figure 2 Factors influencing the significance of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour in recent years (n = 47)

Figure 3 Importance of responding to public demand through the provision of visible patrols (per cent)

variety of external forces, are increasingly assuming a new-found responsibility with regard to crime and disorder issues.

Regional survey of police

A second questionnaire was sent to all 23 divisional commanders in the four police forces within the region as well as the four finance officers within each of the forces. This survey elicited 17 completed replies, a 63 per cent response rate. The survey findings indicate considerable variations across areas and forces in the importance of providing additional patrolling. This reflects the patchy nature of the emerging market both in relation to local demand and the capacity and willingness of police divisions and forces to respond to such demand through additional patrolling initiatives. When the respondents were asked to what extent income generation through the provision of additional police patrolling cover is an important issue for the police within their division/force, two-thirds of them said that it was either important or very important. Respondents were evenly split between those who said that the level of ordinary police beat patrols within their division/force had either increased or decreased over recent years (see Figure 4).
Sixty per cent of respondents strongly agreed that ‘responding to public demands for a patrolling presence is one of the most difficult challenges facing policing today’; the remaining 40 per cent agreed with this statement. Opinions on the police’s relationship with other providers of visible patrols were more mixed. Figure 5 shows that, according to respondents, the police have established closer relationships with council-run warden schemes as opposed to private security patrols. What is also evident from the data is the diversity throughout the region and even within police divisions of relations between the police and other providers of reassurance patrols.

This diversity is also reflected in the extent to which respondents felt that neighbourhood warden and private security patrols contribute positively to public safety. Nearly half of respondents agreed that both contribute positively to public safety in the neighbourhoods in which they operate (see Figure 6). A significant proportion of respondents remained undecided or had no opinion.
There was also general agreement about the need for the police to better co-ordinate and accredit the work of other providers of security and patrols (see Figure 7).

At the time of the survey, CSOs had not yet been introduced in any of the region’s forces, albeit that bids to the Home Office had been submitted by half of the region’s forces and they were very much at the forefront of debate. However, when the respondents were questioned about their impact,

they were generally positive, with 60 per cent agreed (nearly half of whom strongly agreed) that they would be useful. The remaining respondents were uncertain. Finally, 93 per cent of respondents agreed (a third of whom strongly agreed) that the development of diverse patrolling initiatives risks creating a ‘two-tier’ system of policing.

The survey findings suggest a shifting terrain both in terms of public expectations of different organisations’ responsibilities for crime and disorder, and the responses by those organisations to security and policing demands. They also suggest a fluid division of labour and mixed relations between different providers of patrols in residential areas.

**National survey of private security firms**

To date, very little is known about the work of private security firms providing mobile patrols in residential areas. The survey of private security firms sought to uncover the nature of the activities of such firms and their involvement in residential patrols. Names and addresses of companies were drawn from two sources: first, all members of the BSIA manned security section (some 102 companies); and, second, a database of companies involved in some aspect of the security (from which
Companies providing security through patrols in residential areas thus constituted only a sub-sample of those to whom surveys were sent.

We received 47 responses from private security companies operating mobile patrols. A further 18 companies said that they operated static manned security services in residential areas. These were excluded from the subsequent analysis. However, a majority (60 per cent) of those companies operating only static guards said that they were considering entering the market for mobile residential patrols in the near future.

Private security companies operating patrols in residential areas

Most of the companies operating mobile patrols in residential areas that were surveyed ($n = 47$) were small in size. The majority (78 per cent) employed ten or less guards to conduct the patrols. Only four companies (9 per cent of the total) employed 20 or more staff; the largest employed 50 guards. Our data suggest that the market for residential patrol is reasonably small-scale and locally based, with firms providing limited coverage to a modest number of residential areas often within a close proximity. For many companies, residential patrols may constitute only a small part of their overall security business.

A larger survey of security firms engaged in any form of manned security (of which the current survey was a sub-sample) reveals that, when asked which field of manned security business is likely to see the greatest potential for growth across the sector over the next five years, the most frequent response was ‘residential areas’ (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.1). This suggests that private security in residential areas is likely to be a field of considerable growth over the forthcoming years. As a consequence, we may witness a maturing of the market and a growth in the size of operations.

Respondents were asked to highlight up to two peak times of the day/night at which there was the highest demand for residential mobile patrols from clients. Unsurprisingly, the greatest demand was the late evening, between 7.00 p.m. and 3.00 a.m., the most popular time being the hours after midnight. Interestingly, this may be the period of the day when patrols are likely to be least visible to the majority of the public.

Some firms supplement patrol work with other services. For example, a quarter of firms operate a freephone telephone service for residents to inform their officers about incidents occurring in any of the areas where mobile patrols are deployed. And a fifth monitor static CCTV cameras in the same areas that their mobile patrols operate, usually on behalf of the local authority.

In trying to discover more about the work of private security guards patrolling residential areas, respondents were asked to identify up to two aims that best reflected the work of their most typical schemes. General crime prevention, the reassurance of residents and the prevention of anti-social or youth nuisance behaviour were the most frequent responses given, identified by 56 per cent, 47 per cent and 44 per cent of respondents respectively. Interestingly, none of the respondents identified community cohesion as a principal function of their work and few highlighted environmental improvement (including the management of vandalism and graffiti) as key aims.

Further questions sought to elicit an understanding of the activities and functions of residential patrols. Figure 8 shows how often security staff on mobile patrols for the firms surveyed conduct certain specific functions. Key functions include responding to alarms and calls from the public, providing patrol reports to contractors and providing information to the police. The data from the survey reveal the diverse activities and functions undertaken by private security patrol officers in residential areas.
A greater number of respondents viewed security officers’ knowledge of local people and problems as more important than familiarity or accessibility. Nearly half of all respondents identified such local knowledge as fundamental to the work of their security officers (see Appendix 2, Table A2.1).

Respondents were asked to select (up to two) from a list of occupations that they would most directly compare with the work of their mobile security officers (Figure 9). While respondents most frequently compared security patrol officers with CSOs (48 per cent), most did not see their patrol officers as fulfilling functions equivalent to those of the regular police.

**Figure 8** Functions of security guards on mobile patrol in residential areas (per cent)

**Figure 9** Comparative occupations to private security patrol officers
Respondents were asked to identify what they considered to be the most important skills required of a security officer engaged in residential patrols (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.2). Two-thirds of respondents (68 per cent) identified communication skills as one of the most important skills that their patrol officers should possess. Observation skills were identified by just under half of respondents (48 per cent) and people/social skills by slightly less (43 per cent). The extent to which training was provided by firms differed considerably. Over 80 per cent of respondents said that their security patrol officers received 48 hours of training or less. Two-thirds said that their patrol officers received between 24 and 48 hours training of some form.

Relations between private security and local police
Respondents were asked a number of questions about relations between mobile private security patrols and the local police. Generally, respondents indicated that their schemes had received a positive, albeit mixed, reception from local police (see Figure 10).

More than half of respondents claimed co-operation with the police to be very important for their manned security operations. Most respondents said that the level of co-operation with the local police was good, albeit a minority thought it to be poor (see Figure 11).

Companies with experience of working in different police areas noted significant variations between forces. Two-thirds of respondents said that co-operation was variable, as against less than one-fifth who said it was quite consistent and 12 per cent who said it was very consistent. The director of a national supplier of security services, including residential patrols, observed that there are ‘43 police forces with 43 varieties of co-operation. Some respect security officers, others regard them as simply members of the public.’ The director of a regional firm elaborated on this:

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\text{In many areas, the divisional area to which we provide security services can be fully supported at times by police. However, we have, on occasions when supplying manpower to local authorities to provide neighbourhood security, been met with hostility by} \]

Figure 10 Reception of security patrols by the local police (per cent)

Figure 11 Level of co-operation with local police (per cent)
police chiefs, giving the impression they do not want private security companies entering this area.

Other firms reported more harmonious relations with the police. The nature of this relationship tended to be limited to reports, passed on by security guards when they encountered crime incidents. Dealing with these was generally considered to be beyond their competency, as indicated by the following comment from the general manager of a local firm:

We have a good relationship with the local police and provide them with good support and reliable information. They, in return, are responsible to calls for assistance by our guards … Incidents observed by our mobile patrols whilst on duty are communicated to our 24-hour control room, who then inform the police for their assistance.

A number of firms saw their role as providing information to the police, as a ‘junior partner’ in community safety, as this managing director of a small local firm explains:

My company and officers contact the police on everything they see which will help stop any crime in any area whether we are static or mobile. I see our company as the eyes and ears for the local police force.

Some respondents highlighted the importance of informal interpersonal relations where private security managers had previously been members of the police service.

The survey findings suggest that few formal mechanisms exist between the local police and private security patrols in residential areas. A significant majority (56 per cent) of firms never hold formal meetings with the police concerning their mobile patrol schemes. A further 12 per cent did not know of any such meetings. Some 19 per cent held such meetings annually or biannually between representatives of their company’s staff and the police, 9 per cent held meetings on average monthly or bimonthly and only 5 per cent at least once a fortnight. This lack of formal meetings with the police was widely perceived to be problematic as the following respondent notes:

We need a bit more co-operation through meetings. Police should visit the local security company officers from time to time to find out what difficulties we face in the locality. At least once a week, a police officer should contact our officers working at night. They get courage and happiness co-ordinating with the police.

Some 12 per cent of respondents said that information provided by the local police is often used to direct their mobile patrols to specific areas. By contrast, 20 per cent said this happened only occasionally, 22 per cent that it rarely occurred and 46 per cent said that such police direction of patrols never took place. More than half (54 per cent) of the firms surveyed said that they did not have any formal protocol for exchange of information with the local police in the areas in which they operate residential patrols. A further 24 per cent said they had such formal protocol arrangements with local police in a few locations, while only 22 per cent had them in most or all locations. The marketing director of a national security company emphasised the importance of such information-sharing protocols:

We have developed information-sharing protocols which assist ourselves and the local police, and we actively promote the quality of the service and calibre of personnel and training to the local police and ensure they see our role as a ‘partnering’ one.

Another respondent commented on the positive experience of involvement in the local crime and disorder partnership as ‘a channel [that] is always open for exchange of information’. Others pointed to the need for greater co-ordination:

Co-operation is disjointed due to police workload although when available the police are very willing to be involved. A good community scheme usually
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results in the element of trouble moving elsewhere, which in turn moves police attention and involvement.

The data gathered from the survey show a new and expanding involvement of the private sector in the policing of local residential communities. Yet it appears that few formal mechanisms of liaison between the police and private security are in operation despite the fact that these private patrols, conducted largely in public places, are also patrolled by the police.

Licensing and accreditation

Nearly all respondents (93 per cent) welcomed the introduction of national licensing of private security officers and the establishment of the Security Industry Authority to oversee the new licensing regime. Most (85 per cent) thought that it would have a significant impact on their company. A similar percentage (83 per cent) agreed that national licensing would improve public perceptions of the private security industry. While 64 per cent agreed that national licensing would improve relations with the police, some 13 per cent disagreed. Whereas 30 per cent agreed that licensing would expand the market demand for manned security services, the same number disagreed.

Respondents also identified a number of concerns about the impact of national licensing:

- 94 per cent agreed that it would increase costs to the security industry
- 74 per cent agreed that it would concentrate market activity across a smaller number of companies
- 55 per cent agreed that it would increase pressures for organisations to purchase in-house security (not affected currently subject to the legislative licensing regime)
- 96 per cent agreed that it would increase the price of manned security
- 62 per cent agreed that it would discourage greater industry self-regulation.

When asked, over two-thirds of respondents (68 per cent) said they would consider applying to the local police for accreditation of some or all of their security officers under the Police Reform Act 2002. The increased scrutiny by, and closer relationship with, the local police that accreditation ought to afford, were viewed as likely to enhance their status and, hence, competitive commercial position. One respondent from a medium-sized regional firm commented: ‘We see it as giving more credibility to our company and the guards we employ’.
This chapter presents an overview of some of the diverse forms of reassurance policing to be found in residential areas. The overview presented here was informed by information gathered in the course of the surveys summarised in Chapter 3. Policing initiatives identified subsequently by respondents became the focus of more in-depth study. As with the surveys, the Yorkshire and Humberside region was the primary focus. Nevertheless, some schemes lie outside the region, but were deemed to warrant inclusion because they did not appear to have obvious equivalents within the region.

The chapter focuses on initiatives in areas with significant residential populations where forms of policing are additional to normal police cover and where resident reassurance was a primary objective. We have excluded the policing of special ‘one-off’ or annual events, such as sporting or musical occasions, demonstrations or street carnivals. The initiatives are offered as illustrative of contemporary developments rather than representative of all such examples.

Research aims and methods

In the research, particular attention was accorded to implementation strategies, inter-organisational relationships and forms of accountability, as well as the capacity of initiatives to meet specific local demands and needs. These and other implementation issues are discussed in Chapters 5 to 7. The nature of the research did not allow for detailed evaluations of each of the schemes but relied on the collection of secondary data supplemented by visits to initiatives and interviews with key stakeholders. While the primary concern was with the Yorkshire and Humberside region, supplementary interviews were conducted with key national contributors to policy and practice debates, including senior police officers, regulatory officials and representatives from the security industry.

Broadly speaking, we can identify the following different forms of policing, dependent largely on the type of contracted personnel and organisation providing the service:

- full-sworn police officer provided by local police – additional public policing
- non-sworn police officer provided by local police, in the form of a community support officer (CSO) – additional civilian public policing
- neighbourhood warden or other patrol officer employed by the local authority and/or registered social landlord – municipal policing
- voluntary citizen or resident patrols and neighbourhood watch – civilian policing
- private security patrols – commercial policing

Examples studied are presented under each of these headings.

Additional police patrols

Our research revealed the significant extent to which police forces, in recent years, have begun to experiment with the new-found commercial freedom that has enabled them to sell patrol services as additional cover to contractors. Thus, many UK forces have appointed ‘business development managers’ to exploit private finance initiatives. By the late 1990s, approximately 40 per cent of UK police forces had set up income-generating charitable trusts, established because they are less restricted by public sector regulations and therefore more easily able to trade (Bunt et al., 1997). An example from within the region is People United Against Crime, a charitable trust set up by South Yorkshire Police.

As sponsorship and income-generation opportunities have increased, a formal national structure has evolved to exploit them. The recently
The extended policing family

established Police Forum for Income Generation (PolFIG) is a network of force representatives that exchanges information and ideas over the development of commercial partnerships between the police and local interest groups. While PolFIG is a national forum, as a network it functions predominantly at the regional level, in accordance with the Government’s regional structure. For instance, financial operatives, such as business development managers and external finance coordinators, from all four forces of Yorkshire and Humberside, meet regularly to identify funding opportunities and co-ordinate best-practice approaches. An initial aim of the network has been to gather information on, and thereafter standardise, sponsorship and external-funding arrangements, for the purposes of audit. Part of the rationale for this exercise is that police forces are likely soon to be measured against each other on their income-generation record.

Sworn police officers
For many residents, if asked, it is the sight of a fully trained sworn police officer that they prefer to see patrolling their locality – the eponymous ‘bobby on the beat’. Income-generation activities have produced a growing number of small-scale local policing initiatives involving the purchase of police time or designated officers. Most often, these are demand-led initiatives in which an organisation, community group or commercial body formally acquires an additional level of ‘extra’ policing service. The recent New Earswick initiative represents one such development that saw North Yorkshire Police dipping their toes into this market to sell additional policing capacity (see Crawford et al., 2003). However, additional police officers are both expensive (given the costs associated with their training, pay, employment conditions and pension) and may be drawn away from their contractual duties (‘abstracted’) as they remain a public resource under the operational control of the chief constable.

There has also been a certain level of unease within the business community and voluntary sectors as well as among private citizens towards further funding of the police via such schemes. Commonly, this takes the form of queries as to why they should ‘pay twice’ for a policing service, having already paid through taxes and rates. As a consequence, most of the initiatives in the Yorkshire and Humberside region arose from sources of central government funding targeted at specific areas, such as the New Deal for Communities programme, or devolved local authority budgets.

**Preston Road Additional Policing Project**
Preston Road is a low-rise housing estate located on the south-eastern edge of Hull, comprising 3,500 properties and approximately 6,400 residents. It received funding under the New Deal for Communities programme, a grant from which supports the provision of an additional police team. In September 2000, the Preston Road New Deal partnership entered into an arrangement with Humberside Police to provide a designated police sergeant and constable who are both geographically ring-fenced to the Preston Road Estate on a full-time basis. The contract, renewable on a rolling three-year cycle, is match funded by Humberside Police through the provision of a further two designated constables, as well as managerial and administrative support. The initiative operates to a delivery plan, stipulating outcome measurements relating to reductions in crime and fear of crime, perceptions of environment improvements, the development of community capacity, reductions in the extent to which the estate’s young people are viewed as problematic and local awareness of the project.

(continued)
The principal tasks of the ‘community policing’ project are the delivery of high-visibility patrols, problem-orientated partnership work and crime-prevention activities. The team largely works between 8.00 a.m. and 10.00 p.m., thus the shift-pattern employed, though closely aligned to the Local Policing Teams, is not geared towards reactive police work. In support of their principal tasks, the team have developed community consultation through monthly surgeries and established a local Police Clinic. Each team officer is tasked to undertake ten hours' high-visibility foot patrol per week. To increase the accessibility of the additional policing team, a discrete telephone line was set up to provide local residents with a more direct channel of recourse to the dedicated officers. Officers engage with a range of local partnerships and community-safety projects within the area such as the Youth Inclusion Project and neighbourhood watch. A major aspect of the initiative has been to target anti-social behaviour among young people. The team has collected information leading to four anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) and 12 acceptable behaviour contracts (ABCs) in relation to local residents.

The dedicated sergeant manages the project. To date, the same sergeant has remained in post since the outset, ensuring a considerable degree of managerial consistency. The sergeant provides progress and activity reports to the community via a Neighbourhood Management Sub-committee. Organisational accountability rests with a Chief Inspector who carries overall responsibility for the project. The local divisional commander sits on the partnership board, providing an additional tier of accountability at a strategic level. Key local stakeholders also sit on this board, including local residents. Hence, community consultation occurs at both the strategic and operational levels. Hull City Vision, a partnership agency with a city-wide regeneration remit, formally monitors the progress of the project through monthly activity reports provided by the police. It is with this agency that the police have a service-level agreement.

Since 2001, the area has experienced significant reductions in recorded crime levels, particularly in relation to burglary. A local evaluation report (Parkinson, 2002) found that the project had achieved success in reducing the amount of anti-social behaviour on the estate and developed strong and productive working relationships with a number of organisations. There were mixed findings as to whether the project had reduced the fear of crime. The success of the initiative was also found to be dependent on the operation of a number of other projects, including the Community Safety Unit, the Youth Inclusion Project, Housing Modernisation Programme, the CCTV project and the operation of mainstream local policing.

Wakefield Safe schemes
The Safe patrols operate in five parishes that border Wakefield. The parishes are semi-rural residential areas that tend to experience relatively low crime rates and therefore receive a minimal amount of ‘normal’ policing provision. The parishes therefore decided to buy-in additional, high-visibility patrols using funds raised through the Parish precept. For example, Walton Parish Council pays £8,000 per year for 47 hours’ patrolling a month.

(continued overleaf)
The extended policing family

These patrol hours tend to occur in the evenings, between about 7.00 p.m. and 10.00 p.m., and late at night, between midnight and 3.00 a.m.

The purpose of the Safe schemes is to reassure residents by providing a visible presence in the area. The additional patrols tend to focus on particular ‘hot spots’ where young people congregate, or on stopping and checking vehicles in the village late at night. The officers are encouraged to go out on visible foot patrol. A pool of officers, who volunteer themselves for the extra duties, provide the patrols. The officers undertake the patrols at the end of normal shift provision and therefore receive overtime payments. This clearly separates off the officers’ time spent on the additional schemes from that of normal police cover. This in turn minimises the extent to which the officers are diverted via the police radio from the scheme areas and activities specified under the terms of the contracted arrangements. As the officers are drawn from an overtime pool, the schemes allow less space for familiarity between officers and local residents, or for officers to develop a detailed knowledge of local people and problems.

A police sergeant, who organises the rotas to ensure the parishes receive the additional patrols, manages each Safe scheme. A duty inspector who authorises the overtime and is kept informed of local issues and developments, bears overall responsibility for all the Safe schemes. The sergeant reports to monthly parish meetings, detailing the activities of the patrols and the nature of incidents attended. The patrolling officers are tasked according to recent police information, but also with reference to issues discussed at the monthly parish meetings, including any requests received from councillors. Although officers listen to and acknowledge local concerns, the final decision on how the patrols actually spend their time rests with the manager and the discretion of the officers themselves.

A high level of regular face-to-face contact between scheme managers and parish council representatives has helped to sustain the funding across all the Safe schemes over the last three-year period. Local parish councillors suggest that having a familiar and accessible contact within the police has been integral to the success of the schemes. However, there have been concerns expressed relating to staff turnover and one scheme was nearly wound up after officers failed to attend parish council meetings.

Burngreave New Deal Community Policing Team

Burngreave is a densely populated council ward located to the north of Sheffield city centre. In 2000, the ward became eligible for a government grant of up to £50 million over the next five years under the ‘New Deal for Communities’ programme. Part of the grant is being used to enhance community safety and reduce the high local crime rates. In 2001, the partnership board, which administers the grant, entered an arrangement with South Yorkshire Police to purchase an additional community policing team. At a cost of £130,000 per year, a sergeant and three constables provide a dedicated presence within the ward. This financial sum is used for overtime payment in order to backfill the ‘gaps’ in normal policing provision left by the officers’ secondment. The agreement, which is renewed on a rolling quarterly basis, specifies that any outstanding funding should be used (continued)
Different policing initiatives

Leeds Community Involvement Teams

There are 16 Community Involvement Teams (CITs) across the city of Leeds, comprising ward councillors, local interest groups, voluntary groups and representatives from the police and residents’ groups. CITs have been in existence since 2000 and have a devolved budget to spend in their area. In west Leeds, there are six CITs, five of which currently pay West Yorkshire Police (WYP) to provide extra patrolling. Each CIT scheme is the subject of a contract specifying how the money should be spent. Generally, local officers take on the overtime at the end of their regular shift. Occasionally, the money is used for rest-day working. This is more costly, but means that patrols can be of a longer duration. The police try to match the extra patrols by directing ordinary resources, usually community beat officers, into the same area to supplement the patrols and increase their impact.

The aims of the initiatives are relatively broad, largely to increase police visibility and reduce anti-social behaviour and crime, with an emphasis on reassurance. Crime-reduction targets are not specified. Most of the funding is spent on highly visible patrols.

The police retain operational responsibility for the officers and have some discretion over how the funding is actually spent. For example, the funding is sometimes used in support of proactive, operational policing initiatives. Community inspectors tend to have overall managerial responsibility for the initiatives, taking budgetary responsibility and presenting crime data and activity reports to the CITs. Operational sergeants manage the schemes on a day-to-day basis. Quarterly reports are produced for CITs, detailing how (continued overleaf)

to finance specific policing operations within the local area.

The area’s mainstream police cover tends to be preoccupied with responding to incidents of serious crime, notably in terms of violence and drugs. In contrast, the additional policing team has been introduced to provide reassurance and focus on quality-of-life policing issues. The team operates from a police sub-station located within the ward, to provide accessible contact between police and local residents. This also provides a base for high visibility foot patrols.

Policing activities include dealing with low-level crimes and environmental matters, such as abandoned vehicles, neighbourhood disputes and anti-social behaviour. The team is operational between 10.00 a.m. and 10.00 p.m. and also responds to incoming tasks generated through the police command and control structure. Consequently, officers are sometimes required to attend to more serious crime incidents. The presence of an accessible local police station with a stable team of officers has been well received and, according to local practitioners, has produced some positive outcomes with regard to residents’ reassurance.

A Chief Inspector holds responsibility for the additional police team, though day-to-day supervision rests with the community sergeant. Local priorities are determined in consultation with the community through New Deal partnership. A Community Safety Advisory Group, with representatives from residents and key local stakeholders, meets monthly to review progress and monitor monthly activity reports. The police team also produces an annual service plan, which details key crime reduction targets.
the money has been spent and what successes there have been. Senior officers also meet with CITT members to discuss action plans for the future.

Members of the CITTs seem enthusiastic about the contact and feedback they have with the police and there appears to be a level of trust over the police use of the additional resources. One difficulty the schemes face is spending the funding. As the money is used on overtime working, it can be difficult to find officers willing to work the extra hours. Although, to some extent, paying officers to provide the patrols on rest days eases this difficulty, it is a more expensive option. This highlights the potential limitations of using extra money to pay for policing without actually employing any extra officers.

Special constables
Special constables provide an alternative police resource that may be the subject of an additional policing arrangement. Traditionally, special constables are unpaid volunteers who work alongside full police officers, have full police powers and police uniforms, and are subject to police intelligence tasking and police discipline. In most forces, specials are allocated to divisional police teams and contribute significantly to a visible patrol presence. However, police forces across England and Wales have increasingly found it difficult to recruit and retain special constables. Research suggests a number of reasons for the high wastage rate among special recruits including: poor supervision, lack of relevant training, a lack of perceived value within the police, uninteresting duties and perception of low-status deployment (Alexander, 2000).

As a response to the decline in the numbers of special constables, the Government has sought to improve the way that specials are recruited, managed and deployed. It has introduced new Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations 2002 and issued Home Office circular 10/2003 to allow, for the first time, the payment of a ‘bounty’ to special constables – standard payment fees for the provision of a minimum number of annual hours. This initiative has been supported by a £300,000 budget made available to local forces. Three forces have received approval to run ‘bounty’ schemes, the most extensive of which is in the Humberside area where the scheme will run across the entire force (the other two are restricted to small areas of the force).

Special Constabulary Allowance Scheme – Humberside
Humberside Police Authority successfully obtained approval from the Home Office to run a pilot Special Constabulary Allowance scheme in the Humberside Police area.

An allowance of £1,500 per annum will be offered to all special constables in Humberside Police, in return for the performance of a minimum of 208 hours pre-arranged and targeted high-visibility patrol or other operational duty (16 hours per four weeks). The allowance will be paid at £115 per four weeks and is in addition to the expenses for travel and refreshment that special constables can currently claim. Humberside Police Authority has provided funding of £750,000 to enable force-wide implementation of a Special Constabulary Allowance scheme. Approval is for an initial 12-month period before a formal review.

(continued)
Different policing initiatives

The Humberside scheme commenced in August 2003 and its broad aims are to:

- improve public satisfaction with levels of police high-visibility patrols
- improve public reassurance and reduce fear of crime
- reduce levels of crime and in particular anti-social behaviour.

The objectives will be to increase the number of hours of targeted high-visibility patrol or operational duty performed by members of the Special Constabulary and to increase recruitment of special constables to an eventual total of 500 officers (from a base of 154 in March 2003). The scheme will be evaluated and reviewed by the force and the Home Office to ensure that value for money is provided.

Non-sworn police staff

Community support officers, as civilian police staff with limited powers, have afforded the police not only a cheaper resource to sell to potential contractors looking for additional police patrols, but also one that is less subject to abstraction pressures that might serve to draw officers away from a contracted initiative.

Bradford Police community support officers

This initiative covers the estates of Little Horton and Canterbury, close to Bradford city centre. Comprising predominantly low-rise council-owned housing stock, the estates are densely populated and have a high proportion of minority ethnic residents. The area experiences high levels of crime and a lack of community confidence. In addition to it being one of five initial Policing Priority Areas (PPAs), Little Horton also receives a £50 million grant from the New Deal for Communities initiative. In 2001, the wider area of Bradford became eligible for £22 million central government Neighbourhood Renewal Funding (NRF), of which approximately £5 million has been designated for crime reduction and community safety initiatives. In spring 2003, an NRF grant funded the provision of four community support officers (CSOs). The officers are dedicated full-time to the area. The arrangement, between West Yorkshire Police and the Bradford South Area Panel, is for an initial 12-month period. An additional two CSOs, deployed to the local area by force managers, supplement the four NRF-funded officers.

The aim of the initiative is to give reassurance to residents by providing extensive foot patrol, and thereby raising levels of police visibility. Prior to the initiative, car-based patrols rarely occurred in or around the estates and foot patrols were non-existent, according to officers. In addition to raising visibility, CSOs are expected to increase levels of police–public contact and develop useful community relations.

CSOs patrol individually between 8.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.m., thereafter patrolling in pairs until 10.00 p.m. To develop broader skills, they also undertake various low-level duties, such as minor crime enquiries, statement taking and victim support visits. CSOs work from a police sub-station in Odsal and form part of a wider community policing team. A community sergeant and two constables supervise them. These community constables cover the same two estates and act as mentors to the CSOs. Like all CSOs within the force, the officers are required to complete daily

(continued overleaf)
Municipal policing

Recently, a number of local authorities have set up their own policing patrols. Unlike parks’ police they do not enjoy any formal police powers. One of the earliest and most notable examples was in Sedgefield, County Durham, where the district council set up its own uniformed ‘Community Force’, in early 1994, to patrol the local vicinity on a 24-hour basis. Other local authorities have followed this lead, often focusing on crime and disorder problems on council-run housing estates. According to some leading police commentators, the threat of large numbers of local authorities setting up their own police forces provoked many police into responding creatively to the emerging mixed economy of residential patrols (Blair, 2002). However, pressures on councils to open up their services to competitive tendering and the emphasis on ‘best value’ have meant that many councils have contracted out this patrolling work to commercial companies rather than retaining it in-house.

Local authority patrols

Sheffield city centre, Ambassadors

In 2001, New Deal funded a team of six ‘Ambassadors’ to provide high-visibility patrols within Sheffield city centre. The purpose of the initiative is to assist the development of a safe and welcoming city centre, but also includes residential areas within the city centre. The primary role is to serve as a source of reassurance and a point of contact for the public, but also as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police. At the end of the first year, the City Centre Management team sought new sources of funding and thereby persuaded the council to continue funding four of the six initial posts. Thereafter, the team applied for further funding available under Street Crime Initiative money and received £500,000 over two-and-a-half years. Recently, the council has also agreed to fund a further four Ambassadors.

From the outset, the scheme built in close links with South Yorkshire Police. There is an official protocol between South Yorkshire Police and the City Centre Management team covering issues such as the calibre of employees, training, uniforms and a clear understanding that Ambassadors are not intended to replace police officers. Two police officers, known as ‘Ambassador Operational Advisors’, work from the City Centre Management office and are involved in their daily deployment. The council funds one of these posts and the police supply the other. In addition to supervising the team, these officers provide operational support when summoned by the Ambassadors.

The majority of the Ambassadors’ time is spent patrolling, generally in pairs, between 7.30 a.m. and 7.00 p.m. Ambassadors also perform some of the more welfare-orientated (continued)
tasks of police officers, such as helping find lost children, assisting at traffic accidents and checking CCTV. Regular activities include environmental tasks such as reporting and clearing graffiti, monitoring abandoned cars, collecting needles, as well as attending ambulance calls, checking CCTV footage, giving advice and directions, and talking to street drinkers and rough sleepers. The team also provides an authoritative presence at city centre outdoor events.

In accordance with funding criteria, the Ambassadors must reach particular targets relating to street crime, fear of crime, car crime and graffiti removal times. As a means of monitoring outputs, each Ambassador completes daily report sheets, which record their activities. As Ambassadors were recruited initially through the New Deal programme, this restricted the pool of available applicants to the local long-term unemployed. Scheme managers reported a lack of basic skills among some recruits, necessitating extensive training, and there were some problems with motivation. However, three of the original six Ambassadors were still working on the scheme four years after it commenced. Now that the Ambassadors are no longer funded by the New Deal programme, the team consciously tries to recruit older people because of ‘the experience they can bring’.

Kent Rural Partnership wardens

During 2000, Kent County Council, the Kent Association of Parish Councils and Kent Police carried out a major consultation exercise with rural communities. This indicated that the main cause for residents’ concern was lack of visibility from the police and other authorities, poor access to public services and amenities, and disappointing police response times. In December 2001, a ‘rural partnership’ was set up between Kent County Council and Kent Police. The aim is ‘to build community confidence and reassurance by reducing crime and fear of crime, deterring anti-social behaviour, improving access to local authorities’ services and fostering social inclusion’. The County Council’s contribution to this partnership saw it employ 12 Rural Community wardens, initially as a three-year pilot. Kent Police match funded this resource input through the provision of a significant number of community officers.

The main functions of the rural wardens are to:

- provide a visible and conspicuous presence: the preventive function
- tackle crime and anti-social behaviour: the corrective function
- act as ‘eyes and ears’ for other agencies: the communication function
- provide as a reference point on behalf of local authorities: the service function
- serve as focal dissemination point for local residents and other agencies: the co-ordination function.

The daily activities of wardens are contingent on the local needs of the various areas. In order to appraise local need and concerns, wardens attend parish and district council meetings and visit schools, clubs and care homes. They also have drop-in bases in local libraries and fire stations, and carry mobile phones that the public can contact them on.

The manager of the Rural Partnership supervises the wardens. As the scheme has expanded, three senior wardens have recently been appointed to provide a level of internal supervision. When the scheme started, the

(continued overleaf)
The extended policing family

Neighbourhood warden schemes
Central government has significantly promoted local-authority-run wardens through the neighbourhood warden programme. Roughly three-quarters of warden schemes are managed by local authorities, while the remaining quarter are managed by housing associations. Some schemes are jointly managed. This picture was reflected across the region in the variety of initiatives revealed by the research, some of which are outlined below.

Kirklees Neighbourhood Wardens
Kirklees Neighbourhood Wardens work across Huddersfield, Mirfield and Dewsbury. The initiative, set up in 2001, is funded by central government as well as by Kirklees Neighbourhood Housing and Kirklees Community Safety Partnership. As required under the funding criteria, all of the areas experienced higher than average rates of crime and deprivation, high rates of tenancy turnover or void properties, and high levels of reported nuisance behaviour, crime and fear of crime. The scheme employs six Wardens and a manager. Four of the Wardens have an area-based responsibility; the other two ‘float’ between two areas each, supporting and covering colleagues.

The functions of the Wardens include: supporting new tenancies; ensuring early and appropriate support to tenants subjected to intimidation, harassment or victimisation; liaising with the police, housing and other agencies over gathering information on anti-social behaviour; undertaking foot patrols; monitoring void properties. The scheme has developed a profile for working closely with the local police. The fact that the scheme manager is an ex-police officer facilitates this close partnership work. The police call centre directs Wardens to incidents of low-level crime and anti-social behaviour, where an assessment is made that a call for police assistance falls within the agreed ‘role remit’ and ‘geographical location’ of the Wardens. This use of Wardens through the call-handling system has freed up police time. In addition, Wardens sometimes gather information in the preparation of ASBOs and, as a result, a number of ASBOs have successfully been secured against perceived troublesome ‘ringleaders’. The Wardens in one specific area have gained recent praise for a near 50 per cent reduction in anti-social behaviour involving young people.

The Kirklees scheme was designed to ensure linkages with the Nuisance and Harassment Team, Area Housing Teams and Neighbourhood Support Unit. The institutional location of the Wardens is represented as shown in Figure 12.

Wardens serve as a visible and accessible link between the residents and the Neighbourhood Housing Department. They are expected to engage with a range of residents’ groups, develop contacts within relevant local agencies and proactively address community matters, as they arise. To facilitate public access, the Wardens’ phone numbers are widely distributed throughout the communities they serve.

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Wardens are managed from within the Housing Department and record their daily activities. They complete referral forms over incidents and tasks, and are required to record the outcomes of follow-up actions. The scheme has experienced difficulties with staff recruitment and retention, which impacted on the consistency of service delivery and hindered the development of inter-agency liaison. A national evaluation concluded that the Kirklees Wardens have been particularly successful with regard to environmental improvements. Evaluation group interviews with residents reported high satisfaction regarding Wardens’ work with young people, particularly in relation to bullying and intimidation, and their involvement in pursuing anti-social behaviour orders (Social Development Direct, 2003). Wardens appear to be a valued local resource and resident consultations resulted in pressure to secure further funding for the scheme.

**Marfleet Neighbourhood Wardens**

The Marfleet Lane estate is located to the east of Hull city centre and comprises 600 properties and approximately 2,000 residents. The estate is owned and managed by the William Sutton Housing Trust, which, along with a neighbouring housing association, Habinteg, matched the funding contribution of the ODPM for 3.5 wardens. The scheme began in 2002 and aims to reduce crime and fear of crime, care for the environmental appearance of the estate, address anti-social behaviour, encourage social inclusion and support housing management over tenancy issues. The Wardens provide a presence on the estate six days a week, working between 9.00 a.m. and 9.00 p.m., with an overlaying shift between 12.00 p.m. and 5.00 p.m., although many residents would like the scheme to remain operational beyond this time. The Wardens operate from a specially (continued overleaf)

**Figure 12 The institutional location of the Kirklees Neighbourhood Wardens**
converted house, located centrally within the estate. From the outset, an emphasis was placed on integrating the Wardens within the local community. The scheme established itself by leafleting all households in the area, informing residents about its aims and limitations.

A significant part of daily duties includes high visibility foot patrol. This enables Wardens to undertake resident visits and monitor void properties. They also undertake a range of environmental work and victim support visits, offer crime prevention advice and fit security hardware, as well as arranging and participating within a range of community development work, such as developing football schemes for younger residents. The team has also developed a ‘Junior Warden’ scheme, which rewards participants with ‘away day’ excursions. The scheme also focuses on supporting older residents, for example, by organising social events and reducing social isolation.

Wardens are tasked by the housing managers, but equally a range of tasks are generated by contact with local residents through, for example, a ‘tasking box’ located in a communal area on the estate. Wardens promote themselves as a ‘community resource’ in that they appear to be a relatively flexible and organic resource, applying themselves to a range of tasks across the community. An area manager oversees the Wardens and a local housing manager provides a degree of operational supervision, although one of the Wardens also acts in a supervisory capacity. Residents are actively involved in steering the initiative through the Estate Management Committee. Monthly steering group meetings, comprising an array of front-line agency representatives, review progress and monitor outputs and outcomes (such as void property rates, crime and disorder incidents, and turnover of residents). The maintenance of daily activity logs facilitates this process.

The Goodwin Resource Centre, Hull, Community Wardens

The Goodwin Centre is a community resource centre located within the Thornton estate, close to Hull city centre, which has developed a profile for national excellence in the management and implementation of warden schemes. It currently oversees the provision of four schemes in Thornton, Anlaby Road, Hessle Road and Springbank. Thornton is an inner-city estate that comprises a mixture of high- and low-rise flats and a population of approximately 3,500 residents. Central government, the local authority and several housing associations fund the initiative. This enables a high concentration effect whereby the scheme employs a team of seven full-time Wardens, split into two teams.

The Wardens serve as a generic resource to the local community and aim to improve the quality of life of local residents within the estate. In order to facilitate community contact, the team is based in a one-stop shop, located close to the centre of the estate. Annually, the shop receives in the region of 5,500 visitors. A recent survey of 344 Thornton residents found that 88 per cent of respondents felt that the scheme had improved the quality of life on the estate and that 60 per cent had used a service offered by the Wardens (Marshall, 2002).

Wardens operate between the hours of 8.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m., six days a week, during which time four Wardens, in pairs, are almost always present within the estate at any one (continued)
Different policing initiatives

Increasingly, ordinary citizens have been encouraged to take on greater responsibility for their own crime prevention, personal and community safety. Governments have appealed to ‘active citizenry’ and ‘voluntary collective action’ to assist in the provision of local goods and services as the role of the state has been redrawn. Civilian policing may take the form of individual or collective action. Individual acts may involve anything from installing personal security measures to contacting the police, giving information to the Crimestoppers phone line or joining the police as volunteers or special constables. Collective action may constitute low-level local surveillance through neighbourhood watch as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police, street patrols, self-help groups and more organised activities. As this suggests, there is often a thin line separating legitimate citizen action and vigilantism. Despite occasional media fascination with events such as the outbreaks of vigilantism against alleged paedophiles over the summer of 2000, most civilian policing is low level and erratic. Research highlights the difficulty of sustaining citizen involvement in relation to crime issues alone, and suggests the life expectancy of citizen patrols is rather limited (Rosenbaum, 1988). Reactions to crime rarely constitute sufficient grounds for maintaining community interest and enthusiasm over time, even in places where initial levels of awareness and participation are high.

Civilian policing efforts tend to be restricted to supplementary patrols supported by the police or voluntary activities that seek to free the police of other tasks so that the police can concentrate on patrols. In an example of the latter, West Yorkshire Police have recruited (unpaid) volunteers to undertake specific duties within police stations, such as providing information on the progress of cases to victims and witnesses, in order to relieve police officers of these duties so that they could spend more time outside the station.

Civilian policing

The Wardens’ role involves a range of activities, including victim support work, hospital visits, shopping duties, escorts for people collecting pensions, and other administrative and advocacy-based tasks. Commonly, Wardens act as a conduit for local services, disseminating information about partner agencies across the local community. Much work is undertaken with younger residents including the provision of a sports equipment library, a range of junior sports teams and a Computer Club that enables young people to improve their vocational skills.

A steering group, comprising local residents, housing association staff and local Chambers of Commerce, meets on a monthly basis to oversee progress. Wardens are supervised on the ground by two ‘team leaders’ and at a more strategic level by a Community Safety manager. The completion of activity reports and annual action plans assists managers to unlock diverse sources of funding that have secured the provision of the schemes over the last three years.
North Yorkshire, Country Watch schemes

North Yorkshire is the largest county in England and presents particular challenges in terms of police coverage. As the police have centralised their operations, their presence within local rural communities has declined. In response, several Country Watch schemes have emerged within the county. These initiatives tend to stem from small groups of individuals, forming self-help groups as a mechanism to provide patrols within isolated communities. The patrols aim to reduce the extent to which rural communities feel isolated and vulnerable to crime. The Scarborough and District Country Watch scheme began in 1995 in response to a particular spate of poaching incidents. At the time, the local police did not own any four-by-four vehicles and, initially, Country Watch organised joint patrols – civilian members accompanied by a regular police officer or special constable, generally in two vehicles, with a police car as a back-up. Patrols tend to occur between the hours of 10.00 p.m. and 2.00 a.m.

More recently, Country Watch members have started to patrol without being accompanied by police. This has been precipitated by police manpower problems, particularly the decline in the number of special constables available. In response to this development, the police instigated a code of conduct, including assurances that:

- patrols should be observation only and not intervene in incidents
- no pursuits were to be undertaken
- the police must be informed every time a Country Watch patrol occurs
- no weapons were to be used.

Police constables usually serve as points of co-ordination and liaison for the schemes.

Volunteers must apply to the police and receive formal consent before they are able to participate within the patrols. In so doing, details of the patrolling vehicles are recorded and volunteers asked which days of the week they are available to patrol.

Several of the schemes have received funding and sponsorship from a variety of public and private sources for extra equipment, such as radios and vehicles. Schemes use the ringmaster system in order to brief members about crime incidents in relation to which they receive police input in terms of local intelligence and crime prevention advice. Originally a police-led scheme, the Scarborough and District initiative is now run by its own committee.

Kidderminster Neighbourhood Watch mobile patrols

Churchill and Blakedown are neighbouring villages in semi-rural North Worcestershire. They are mainly residential villages with some farms and businesses, and a small number of shops and pubs. There are 607 homes in the two villages, a mixture of expensive large houses and smaller, older, terraced properties. In 2000, the co-ordinator of the local Neighbourhood Watch started formal patrols in response to increasing incidents of burglary and vandalism. At their height, the patrols involved 50 residents.

The stated aims are to ‘help the police catch criminals and vandals and hopefully deter them in the first place’. Significant emphasis is placed on keeping residents informed so that they feel involved and are encouraged to play their part in local crime prevention. While the actual patrols are discreet and the identity of the patrollers is kept confidential, the local

(continued)
Neighbourhood Watch endeavours to maintain a high profile for the scheme within the village by leaflet distribution.

Members undertake hour-long patrols, usually in groups of two or three, whether in their own vehicles or on foot. Under guidelines issued by West Mercia Police, the patrols are instructed not to stop at the scene of a suspicious incident, but rather to stop at a safe distance away and take details, reporting directly to the local police if necessary. Patrols are not required to follow in ‘hot pursuit’ of suspicious vehicles, nor become involved in apprehending offenders. The police advise patrollers always to back off if a confrontation should arise.

Before a patrol goes out, the police are notified and given details of the vehicle involved, a contact number, who is participating, where the patrol will take place and when it finishes. The patrols log all movements, in case of complaints of suspicious vehicles, and this log is immediately faxed to, or left at, the local police station at the end of the patrol. The local Neighbourhood Watch co-ordinator, who organises the roster, manages the patrols. Members usually have a set, regular time but these can often be changed to suit individual needs. When the patrol ‘logs on’ with the police control room, they ask if there is any specific area that the police wish them to cover, but this is usually left to members’ own discretion.

Over recent years, information provided by the patrols has contributed to several arrests. One foot patrol discovered a burglary in progress leading to four arrests. The patrols have also been of use in identifying young people involved in sprees of vandalism.

Sustaining interest in the patrols is largely down to the drive and enthusiasm of the local Neighbourhood Watch co-ordinator and successful publicity and recruitment campaigns. Nevertheless, over the lifetime of the patrols, the frequency of patrols has been reduced.

Commercial security

Private security patrols

Findings from a national survey presented in Chapter 4 highlight the growing role of private security in the provision of residential patrols. Here, we present two initiatives from within the region.

York, Community Rangers

Nineteen of York City’s 22 council wards spend part of their devolved council ‘local improvement’ budget on purchasing ‘Community Ranger’ patrols provided by private security. The arrangement between City of York Council and Mayfair Guarding, the security firm, is formalised by a contract that specifies how many patrol hours are to be purchased and approximately when they should be carried out. Typically, two separate one-hour patrols (three at weekends) are provided on a daily basis at various times between 7.00 p.m. and midnight. The contract also specifies that the patrols should ‘record any activity, behaviour or events that may be used as evidence in police investigations and prosecutions’, that this should be submitted to North Yorkshire Police and that, if required by the prosecuting authorities, security personnel shall attend court to present evidence. Patrols cost approximately £11.50 per hour.

(continued overleaf)
The first patrols began in 1999; thereafter their presence spread rapidly. Their primary aim is to prevent incidents of crime and disorder, and promote reassurance within local communities. This undertaking sometimes involves North Yorkshire Police steering the patrols to particular localised ‘hot spots’ as well as specific incidents. The public is also able to give directions to the patrols via an ‘incident’ phone line. The vast majority of the patrols are vehicle-based, although one ward has specified that it should include some foot patrols. The patrol vehicles, which are marked and visibly distinctive, carry an on-board mobile CCTV capability. Relevant information recordings are made available to the police.

Supervisors are required to attend formal ward committee meetings to review developments and submit monthly reports, which detail patrol activities, the number of ‘police contacts’ and calls received from the public. Safer York Partnership also closely monitors patrols, and acts as a conduit for information exchange between the Rangers and North Yorkshire Police. Patrols are also subject to a blunt form of market accountability, in that residents must vote on renewing the rolling contract at annual ward committee meetings.

The day-to-day management of the patrols has passed to Safer York Partnership in an attempt to co-ordinate activities and link them closer to the provision of other local services (provided by both the police and local authority). In an attempt to assess public reception of the patrols, Safer York Partnership recently conducted a public survey throughout parts of the city. It found that half of the respondents were aware of the patrols, one-third of who reported that the patrols increased their feeling of safety (Safer York Partnership, 2003). Of those surveyed, the youngest, aged 16–24, had the highest level of awareness of the patrols. The survey also uncovered a substantial deficit between the level of reassurance the public expected from the patrols and the level actually delivered.

Rothwell, private security patrols
Rothwell is a small market town, with a resident population of 20,000. Located three miles to the south-east of Leeds, it has a mixture of pre- and post-war council estates and an increasing number of private housing developments. The area is policed from a district police station in Leeds, though a small operational police house remains open in the town. Some of the town’s estates have developed poor local reputations, with pockets of high relative deprivation. In August 2002, Richmond Hill and Rothwell Community Involvement Team (CIT), with responsibility for determining the spending priorities of a devolved council budget, entered an agreement with a private security company to provide local patrols to the ward. Although spending priorities are determined through consultations with local communities, for the most part this was a council-member-led initiative. The arrangement purchased 25 one-hour patrols per week. During weekdays, three patrols per day were provided, rising to five at weekends.

The aims were to reassure residents; deter crime and disorder; and gather intelligence and evidence over incidents of anti-social behaviour. Patrols were directed to a variety of anti-social behaviour local hot spots across a number of estates within Rothwell. All (continued)
Different policing initiatives

Patrols were vehicle-based, although they lacked an on-board video surveillance capability. It was initially intended that the patrols should serve as a referral mechanism, alerting both the anti-social behaviour team and the police to incidents of disorder and other relevant information. However, this aspect of the initiative remained largely undeveloped.

An inter-agency steering group comprising representatives from the police, local authority, Neighbourhood Watch and the anti-social behaviour team, managed the initiative. The submission of a daily record of patrol times and activities provided a level of accountability to the steering group. This included details of incidents encountered and frequency of inter-agency contacts. The initiative failed to gain approval for continuation funding and subsequently ended in May 2003. Anecdotally, housing officers reported some positive reassurance outcomes arising from the initiative; however, the steering group was disappointed with its overall effectiveness. Inter-agency relations were difficult to establish and the police, in particular, were doubtful about the merits of the scheme from the outset. No formal evaluation of the initiative occurred and the steering group found it difficult to measure tangible impacts.

Gated communities

Gated communities are succinctly defined as ‘walled or fenced housing developments to which public access is restricted, often guarded using CCTV and/or security personnel, and usually characterised by legal agreements (tenancy or leasehold) which tie the residents to a common code of conduct’ (Blandy et al., 2003, p. 2). Compared to America, the number of secure private residential estates and gated communities in the UK is very small. They remain something of a novelty and there is little empirical evidence on their growth and impact. Nevertheless, many urban planning commentators suggest that we are likely to see the significant growth of gated communities in future years. A report published by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) concluded that the popularity of gated enclaves is on the increase in the UK, often fuelled by concerns over education and crime (Minton, 2002). The likely expansion of gated communities will be facilitated by current weaknesses in planning policy with regard to social mixing and the protection of greenbelt sites.

Interviews with innovative developers spearheading market development in city-centre living in the UK indicate the extent to which the privatisation and gating of communal space within schemes has become an accepted design and selling feature (Webster, 2001). Three areas most likely to see this growth are upgraded social housing estates transformed by gates, concierges/security patrols, smart city-centre condominium-style residences and small gated suburban developments. Central and local government commitments to repopulate city centres are likely to serve as driving forces encouraging gating. Innovative planners may increasingly look to security features and a visible policing presence as ways of attracting residents back to city centres.

A telephone survey of just over a thousand randomly selected respondents around the UK, conducted on behalf of the RICS, found a significant public attraction to the idea of living in a gated community (Live Strategy, 2002). Half of all respondents said that gated communities were a good thing and favoured their wider introduction. However, only just over a third said that living in a gated community appealed to them personally. The main reason given for the attraction was greater security. The survey revealed some considerable demographic and regional variations. Young people were more likely to be attracted to the idea
of gated communities than older people. Northern Ireland revealed the highest level of favourable response, whereas respondents in Yorkshire and Humberside were the least in favour.

A recent survey of planning authorities conducted for the ODPM identified around 1,000 gated communities in England (Atkinson et al., 2004). These developments are generally small (mostly less than 50 units) but are spread across the country, albeit particularly clustered in the South East of England (see map in Appendix 3). Yorkshire and Humberside reported an average numbers of gated communities. As yet, many gated communities in the UK do not have additional security personnel and rely rather on restricted access and technology as security features.

**Nether Edge, Sheffield**

This ‘new urban village’ is an exclusive gated community within the city of Sheffield, the first of its kind in the city. Gleeson Homes built it as a redevelopment of the former nineteenth-century Nether Edge hospital. The properties are a mix of converted Victorian buildings and new-built homes, all surrounded by landscaped courtyards and gardens, in a 10-acre gated development with CCTV. The occupancy is high density, comprising 180 dwellings in all, with communal garden area in the centre. There are three access roads, all of which have electronically controlled gates. There is an extensive CCTV system installed around the development, such that cameras can track the movement of individuals across the site. The intention is that, when all the dwellings are completed, the management company (composed of all the owners of the individual dwellings) will pay for the services of a concierge or guard on duty during working hours who will also patrol the grounds. Over night, a control centre will take over responsibility for security. The development is located in an affluent area not far from the city centre, and sits on the frontier between the wealthy south-west sector of Sheffield and the more deprived areas to the east and north. Property prices commence at £290,000 for a three-bedroom new house.

Interviews with residents suggest that the motivational priorities are property values and security features (Blandy and Lister 2003). Three or more months after moving in, residents had high levels of satisfaction. However, expectations expressed by residents about the development of community and the likely extent of their own involvement in the life of the village when they first moved in compared with the reality of the lack of community expressed in subsequent interviews.

What is clear is that urban developers and local authorities seeking to lure (affluent) people back to city centres as magnets for regeneration will increasingly look to security systems, gating and visible guarding as means of achieving this. The evidence available suggests that the principal motivating factors for residents buying into a gated community are greater security and safety, as well as increased property values and proximity to amenities and facilities, particularly where these are located within the community (Blandy et al., 2003, pp. 13–16).

It is worth noting that ‘gating’ does not occur exclusively under private auspices. Registered social landlords and local authority housing departments have introduced both the physical mechanisms of gating and the human personnel to provide security. Often inspired by notions of ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972), housing providers have sought to redesign the built environment so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour, and simultaneously enhance surveillance and territoriality. This has generally taken the form of physical perimeters, road closures, partitioning,
reduced or single entry and exit points, and the general physical segregation of residential areas. In theory, such modifications of the environment embed policing into the physical surroundings by encouraging greater control and surveillance on the part of residents. However, designated security personnel may easily supplement the efforts of residents.

There are various shades of gating, perimeters may be more symbolic than real – as in the case of cul-de-sacs – and security may be provided more or less by residents or designated personnel. In sum, the process of fortification – ‘forting up’ – has many gradations, only the more extreme of which takes the form of gated communities with additional security patrols. Nevertheless, with security and exclusivity as the most important aspects driving demand, we are likely to see various forms of gating become more prominent features of residential areas.
5 Diverse functions

Not only do we find increasingly different providers of policing in residential areas, but also these initiatives may encompass diverse aims and functions. Different services may be provided to meet different needs in different localities. A ‘one size fits all’ approach to security and policing needs is unlikely to be appropriate. Initiatives that work best are likely to be those where the aims are grounded in some inclusive process of deliberation over the local needs or problems and the appropriate manner in which a solution to them may be sought.

As such, before pursuing a given policing intervention, practitioners highlighted the need to understand the nature of local ‘problems’ and their context, preferably through local consultation with key stakeholders. Different contexts require different forms of policing attention. Throughout the research, we found that organisations were developing a heightened awareness of the mixed economy of policing and the emerging division of labour that exist within and between the diverse policing providers:

Even with additional policing or the neighbourhood wardens, you’re only scratching the surface and there are different roles and different sorts of purposes of the respective schemes as well ... the neighbourhood wardens quite often provide more of a high-profile community-based patrol, and everyone knows that they’re not police and we try not to have them based at police stations for that reason.
(Community safety officer)

In some initiatives, reassurance through a visible presence is only one among a number of aims. This raises several issues. First, it would be wrong to see some of the initiatives outlined in Chapter 4 solely through a policing lens. Within many neighbourhood warden schemes, for instance, the policing role is subordinate to the environmental or community cohesion functions. For the ODPM (2002), the explicit purpose of neighbourhood wardens has been more concerned with regeneration than crime, albeit that the former is intended to impact positively on the latter, as this senior manager from the Neighbourhood Wardens Team explains:

From a Home Office point of view wardens can help by being part of the extended police family but wardens also do a great deal more than that, they’re part of the regeneration family. The evidence shows that wardens can be really helpful in moving in at a very early stage into deprived communities and helping with some of the very early priorities that deprived communities in particular face, including issues of community safety and environmental concerns and looking after housing maintenance, community engagement, looking out for vulnerable elderly people and people like asylum seekers and the mentally ill and so on. So, yes, they have a community safety role but the role goes much wider than that.

This view was also reflected in many local initiatives. Hence, the policing of crime or anti-social behaviour may be a less urgent priority than meeting other local needs or services.

A second issue concerns the relationship between diverse aims. One of the lessons from local practice is that too many aims may leave an initiative floundering as it is pulled in different, sometimes competing, directions. This may be a consequence of initiatives avoiding the sometimes difficult task of concentrating efforts and prioritising aims, as they seek to meet different interests. Where different stakeholders or funding sources are involved, this may lead to ‘lowest common denominator’ solutions and a lack of clarity and coherency. It also places individual front-line personnel in difficult dilemmas as how best to manage their time. Furthermore, it presents significant problems for evaluation, as it can be unclear which criteria of success or failure should be prioritised.
Given the wide range of roles assumed by different reassurance patrol schemes, clarifying objectives and the appropriate balance of functions and activities at the outset was seen to be crucial. This was particularly so with regard to the multi-faceted role of neighbourhood wardens, as the following civil servant managing neighbourhood wardens noted:

There is a great range across the warden family. Out of the 245 schemes that the ODPM is currently funding there’s a huge range of what they do. Some of them are very close to the police, being strong on enforcement. Their uniforms look rather police like. At the other end of the spectrum, they’re very much about being advocates of the community and just reporting and linking up with local environmental services, organising local community pickups and helping old ladies to get out and collect their pension and so on. And there is a big spectrum and it was up to local organisers and funders, at the time when they were putting together their scheme implementation plan, to decide what their objectives were and the end of the market they were aiming for … But typically the ones in deprived communities and the ones managed by housing associations operate on the softer side, offering a personalised service to communities and linking them up with local agencies. Whereas the ones operating in town centres and so on, where it is a more impersonal approach, would tend to be stronger on the enforcement and visibility. Though, across the board they all do patrolling and reporting.

Third, it is important to consider not only the explicit aims of an initiative, be they determined by central government or local protocol, but also how the initiative is received on the ground. An initiative that starts out with a particular aim may be pulled in a different direction through interaction with local residents and/or other local service providers with which it must co-exist. Given the significant autonomy and discretion available to local policing personnel, there is a danger that aims and objectives develop beyond the strategic framework and evolve organically, blurring the initial vision of the implementation strategy. Hence, initiatives that start out with the explicit aim of regeneration, for example, may be pulled more into policing crime or anti-social behaviour if these are the concerns that other local service providers or the community bring to bear on them. By contrast, specifically crime-focused initiatives may be drawn into wider environmental or regeneration issues in their interactions with local residents and local service providers. In other words, there may be tensions between local needs, the capacity of local residents to voice their demands, the existing relations between local service providers and the stated aims of a specific initiative.

Where they work well, front-line patrol personnel have a crucial linking function connecting the diverse range of organisations that impact on community safety, both with each other and with members of the local community. Where crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) have sought to join up community safety provision at a strategic and middle-management level, front-line patrol personnel of different kinds can become the street-level links between local services; as such, they can address the ‘institutional gaps’ and ‘co-ordination problems’ that often exist. Added to this, front-line patrol personnel have an important referral function moving people and information through and between appropriate organisations. To perform these functions, it is imperative that such personnel have a good understanding of the local services and organisations available, their ways of working, capacities and limitations, as well as appropriate referral points.

On the other hand, the interaction that patrol personnel have with other service providers can mean that patrol personnel become drawn into the ways in which these organisations work and,
hence, may be seen by local residents, erroneously or not, as closely associated with them. In the process, they may be perceived as losing a degree of independence, potentially an important element in community acceptance. A high proportion of successful initiatives highlighted the importance of clarifying and specifying, from the outset, the aims of a given project, its methods of implementation and the roles and responsibilities of all the partners.

The focus of policing

In seeking to clarify some of the different functions and ways of working deployed in diverse initiatives, we can identify three axes on which to situate differences. As set out in Figure 13, we can highlight three different points around which the focus of a given initiative coalesces.

First, it may be driven by incidents of crime and disorder, whether responding directly to incidents as they arise or on the basis of information gathered on previous incidents, for example by targeting ‘hot spots’. Second, the focus may be on working with, and through, the people living and working within a given locality. Such a focus on improving social relations will highlight the community development aspects of initiatives, which seek to bolster social cohesion and informal control mechanisms. Third, initiatives may prefer to focus on improving the physical environment as a way of revitalising neighbourhoods and reconnecting people, in line with the Government’s agenda for neighbourhood renewal (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) and promoting ‘cleaner, safer, greener’ communities (ODPM, 2002). Many initiatives involve a combination of all three foci. However, the nature of a given initiative will depend on the relative balance between, or priority given to, each.

Where community development is a priority, this often relates to working with local young people in a diversionary capacity. A warden manager explained that the breadth of the role allows activities to be prioritised in a manner that seeks to develop immediate communal trust in the wardens by demonstrating a swift and positive impact:

> It’s important to prioritise it, so that initially for the first six months we might be just concentrating on environmental issues to start with, get the area cleaned up and then we’ll be going on to do the other things, like crime prevention, next. And we won’t be trying to tackle the gang of kids outside the chip shop and certainly not initially because one of the problems with that is that the kids are usually quite hostile. They hang about in gangs because they see us as a threat initially; it takes a while, a period of time to start establishing a trust and then start forming a relationship.

This pragmatic decision acknowledges how changes to the physical environment may have a more instant impression on local reassurance than seeking to address long-term community development issues. Further, it indicates the way in which some initiatives are required to be dynamic, shifting and changing over time.
**Modes of policing**

In addition to the question of focus, we can highlight three different modes of policing, regarding how implementation is achieved (see Figure 14). Again, these are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, but represent differing styles or approaches to delivering reassurance. First, patrol places emphasis on the visibility of policing personnel as a reassuring presence, a kind of a ‘mobile scarecrow’. Second, enforcement emphasises compliance through imposition. As such, it places greater store on the coercive powers of given policing personnel. Third, problem solving is more concerned with seeking to address the causes of local problems through prevention and partnerships with wider stakeholders. This is usually sought through holistic interventions that may extend far beyond the narrow lens of crime control.

There is clearly an interaction between the focus and mode of policing. As already noted, most neighbourhood warden schemes tend to place less emphasis on policing through enforcement and focus more on people and places in order to assist community development and urban regeneration. Private security patrols, by contrast, tend to operate with less emphasis on enforcement or problem solving. They focus less on direct public contact, but rather on the deterrent capabilities of vehicle patrol, the reassurance afforded through visibility and the ability to respond to calls from the public reporting nuisance behaviour. For example, in the absence of any enforcement powers, private security patrols often utilise in-vehicle mobile CCTV as a mechanism to deter and prevent disorderly incidents.

Different schemes tend to lay emphasis on different modes of working, yet this is not to suggest they are mutually exclusive. Patrol is a strategy of reassurance but it is also a method of surveillance, of uncovering ‘problems’ that require attention or rule breaking in progress. Furthermore, it would be inaccurate to think of all warden schemes as problem solving, or all private security as being merely delivered through patrol and police initiatives through enforcement. A number of initiatives in our research contradicted this stereotype. For example, police officers provided by one additional policing project were drawn quite heavily into problem-solving activities:

> Our additional policing team is there to focus on the issues that [the New Deal for Communities] would like tackling as part of the regeneration process, to try and deliver the model of long-term problem solving. But that’s what we’re trying to do … actually break the cycle. So in terms of, for example, dealing with anti-social behaviour, it’s a lot more than enforcement, it’s about working with young people, making sure that the right opportunities are created for young people to divert them away from crime and anti-social behaviour.

**The tools of policing**

In line with, and elaborating further on, the different modes of policing, we can also identify the relative emphasis placed on resort to different tools of policing (Stenning, 2000). The capacity of...
The extended policing family

different initiatives to draw on different tools in large part depends on the different kinds of security personnel employed, their legal powers and personal competencies. Figure 15 outlines the broad types of tools on which policing personnel may draw.

Physical and technological tools relate to the material things that policing personnel use in their work; such as vehicles, radios and surveillance cameras, as well as handcuffs, batons and protective vests (where relevant). Legal tools are the powers (either threatened or used) that policing personnel can employ, be they powers of arrest, detention, issuing fixed-penalty notices, bye-law or civil enforcement, powers of eviction or powers deriving from private property. Personal tools include communication and negotiation skills, strength, character, local knowledge and other personal competencies. Symbolic tools are those vested in the status of the policing personnel, derived in large part from public respect for, or deference to, the given uniform officers wear. The presence or absence of symbolic tools depends on the esteem in which a given organisation employing an officer (police, social landlord or security company) is held. The relative reliance on different tools not only varies across schemes but also differs between individual personnel.

The manner in which different policing personnel make recourse to their available tools emerges from the cultural practices forged within the workplace. These practices are, in turn, largely influenced by the mode of policing being pursued at any one time. For example, initiatives that prioritise enforcement strategies are more likely to see personnel using legal rather than personal tools in order to achieve a given objective.

Table 1 summarises some of the general differences between various types of patrol personnel according to the three axes of policing described above. These are illustrative of broad trends found in the research rather than meant to imply that all personnel in all circumstances conform to these archetypes.

Legal powers

Our research revealed some concern that the availability of enhanced legal powers, namely through police accreditation schemes, may in itself distort the way in which policing personnel operate. For instance, additional legal powers might encourage an enforcement approach at the expense of community development and focused problem-solving strategies. This was particularly evident with regard to neighbourhood wardens, where it was believed that extended legal powers might foster a tension within the warden role between ‘working with’ and the ‘policing of’ local residents. The following warden pointed to the possible adverse implications for sustaining trust with local residents:

They’re bringing these new wardens out where they’ve got the authority to issue tickets and that sort of thing. I think you can become too authoritative then. We’ve got a great reputation on here [the estate] at the moment; if we were given that power to go out there and issue tickets for road tax and that sort of thing, we’d lose the trust of the people. They would shy away from you again. And I think, if you start, you’re becoming more like the police ... We’re not here for that.
Table 1 Different forms of policing

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<tr>
<th>Focus of policing</th>
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<th>Tools of policing</th>
<th>Personal skills training*</th>
<th>Symbolic power</th>
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<td>Incident focus</td>
<td>Patrol (visibility)</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
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Very high
High
Medium
Low

* This is assessed on the basis of the approximate level of training received.
Analogous concerns were raised with regard to commercial security guards, where our survey revealed a significant ambivalence to the idea of extended legal powers as part of accreditation schemes. While patrolling public spaces, this form of plural policing is able to draw symbolic support from legal powers, which some members of the public may believe they possess. A private security officer explained:

*The only saving grace we’ve got, as I say, is that those kids out there do not know what powers we’ve got. That is our get-out, they don’t know. They think we’ve got all the powers in the world except for the know-it-all. And I would say a good 70 per cent think that we’ve got more powers than we’ve actually got, and that’s what gets us through. If I’m being truthful, it kids them; it’s a bit of kidology.*

Different situations require different recourse to different tools. Where policing personnel do possess legal powers, then the role of discretion forms a vital part of how they are used, and to what end. Unsurprisingly, police forces, in particular, display some concern that the powers and processes of civilian arrest, available to plural policing personnel, should be clearly defined. In this, the importance of discretion is a given. For example, there is some evidence that, in the early phases of implementing police CSOs with detention powers, the officers within one local force were unnecessarily resorting to detention, when other problem-solving techniques may have been more appropriate. While training can provide guidance on the appropriate use of various policing tools, for the most part, this is learned behaviour, gained through experience within the role.
This chapter summarises some of the implementation lessons learnt from the case studies outlined in Chapter 4 and other initiatives contacted in the course of the research. In addition, it draws on interviews conducted with key national figures representing the different interests and organisations involved in delivering residential patrols.

Skills and competencies
The skills and competencies of those individuals delivering plural policing initiatives are often very important to the success of a scheme. Communication skills are seen as the most important characteristic of a successful warden, as a large part of the role involves acting as a link between, and referral point for, different agencies as well as a point of contact for residents who have concerns or problems. The following warden manager highlights the importance of good communication skills:

*They’re all sorts of shapes and sizes, but the one thing that we’ve got is they’re all good communicators. They’ve all got a variety of skills from a variety of backgrounds.*

Attracting skilled wardens with the appropriate personal qualities proved problematic for some warden schemes, but, as the following manager notes, he would prefer not to recruit than to recruit inappropriately:

*But what we’ve always said is that we wouldn’t just fill numbers. We’ve run at times with three wardens and just still kept the scheme going because it’s the quality of the warden that we’ve got not the quantity. We could have a dozen people of the wrong calibre, this scheme wouldn’t last, wouldn’t last a week.*

A private security officer discussed the importance of knowing about the people with which interaction is required so as to find ways of intervening in situations such that they do not escalate:

*But, nine times out of ten, if you go up to them in the right manner, where if you get a gang there’s probably two or one that’s the centre of it. If you can pull him out and have a quiet word, he’ll keep the rest quiet. The others are just like sheep. They’re following all over, because they’re not all bad kids.*

Local knowledge
A key personal tool is local knowledge. While community consultation exercises aim to feed local knowledge into strategic decision-making priorities, implementation is usually assisted by recruiting people who are themselves knowledgeable about their locality, its people, places and resources. Where officers are dedicated to an area, this is often seen as being important in terms of improving links with the community that may foster local knowledge. The local knowledge that long-serving policing personnel can develop allows them to police the community more sensitively, exercising discretion appropriately and thereby gaining the trust of the community. A private security supervisor spoke about the way one of his staff had developed acute local knowledge in the following terms:

*He knows his area so well now and the local knowledge he’s got, and the local knowledge that he’s giving to the police is second to none. If they want to know anything from that area, they follow this guy. And they know that they will know everything, but everything.*

Local knowledge entails getting to know the residents, the relations between them, their capacity to support security endeavours, and the diverse needs and problems of the area. Developing informed local knowledge takes time on the part of policing personnel, and requires them to build and sustain relations with residents.
The extended policing family

Clearly, this is enhanced where individuals work or live within the same area over a period of time.

By contrast, staff movement can adversely impact on reassurance policing initiatives, as residents usually prefer to have a familiar face. Consequently, moving wardens around to different areas tends to be avoided, as the following scheme manager makes clear:

[I] originally thought that we might move them round, wouldn’t dare do it now! I only do it when I really, really, really have to because they get a very close bond with them.

However, wardens may be perceived as a resource of the local authority and moved in accordance with organisational needs. For example, one neighbourhood warden working in Leeds was moved out of one ‘difficult’ estate to another, precisely because she was considered to be particularly skilled and experienced at working with difficult youths on such estates. This raises questions over whether managers utilise neighbourhood wardens as a local or an authority-wide resource. Where the former holds, the resource is likely to have more time to develop local relationships both with residents and other local service providers; whereas the latter tends to result in a resource being used in a ‘trouble-shooting’ capacity, moved to wherever the greatest need is perceived to arise over time.

Staff retention

Staff retention is a problem that can serve to undermine local reassurance, as familiarity, trust and local knowledge may all become disrupted by staff changes. One warden scheme in the region lost four of its staff in the first year alone. In order to address retention issues, one scheme in Hull has introduced loyalty payments for wardens if they remain in post for more than one year. The following local authority officer highlights the problem of staff turnover in relation to neighbourhood wardens:

One of the problems that we’ve faced has been retention of staff. It’s good news and bad news is that. The bad news is that we’ve lost staff. The good news is that the reason we’ve lost staff is that they’ve gone on to something else, usually within the same sort of field or, don’t take this the wrong way, but they’ve moved up.

As this officer implies, the very skills developed as a warden may be transferred to other lines of work and the role of a warden may be a stepping stone to new careers. The breadth of the warden role offers particular opportunities to move into other occupations. This raises an issue over the relative status of particular occupations within the extended police family. Similar career movement is commonplace between private security and the police, with retired police officers becoming security managers and some security guards applying to the police. Similarly, there is some evidence of movement from wardens to CSOs as, among other things, the uncertainties of short-term funding arrangements begin to bite.

In addition to movement between organisations, the new role of CSOs appears to be offering police forces a new means of recruitment into the full police role. To date, in some forces, significant numbers of CSOs have applied and/or been accepted onto probationer training. Given the greater representation of black and ethnic minorities among CSO recruits, as compared to their representation among rank-and-file police officers, this may provide an important way for the police to become more representative of the population. However, this vertical movement questions the relevance of claims that CSOs constitute a new breed of police personnel ‘genuinely committed to the police equivalent of public health’, namely the less glamorous aspect of patrolling (Blair 2002, p. 23). It appears that, for
some recruits, work as a CSO is rather seen as a pathway into the job of a full-sworn police officer. This also reminds us that the introduction of new policing personnel can have knock-on implications for other, more established forms. It is clear that the introduction of CSOs is likely to have an adverse impact on the recruitment of special constables, whose numbers are already on the decline. The widespread introduction of CSOs may also sap funding away from other forms of patrolling, potentially reducing the extent of the plurality that we are currently witnessing.

Training

For all forms of plural policing, training and skills development are important in the delivery of high quality and competent staff. Many managers and front-line staff recognised that there is considerable scope for greater improvement (in content quantity and quality) and standardisation of training for different policing personnel. Currently, the training for CSOs varies across police forces. Most training of neighbourhood wardens has been organised locally or regionally by scheme managers, in co-operation with police, mediation services and various departments of local authorities with whom wardens are expected to come into regular contact. Before becoming operational, most wardens undertake generic training courses that cover a range of topics, including first aid, counselling, crime prevention and general health and safety. The duration of these courses is usually in the region of between six and eight weeks.

Despite the difficulties of developing and providing centrally administrated training courses, it is clear that the relationships that scheme managers have built up with civil servants at the Neighbourhood Wardens Team, in the ODPM, and in government regional offices, have proved valuable in some instances. The training of private security officers in the current period prior to the introduction of the new SIA regulation and licensing regime in 2005/06 is acknowledged to be patchy and almost negligent in some cases. In this context, the BSIA and the Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) have sought to promote and provide training for the private security guards by aligning it closely to the recent regulatory drive and defining it as a central mechanism to raise industry standards.

Times of the day/week

In addition to the diverse needs of local areas and the different functions that policing personnel pursue, a further variable in the type of policing resource relates to the different times of day and days of the week that services are provided. While normal policing cover by the police is a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year service, additional patrols may be restricted to particular times of the day or days of the week.

Most neighbourhood warden schemes are limited to the working day and tend not to cover evenings and weekends. Although some extend provision until 10.00 p.m., this is the exception to the rule. By contrast, private security patrols generally occur only in the evening, evidently when most complaints of youth nuisance behaviour are made. As a consequence, both wardens and private security operate in the same neighbourhoods, although there is often little relationship or contact between them as they pass like ships in the night/day. In part, this relates to the different policing demands at different times of the day. While the daytime activities of wardens may be more attuned to community development, the night-time patrols are more focused on reassurance and incident management.

Some neighbourhood wardens expressed concern that there was pressure on them, often coming from residents, to work later at night and into the weekends, as these were the times of greatest perceived insecurity. However, as the following warden explained, some felt that this
The extended policing family

would draw them more into the enforcement function and leave less scope and time for community development work:

The majority of our work is evening work and most of it we work evenings until nine o’clock because obviously that’s when the kids are out of school. So that’s when we need the street cover [from the police] and then residents say ‘yeah, but you go off at nine then they [the kids] start misbehaving’. But we’re not a police force, we can’t be here 24 hours a day.

Trust

Establishing and sustaining trust relations between local policing personnel and residents, as already noted, is a fundamental aspect of a successful initiative. This is particularly so for wardens given their wider community development and neighbourhood renewal functions. New schemes particularly need to overcome initial scepticism or hostility on the part of residents as the following warden explained:

Most people on the estate, when we first came on the estate people were a little bit unsure of us so we did a door-to-door knock, dropping the leaflet off, introducing ourselves saying this is what we are about. So, after that, the more they see you walking the street the more confident they are with you, they approach you.

Another warden suggested that establishing trust becomes easier once residents begin to see tangible improvements within their area or neighbouring localities:

People are seeing the changes and, I mean, the surrounding areas here are looking to have wardens. And I like to think that’s because they’ve seen what we’re doing on the estate and that people are trusting us and we are starting to solve some of the problems on the estate and people want us to stay now.

For wardens, the relationship with the police can be seen as a stumbling block to sustaining trust, particularly in high-crime areas where residents may often display suspicion of police activity. The following warden explained that perceptions of the closeness of their relationship require managing:

When you come on to an estate like this, people look at you as being a copper’s snitch. And I think some people were a bit wary. We used to have a police surgery run out of here and it was like a police drop-in and then we stopped doing that. Although we do have a good working relationship with the police, we keep it at arm’s length. We didn’t want the police using this as a tea spot because the kids on the estate would see us as being working in conjunction with the police. It was very important for us to win the trust of the young people on the estate and to do that we had to interact with them. And we just felt that the police were putting barriers in the way, extra barriers that we’d have to break down to get the trust.

One scheme manager explained how wardens can act as an important link between police and communities where relations are strained with the local police:

If you had to find estates where often the police are seen as part of the problem, then the person that you might trust is the warden. So you might know who the person is who’s dumping the abandoned cars, but you’re not going to tell the police. But you will mention it to the warden who will then tell the police.

In other neighbourhoods, a close formal relationship with the police may be seen to be a benefit.

Familiarity

Povey’s Open All Hours report (Povey, 2001) identified the key elements of reassurance policing as visibility, accessibility and familiarity. Our research reinforces the importance of policing
personnel being both visible and accessible to the residents they serve. Familiarity, however, as an element of reassurance policing in residential areas is somewhat problematic. A central characteristic of successful policing personnel is local knowledge, which entails staff being both locally known and knowledgeable about their community and its local capacities. This is different from familiarity. Too much familiarity can undermine the ability of policing staff to work with, but stand outside of and be independent of, the community that they police. The more attached to the community that policing personnel are, the less likely they are to hold the required ‘detached stance’ that constitutes a central value in establishing legitimacy. The more familiar their relations with members of the community, the more policing personnel may be seen as allying themselves with particular interests or individuals. It is precisely for this reason that many policing personnel prefer not to work the areas in which they live. They realised that to police an area with which they are too familiar might present difficult problems for them and raise potential conflicts of interests.

Visibility and dosage

Policing and crime prevention projects often fail because the intensity, or dosage, of an intervention is insufficient to ‘make a difference’. This requires consideration of ‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘at what rate and quantity’ a patrol resource should be introduced into a specific area. In terms of reassurance patrols, dosage is perhaps mostly a function of visibility. To have a significant impact on residents’ sense of security, high-profile patrols may require a considerable concentration of resources. Importantly, dosage decisions need to consider the impact of the residents’ expectations and the manner in which they may serve negatively to influence assessments of success.

Similarly, a community safety officer described that high-dosage schemes often may still fail to meet community expectations over the increased visibility of patrol:

*Because when you tell the community they’re getting ten wardens in an area they think that’s a lot. But when there might only be four or six on at once that’s only three lots of patrols that can happen at any one time, or two wardens in a shop and two patrols. And some of the areas are quite big when we’re looking at ten wardens in a scheme so you’re not gonna see wardens walking past the door all day.*

If dosage levels are too low, then even the most modest outcome expectations are unlikely to be realised. One council officer expressed this sentiment when setting up a local warden scheme:

*The last thing we want to do is set them up to fail. And there were some sort of reservations from people, ‘why on earth didn’t you put one in that area that’s crying out, it’s got real problems?’ And we thought well you’ve got to be realistic and think what impact can one warden or two wardens have? They obviously work in pairs now, in such an area, and we thought, ‘no, you’re setting them up to fail’ … we did choose areas that have problems but perhaps they weren’t the ones that were too intractable.*

This comment also draws attention to the potential limitations of the warden’s role in terms of the impact that they can have realistically, notably within some intractable areas. This re-emphasises the importance of selecting appropriate forms of policing personnel in accordance with the local context. But it also alludes to the danger of resources being drawn into areas where they may be perceived to have the greatest chance of measurable success rather than distributed according to need.
The extended policing family

Identity

The variety of different agencies currently providing visible patrols within residential areas has introduced an assemblage of new policing operatives, with a diverse array of identities, to the public. This not only presents different policing uniforms, each representing distinct agencies and organisations, but also an assortment of policing styles that are underpinned by different mechanisms of recourse to formal and informal powers. This potentially introduces considerable ambiguity to the way that the public receives plural forms of policing and the reassurance outcomes that they might be expected to generate. As such, there is a danger of uncertainty and confusion characterising the public’s response. In this, the appearance and identity of different providers is to the fore. One regional police force recognised this in issuing the following guidance to senior officers:

Wardens need to be readily identifiable at a local level. Their appearance should be distinct from that of the police in terms of uniform, livery and corporate image so as to avoid confusion to the public.

This issue is brought closer to view by the introduction of CSOs. These patrolling personnel may appear to the untrained eye as ordinary police officers, but minimal legal powers betray their civilian status. Here, the corporate identity of the police remains, but it no longer guarantees a ‘police officer’.

Identity confusion may gain pace with the introduction of police accreditation schemes and as the market for private security grows in sophistication. A local authority officer voiced the concern over identity confusion in relation to private security patrols:

We’ve got some issues as to how they appear, the scheme is seen as quasi-police: uniform and handcuffed and marked vans with flashing lights and all the rest of it. What’s the difference between them and the police? And we have got some issues around that. I think in an ideal world we’d like to try and tone that down a little bit.

Formal accreditation schemes are set to enable private security guards to claim a level of intimacy with the police hitherto unseen. They signal an intention for closer forms of partnership, whereby the police brand will be shared with non-police colleagues. Accreditation will impart an element of public status to the identity of private personnel and, simultaneously, potentially dilute the corporate identity of the police, as perceived by the public. One chief constable within the region indicated that a cornerstone of this identity is the integrity brought about by public accountability, lacking from other forms of plural policing:

I have to make sure that all the elements that go together for the integrity of the police force are not undermined. Integrity of the police is absolutely foremost on my mind. We have to be sure of everybody who works for us – we have to be sure of everybody who works for the public. If we accredit them [street wardens], how accountable are we [the police] for their behaviour? Who controls their behaviour? It’s about the integrity, the direction of control issue. Integrity and direction of control worry me enormously. I’ve got control here over the integrity of this force and anybody who works for it – and if they step out of line I can deal with it. I can’t deal with their [wardens’] integrity.

Publicity

Publicity occupies a key role within reassurance-based policing projects. However, in seeking to raise the profile of an initiative, expectations may become over-inflated. Hence, initiatives have a responsibility to provide a sense of realism when informing residents about what an intervention might practically achieve.
Publicity surrounding the provision of additional policing can serve to highlight the extent of crime problems within a particular area. Here, the solution of policing may betray a contradiction within the goal of regeneration. While aimed at reducing crime and fear of crime, it may serve to re-emphasise an area’s crime problem, potentially reinforcing an adverse reputation.

By contrast, publicity about a scheme in one place can leave those living in neighbouring areas feeling more vulnerable because of concerns over displacement. In this way, additional patrol schemes can have a spreading logic. As a scheme is introduced into one area, concerns over potential adverse knock-on effects may lead others to lobby for the introduction of similar initiatives in their localities. A councillor explained how this had manifested itself in his city:

> I think also there’s a displacement fear. Residents in one area that don’t have a scheme, if the neighbouring area has a scheme, are all the hooligans coming out of that area and into their area? So, one or two schemes have sprung up because of that. I think, by and large, residents welcome schemes don’t they? They feel that reassurance. That’s the ad hoc evidence we get, but, as I say, we don’t have any hard evidence to suggest that.
It is increasingly acknowledged that, despite successive police and government attempts to promote ‘community policing’, modern pressures on police have largely served to pull officers away from locally based, proactive activities into demand-led, reactive duties. Burgeoning public demand on the police has left little time for non-incident-based interaction between police officers and the communities that they serve.

Organisational pressures to measure performance in the name of efficiency require the police to prioritise easily measurable activities. Consequently, public reassurance through locally tied patrols has lost out in the process. A chief officer from within the region explained:

Self-evidently, cops don’t have time to stand and talk to little old ladies on street corners or little old men in pubs or anything else any more in that sense because they’re constantly driven by this bang, bang, bang, next job, next job, next job, next job, get to it, go, go, go, and it’s a treadmill for them.

This has served to reduce the public’s sense of ownership over, or investment in, professional policing. Additional policing patrols, by contrast, allow for a potential re-engagement on the part of communities with local policing processes. They do so precisely because they invest some notion of ownership over the ‘new’ policing resource. In so doing, they also raise community expectations over the quality of service delivered precisely because policing is both additional and the outcome of a commercial relationship. As the following police manager notes, additional contracted policing essentially means that residents are paying twice for the levels of service:

I feel I’m qualified to say with my length of service that it’s a little bit sad in society these days that you can’t provide a standard of quality of service that the public has come to expect. And it’s a sad

indictment that, basically, rate payers are having to pay twice for the same standard of service or to get the quality of service back.

While the purchase of additional policing patrols is a reminder of the failure to provide an adequate universal policing service in response to contemporary demands, it also serves to reconnect ownership. The contemporary message is that, if residents want a visible presence in their area, they have to pay for it. A local authority community safety officer articulated this point:

The only thing the [local authority] can do is to say that, if we want two police officers to come on a Friday night and not have a radio that is going to call them away, then realistically the local authority know that they are going to have to pay for extra police hours.

The flip side of this is that, through additional payment, a greater degree of ownership is expected. A new, more direct relationship is forged, which, as the following local authority officer suggests, infuses policing with a more client-orientated disposition:

If all of the [local authority teams in the area] pay £10,000 each to the police, you could ask why don’t the council just take £10,000 off each and give it to the police budget in the first place? But I wouldn’t be in favour of that because that goes into a management pot and it’s not necessarily going to go to the people who paid the money in the first place. So, if you’ve got a local [resource], people can contact their local councillors and can then pay for the extra policing for their local problem. That’s far better than having it creamed off into a central pot and having no control of what policing it gets.

Local funding arrangements facilitate the decentralisation of ownership over policing, which in turn demands, and in many instances enables, the thickening of local forms of control.
Community engagement

The initiatives studied all highlighted the importance of engaging with local residents, exploiting their knowledge about local crime and disorder problems, and providing them with a stake in their own community policing efforts. Good community consultation at both strategic and operational levels was identified as important in establishing and maintaining community engagement. Structured community feedback – such as focus group interviews, surveys – can help to avoid problems escalating. Non-traditional methods of consultation may help elicit feedback from otherwise hard-to-reach groups within communities, such as the young and elderly. Some of the practical ways of engaging local communities are set out in Box 2.

Ownership and control

The question of ownership is problematic where the police sell an additional level of service. This is because chief constables are unwilling to relinquish operational control over their officers. Given that officers ultimately remain public resources, the police need to retain the operational ‘final say’ over deployment regardless of whether they are contracted to specific patrol duties or not.

A contractor of additional police patrol may end up purchasing a resource but not have the ultimate say over its deployment or availability. This can become a stumbling block to implementation, particularly where a dedicated officer is frequently drawn away from their contracted work into wider operational duties (Crawford et al., 2003). In practice, so long as the activities of the additional contract fall within general policing priorities and local delivery plans, then deployment duties can usually be agreed between the police and contractor in the form of a service-level agreement. Other ways to reduce the pressures of abstraction are to use police overtime or CSOs as the basis of additional policing. Overtime is additional to normal duties and therefore less likely to be

Box 2 Engaging local residents

- Providing residents with accurate data on local crime and policing activities, to allow local citizens knowledge of crime patterns in an understandable form.
- Informing residents about the local personnel, with photographs, as well as about the initiative, its realistic aims and limitations, for example through meetings, newsletters and leaflets.
- The provision of an easily accessible operational base or office located within the residential area from which patrol officers work, preferably in conjunction with other local community safety service providers under the same roof – in a ‘one-stop shop’. Where this is not possible a drop-in base may prove an alternative option.
- Enabling residents to provide confidential information to patrol personnel on problems, hot spots and potential solutions – such as a well-publicised dedicated telephone number or ‘tasking box’.
- Organising activities that seek to involve the community alongside policing personnel, such as ‘community clear-up’ days and other events with younger people.
- Involving personnel in key activities with vulnerable groups, such as victim support and witness assistance programmes.
affected by wider operational demands, and CSOs are a more flexible resource and, as their primary role is that of patrol, they are less likely to be abstracted to non-patrol-based operational duties.

**Accountability**

Traditionally, accountability with regard to policing tends to take a variety of forms (see Box 3).

**Box 3 Accountability with regard to policing**

- *Legal accountability* to legal norms of conduct through the judicial system.
- *Political accountability* through the political processes of representative bodies (namely, local police authorities and ultimately the Home Secretary).
- *Administrative accountability* through the administrative systems of complaint and discipline.
- *Financial/managerial accountability* to ensure the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of policing through the processes of inspection and audit.
- *Direct accountability* through mechanisms by which the police are directly accountable to citizens as individual consumers or as groups, such as responsiveness to individual incidents or calls to the police and local consultation arrangements.

This framework of public accountability extends less easily to forms of additional policing provided by professional police where purchased for parochial purposes and, even less so, to non-police patrols. Nevertheless, where policing is purchased as an additional resource, new forms of ‘private’ or ‘parochial’ accountability come into play, namely:

- *contractual accountability* through, and in accordance with, the negotiated terms of the contract or agreement
- *market accountability* through the ultimate power of the purchaser to change providers.

**Contractual accountability**

Contractual accountability tends to take the form of *post facto* reporting to the contractor on operations and activities conducted, in line with the explicit aims of a given scheme. Accountability, here, is the measurement of performance by activities and results set against objectives. In brief, to be sold in a commercial context, reassurance needs to be commodified, broken down into component parts and given to the contractor (either physically or as a verbal account) as part of a transaction (Rigakos, 2002). Something paid requires something tangible in return. Often this will take the form of reports on patrol activities, incidents and information gathered. This information exchange is, in effect, a commodity transaction.

Most schemes examined were run on relatively informal mechanisms of accountability, particularly where there was no formal contract. Despite concerns over public confidence, the police are accorded high levels of trust and considered the experts in matters of law enforcement. Consequently, there is a tendency to rely more heavily on trust and interpersonal relations. For example, these factors were important to the success of one of the additional policing schemes studied where the need for formal accountability measures was reduced by the strong trust relationship between the purchasers and the police representatives of the scheme. This did not eliminate the necessity for the police to provide the purchasers with other forms of commercial accountability, such as activity information and discussions over future patrol activity. However, the experience from some research sites suggests
that trust, where founded on informal interpersonal relationships, may be brittle and easily fractured when there are frequent changes in key personnel.

**Output and outcome data**

Contractual accountability often involves service providers supplying contractors with output data relating to patrols, information gathered in the course of, and any outcomes resulting from, patrols. Most often, these are descriptive accounts of where, when and what occurred and, where relevant, involving whom, relating to patrol and other activities, incidents and actions were taken. The front-line nature of local policing and patrol means that such personnel will frequently act as ‘information gatherers’, producing information of relevance for referral on to local service providers, including the police. This is not to suggest that information gathered is always appropriately referred on or used, but that information brokering is a key element of such ‘communications policing’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Policing personnel, thus, can become the ‘eyes and ears’ not merely for the formal police but also for diverse other local services and agencies. This information becomes an important commodity for exchange within accountability exercises. The following extract is illustrative of the recording mechanisms with regard to wardens:

*We do a monthly report. Wardens have to record everything that they do, put it all in their logbooks and they fill in a tally sheet of their activities. We have a big spreadsheet of all the different activities of wardens. So under ‘crime prevention’ it would be locks fitted, security visits, equipment, pieces of equipment marked, etc. Then under ‘environment’ will be graffiti reported, dumped rubbish reported, etc. The wardens just tally that up and that’s all collated.*

(Warden manager)

Where private security companies provide formal records of account, the nature of the information is almost entirely output driven. Thus, hours of patrol, incidents, liaison with the police, meetings attended, actions taken, phone calls received are the currency of accounting. More problematic is how to make sense of the relationship between these outputs and wider outcomes.

The collection and recording of activities undertaken by service providers tend to be more thorough and routine within those organisations experienced in the requirements of accounting for a service to an external funding agency or contractor. Commercial patrol firms in the study areas were more likely to provide detailed information pertaining to activities and performance. By contrast, this information can be difficult to extract from the police, not least because they are less in the routine of providing such information to customers. While commercial patrols may be better at recording and submitting information on activities, the quality of accounting varies significantly between companies. A council contract manager expressed some scepticism over the value of some reporting:

*The monitoring reports we get from them are poor, they simply say ‘it was raining tonight, nobody out’, and we know they are receiving phone calls and attending incidents, but there’s no real record of that. The quality of it is negligible, there’s very little of any real value to us or to the police probably more importantly.*

**Market accountability**

Contracts for policing services invariably afford accountability to purchasers, and indirectly to their beneficiaries, via the marketplace. If purchasers are unhappy with the nature or level of policing, believe that the service provided does not sufficiently reassure the consumers or feel that its
effectiveness is in doubt, they may withdraw their custom and take it elsewhere. Policing contracts may be terminated early (depending on any contractual sanction that this entails) or may simply not be renewed. Ultimately, the threat of exit may act as an influential lever over the quality of the service provided by the policing body. This market pressure can also operate at the level of residents. They may vent feelings of disappointment to the purchaser or, where possible, choose to move away from places where they feel unsafe, or where security is poorly provided. This element of consumer choice operates more clearly in private housing than it does in social housing where consumer choice is much more limited. However, market accountability depends on the existence of suitable alternative providers. Competition may not be readily available locally.

External audiences

As well as parochial forms of accountability, private or locally tied additional policing arrangements also raise wider public implications, for which few mechanisms of accountability exist. Most obviously, local additional patrols may serve to displace crime and anti-social behaviour to neighbouring areas, or at least may increase the fear of crime in surrounding localities.

Where police officers are deployed to additional policing contracts, this may have adverse impact on the capacity of the force adequately to replace them. For example, experienced police officers may be pulled into private purchasing arrangements leaving inexperienced colleagues to satisfy public duties. Interestingly, a second bid proposal of one large additional policing scheme contained the following observation:

*As it takes a minimum of two years to recruit and train a police officer to an operationally competent level and that the level of ability to effectively police areas such as [the scheme area] generally requires officers of greater experience, the effect of providing additionality can have consequences on the force’s ability to deliver services in other areas.*

The short-term nature of most additional police schemes raises problems over replacing those officers drawn into satisfying the conditions of the contract. This is because the time required to recruit and train a probationer is often longer than the initiatives themselves. In satisfying private contracts, ‘additional’ resources will often be drawn from elsewhere within the organisation, without necessarily being replaced immediately by incoming recruits. In this event, external audiences may rightfully claim to be on the sharp end of an accountability deficit.

Alternatively, external audiences may benefit from contracted police schemes in that the insertion of additional resources ought to free up operational resources for increased policing provision elsewhere. As one local authority officer recognised, there may be a simple realisation among local police managers that, given the presence of the additional policing resource, the need for normal policing cover declines:

*And I guess that, if you’re looking at where you need to put some highly visible officers in, they would say, and they are probably quite right, that they’re not going to focus too much of their high-visibility resources on my area because I’ve got three [contracted additional police officers] here doing it for the large part of the time.*

This form of resource displacement undermines the extent to which, in reality, additional public police schemes provide an additional level of service over and above normal provision.

Viewed in this light, local initiatives can raise important implications for the wider public sphere, often not the subject of deliberation. They introduce other accountability audiences beyond the confines of those immediate parties to a contractual arrangement. These external audiences invariably
do not have a voice in, nor are they privy to, any contractual mechanisms of accountability. Difficulties associated with measuring additionality render these wider implications less transparent. As such, police forces need to consider how they can sell patrol services, which remain a public resource, without having an adverse impact on the wider policing service or undermining the expectations of those who are purchasing the service.
8 Conclusions

We conclude with some observations on the nature of relations between the various forms of visible patrol, the governance of the extended policing family and the possible future direction of developments.

Relations between police and ‘extended policing family’

Relations between additional policing and normal police range along a spectrum from co-production, co-ordination, indifference, competition to hostility. Where co-ordination exists, this takes a more or less explicit form (for example, governed by protocols). The nature of co-ordination depends on the relative power relations between the parties. In some instances, the role of the additional policing body is that of a ‘junior partner’ to the police. In other cases, the relationship is more equal with regard to information flow and who determines the nature of co-ordination. We can identify four broad models reflecting the nature of such relations (Crawford, 2003, p. 157) that apply to patrols in residential areas, as elsewhere (see Box 4).

Box 4 Relations between police and ‘extended policing family’

- An integrationist model whereby forms of policing are integrated within the ‘immediate police family’ of the professional state police.
- A steering model whereby the police seek to ‘govern at a distance’ the policing activities of others.
- A networked model whereby plural policing providers link together in horizontal partnerships in the co-production of local security.
- A market model whereby competition structures the relations between divergent providers.

Each model is to be found to some degree in the current patchwork of plural policing and recent policy initiatives. The establishment of CSOs represents an integrationist model, accreditation schemes reflect a steering model and community safety partnerships appear to advance a networked model. Meanwhile, the growth of the private security sector and the commercialisation of public policing are testimony to the vibrancy of a market model.

Co-ordination deficits not only are a product of the nature of local relations between different policing organisations but also are structured by central government and the lack, or presence, of genuine joined-up thinking. There have been quite different perspectives emanating from the Home Office and ODPM with regard to the role of wardens and their position within the ‘extended policing family’. Consequently, there has been an apparent lack of co-ordination between the various recent initiatives.

How do we actually make sense of this mixed economy, bearing in mind that we’ve got neighbourhood wardens funded by ODPM, we’ve got other wardens funded under specific elements of various hypothecated funding streams, Policing Priority Areas, Neighbourhood Renewal, Communities against Drugs, etc.? What do we want to achieve? Or are we just going to end up with dozens of different uniforms: purple, green, red, yellow, blue, etc. out there, the public utterly confused and no sense of synergy, no sense of joint working or tasking? You can get more out of all these people than the simple sum of their parts if you co-ordinate it properly.

(Chief Constable within the region)

While many police officers consider the sight of private security patrols in residential areas as disruptive and a source of competition, others have come to see them as a potential source of support, supplementing the work of the police and in need of greater engagement and co-ordination.
Conclusions

The reality is that the public police have not done many of the things that the private security industry is able to do for a very long time. If the industry can put people to do those jobs, I don’t see that as taking anything away. I think that’s just enhancing and developing a relationship which the public seem to find reassuring. From the stuff I get from people in my communities, they’re absolutely committed to the concept of having people about, having visibility, having reassurance.

(ACPO representative)

Across the region, local markets in patrol have developed differently, resulting in some forms of plural policing being more visible in some areas than others. The main factors influencing this uneven development include:

- detectable variations in the approach of senior police managers towards the delivery of patrol, engagement with the private security sector and work with neighbourhood wardens/local authority patrols as well as willingness to enter a market for their services
- the uneven manner in which local authorities have responded to the rising climate of fear and insecurity, and the requirements of partnership working, contained within recent legislation
- variations in local responses towards central government funding regimes, which aim to ‘pump-prime’ and stimulate the growth of various forms of plural policing.

The recent accelerated growth of local markets in patrol closely reflects escalating concerns and anxieties over crime and security.

Regulation and oversight

The burgeoning yet embryonic market for visible patrol presence in residential areas demands external regulation to tame the excesses of market provision. The introduction of the Security Industry Authority (SIA) affords the promise of a higher quality and more closely regulated industry, as respondents to our survey testify. Nevertheless, in much of the private security field, there appears little differentiation in terms of quality, with cost being a defining feature. The BSIA, long-standing lobbyists for greater regulation, have repeatedly shown that, to their chagrin, some 60 per cent of public sector contracts for security services are awarded on the basis of price alone (BSIA, 2001). This begs questions how to encourage a shift in the attitudes of potential purchasers towards a focus on the quality of policing, regardless of who provides it. Experiences from many of the initiatives examined during this research suggest that such questions are becoming more considered.

However, the plurality of providers raises difficult issues regarding the regulation of patrols in residential areas. Different forms of patrol are (or will be) the subject of different regulatory regimes. Regulation is compartmentalised and segmented, in contrast to the increasingly networked nature of contemporary policing. Moreover, the simultaneous role of the police as competitor and regulator – notably through their role in accreditation schemes – not only places them in an ambiguous position, but also directly raises concerns over conflicts of interests. Should the police accredit and license the policing activities of others while simultaneously competing with those other providers?

Chief officers may find themselves in the invidious position of deciding whether to award a competitive advantage to private security companies or neighbourhood wardens – through police accreditation – while at the same time attempting to sell additional police, CSO or special constable patrols to precisely the same purchasers as those competitors. As local authorities consider how to spend their resources in the light of the...
termination of central government funding for
neighbourhood wardens, the relative attraction of
funding a police officer, CSO, private security
guard or warden through mainstream budgets may
depend on the willingness of the police to co-
operate with different members of the extended
crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs),
established by the 1998 Act in England and Wales,
provide a potential local vehicle to perform such a
task. To do so, these partnerships, which remain
dominated by the public sector, need to engage
more actively than at present with commercial
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This suggests the need for the establishment of
an independent regulatory agency above and
outside of competing interests to ensure fair
competition and appropriate standards, and to
safeguard the public interest. To this end, some
commentators have argued for the creation of
crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs),
established by the 1998 Act in England and Wales,
provide a potential local vehicle to perform such a
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more actively than at present with commercial

Regional policing boards

It is at the regional level that a policing board might
have the most impact. This would allow for
oversight of the community safety efforts of diverse
crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs),
established by the 1998 Act in England and Wales,
provide a potential local vehicle to perform such a
task. To do so, these partnerships, which remain
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more actively than at present with commercial
crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs),
established by the 1998 Act in England and Wales,
the police themselves. This would serve to bring into closer alignment the two forms of regulation and thereby help to reduce any emerging inconsistencies.

A regional policing board could ensure greater standardisation of quality among plural providers by working with other relevant authorities over the nature and extent of service provision; thus reducing the potential for conflicts of interest to arise from the dualism of the police’s current market role as ‘regulator-cum-provider’. A regional policing board would remove from individual chief constables the responsibility for, and burden of, accreditation. It would also address the concerns of chief constables over their potential vicarious liability with regard to accredited community safety officers as well as provide strategic oversight and co-ordination of the public, municipal, commercial and voluntary agencies that comprise local policing networks.

The potential advent of regional assemblies would allow regional policing boards to connect with lines of democratic accountability. A regional policing board as one tier of oversight, co-ordination and regulation would also pre-empt any subsequent shifts towards regional police forces – as promoted by some senior police officers (Blair, 2003) – and map onto the regional bases of private sector developments.

Looking to the future

This research has revealed a growing mixed economy of residential patrols, one that is likely to expand and become more established over the forthcoming years. The end to the police monopoly of reassurance policing in residential areas is now an acknowledged aspect of contemporary policing.

It is likely, as presaged by respondents to our survey, that national licensing and regulation of private security will increase the cost of hiring security personnel. Licensing of the manned guarding sector by the SIA will not be implemented until during the year 2005, but its effects are likely to come into play before then, as the industry prepares itself for the new licensing regime. It has been estimated by senior officials within the BSIA that this may only amount to a one-off rise of about 7 per cent or 8 per cent. However, the pressures of the European working time directive may add further cost pressures to that caused by licensing. This may render private security guards less competitive and restrict their expansion in residential areas. More likely, as the demand for security shows little sign of waning, the increased cost of security personnel may encourage potential purchasers to look to technological solutions, such as CCTV systems, gating, alarm response systems, etc. The manned guarding sector’s loss may be the security technology sector’s gain. However, residential areas may be less affected by this shift in security than retail and business areas. The attraction of visible security personnel and figures of authority appears to remain dominant among residential communities and is less likely to be easily replaced by technology. As respondents to our survey noted, residential areas constitute the field of manned security business likely to see the greatest potential for growth across the sector over the next five years.

At the same time as the cost of private security is set to increase, the introduction of CSOs has reduced the cost of a uniformed police officer (albeit one with limited powers and training). This will seemingly allow the police to compete more effectively within this growing market. Furthermore, some senior police officers believe privately that, given the superior organisational resources available to CSOs and the greater level of public trust in police as opposed to private security guards, they now hold a significant market advantage. It is in this context that recent government initiatives may intensify competition within the extended policing family.
The future of wardens is more uncertain. Some police forces are approaching local authorities and offering to recruit neighbourhood wardens and thereby transforming them into CSOs’ role, only to then sell them back to the authorities. While potentially attractive in terms of co-ordination and co-tasking, this process would transform the work of wardens and undermine their wider, non-policing role. In this scenario, local authorities would have to accept giving up control over their resources, a bitter pill that some might be unwilling to swallow, despite assurances that local authority priorities would be fed into deployment under the National Intelligence Model (NIM).

The future implications of accreditation remain unclear. The extent to which commercial security firms, local authority patrols or neighbourhood warden schemes intend to apply for accreditation is undecided. Our survey findings suggested that many private sector operatives are receptive to the idea, largely on the basis of securing a competitive advantage, although the cost of the process may prove prohibitive. As the following senior police officer suggests, the lever over security companies that accreditation affords the police may deter some in the private sector:

*I think with accredited schemes it’s slightly different in that, if they are private sector people, somebody’s going to have to make the odd bean out of it. And for the police to dictate to them, beyond a certain point, how they’re going to do their job will impact on whether they make a bean out of it. There are very few private sector companies in the industry I know that do it for charity. So I think there will always be the underlying obligation of private security companies to become accredited to make money, which means they will want to keep a handle on how they do things.*

(ACPO representative)

Accreditation is perhaps more suitable for private and municipal policing bodies operating outside of residential areas (for example, in shopping malls and city centres), where the additional powers associated with accreditation may be more appropriate. If sought in residential areas, these additional powers may draw security guards or wardens into more law enforcement roles. Nevertheless, accreditation offers a vehicle through which the efforts of diverse providers may be better co-ordinated as well as the possibility of some degree of standardisation of identity through harmonised badging.

**Equity**

The growth of a market in additional policing through patrols in residential areas also raises concerns regarding the unequal provision of policing, such that some areas acquire a surfeit of policing and security while others experience a policing deficit. A key question then is that of access to additional policing. Access is primarily determined by recourse to financial wealth. In part, this is contingent on the financial and organisational capacity of groups of residents to club together to purchase additional security, raising the concern that policing will become greater in affluent areas, thus fuelling social polarisation. In addition, residents eager for quick-fix solutions to local insecurities are placing increased pressure on local authorities to fund extra patrols. However, there is no simple relationship between the capacity of residents to lobby local authorities and need. This is all the more troubling because of the significant discrepancy between perception and need. One of the central paradoxes of crime prevention is found in the often inverse relationship between activity and need. Security tends not to be concentrated where most needed. Consequently, the uneven access to additional policing patrols in residential areas has the potential to impact adversely on social cohesion instead fostering social polarisation.
The inequitable distribution of policing in favour of the affluent challenges governments to think creatively about how to respond to the growing security deficit in some of the poorer areas of the country. Targeted regeneration funding and the provision of neighbourhood wardens have been one response to this problem. One way to respond to this challenge is to supplement public policing in poorer areas. Conceivably, in the long run, the police will struggle to compensate for the lack of security in poorer areas, particularly given the demands placed on them.

A more radical solution, proposed by Shearing (2001), is the provision of ‘block grants’ or ‘security budgets’ to poor communities, enabling them to purchase additional security, whether from the police or other providers. This suggestion addresses the problem of restricted access by the poor to the burgeoning market for residential patrols. However, it offers little to address the inequities and unevenness of the market itself. The introduction of security budgets is likely to serve to entrench and bolster the market for security and patrol. It might increase choice, but simultaneously present significant problems for co-ordination.

More fundamentally, the further marketisation of security may have an adverse impact on the wider public sphere. Just as community safety departs from private security, in that it may be obtained only by mitigating the safety of some individuals as against others, as not all harms are evenly distributed, so public safety is not merely the sum of all neighbourhood security. One person’s security may be achieved only at the expense of another’s. So, too, one community’s security may be achieved only at the expense of another’s. In a context in which market-driven choices dominate provision, security differentials may become defining attributes of wealth, power and status, to the extent that security budgets would continually need to expand to keep up with demand. This may not be sustainable.

Furthermore, in the US, where residents frequently club together to purchase security, notably in the form of gated communities, they often prefer to opt to withdraw from public provision of local goods that they can secure themselves, such as security (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). The affluent may be less willing to pay for a public service while also spending considerably on a private service, particularly where more of that public service is provided to the poor. Such ‘civic disengagement’ may reduce the quality of the public sphere and services – such as policing – provided therein. Public policing in this scenario becomes a second-tier form of provision of last resort, more geared to coercive law enforcement and the residual policing of those left behind.

Security budgets, too, may not be politically acceptable for the same argument. Affluent taxpayers might reasonably conclude that they are paying three times for security: first, by way of taxes to support the public police; second, through the expense of hiring private security; and, third, through additional taxes to subsidise the entry of the poor into the commercial security market.

Funding

One of the key uncertainties about the future relates to the question of funding. To date, the funding for many of the new initiatives has been short-term, leaving the continuation of schemes contingent on the search for the next quick fix of interim stability. This can leave partnerships and local initiatives chasing sources of funding instead of their implementation objectives. The New Deal for Communities programme, given its longer time horizons, has allowed greater stability. Where devolved local authority budgets are used to purchase policing, they tend to operate year on year.

This raises the problem that, if additional policing becomes ‘normalised’, in the sense that
residents come to accept and expect it, residents are likely to be displeased by its withdrawal. This is particularly evident in areas where residents are unable, themselves, to purchase additional policing but are reliant on governmental sources of funding. If additional policing is not sustainable, raising residents’ expectations only to disappoint them in the long run may prove to be a costly tinkering with residents’ fragile sense of security. Such well-intentioned experiments may leave a legacy of frustration and disillusionment.

According to recent media coverage, the Home Office has been considering plans to encourage community groups to purchase their own policing. Under the proposals, an organisation such as a residents’ association would be able to hire a CSO or neighbourhood warden to patrol its area. The scheme would require residents to pay about £10,000 per year for an officer, estimated to be half the cost, with the Home Office matching the additional funding. A Home Office spokesman said that the intention would be ‘to make it easier for people in a particular street, community or estate to raise a levy if they want to pay for a community support officer’ (Sparrow, 2003). Such an initiative would dramatically stimulate the existing mixed economy of patrol, albeit in a restricted manner in that private security personnel appear not to be included. It would reinforce the central finding of this research that a second tier of additional policing is increasingly a reality in modern Britain. As such, it is a bold proposal, but one that risks skewing policing resources into areas able to afford the matched funding rather than those in greatest need of additional policing. If targeted at the poorest areas, it raises the issue of where the matched funding is likely to come from and, like much recent government funding, begs questions about sustainability in the long term.

Security as an organising focus for local services

A further concern with the idea of security budgets is that local problems can become increasingly seen through a policing and security lens. Not only may resources be drawn away from other forms of social provision in order to fund policing endeavours, but also those other social provisions may be drawn increasingly into policing and security concerns. A local authority officer expressed the following concern:

If it’s sustainable in terms of really being an Elastoplast on a wound that wants better treatment then I think it would be silly to say this is going to solve long term some of the issues, when other funding should be being deployed for things like improving facilities.

Given the emotional attachment to feelings of security, policing solutions can bolster ‘bonding capital’ at the expense of ‘bridging capital’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Policing may provide ‘bonding capital’ in that it unites and binds together all of similar interests who have access to the security provided within the communal space. As such, bonding capital is inward looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. However, policing does not necessarily provide ‘bridging capital’, which is outward looking and encompasses people from across different social groups in ways that foster reciprocity and mobilise solidarity. Furthermore, bonding capital ‘by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 23). Parochial policing with its narrow particularistic focus is not the same as ‘public policing’.
This reminds us that solutions to the problems of security and order do not necessarily lie in policing-based responses alone. Policing personnel, be they the police, wardens, local authority patrols or private security guards, ultimately will not be the only answer to the public’s quest for social order, even as the market becomes more sophisticated and responsive to the communities that they serve. Building balanced communities may not be best served by an over-dominant focus on insecurities. Pro-social patterns of behaviour in communities are more likely to be fostered around activities of care, nurturing and mutuality. All of these may have consequences for policing and security, but they should be accorded prominence for what they are, not for what their consequences might be. This is not to say that policing may not be a vital component in producing the conditions under which communities can flourish. However, it is but a small part in the wider framework of fostering vibrant communities.
Chapter 1

1 Police telephone control rooms in England and Wales now handle about 40 million calls including at least 12 million emergency calls.

2 The project’s main thrust is to test the ‘signal crimes’ thesis, identifying accurately what these ‘signals’ are and targeting police resources accordingly. The project involves working with local communities to identify the signals for insecurity and fear, and working with partner agencies to develop a resolution strategy to tackle these crimes or events.

Chapter 2

1 The number of police officers across Britain also rose during this period (albeit not at the same rate) from 84,585 to 149,964.

2 Between 1951 and 1991, the number of bus (and tram) conductors fell from 96,558 to 2,471, rail ticket inspectors/guards declined from 35,715 to 15,642 and ‘roundsmen’ fell from 98,143 to 49,182.

3 It will be a criminal offence for an individual to provide security services, in regulated sectors, when they do not have a licence, or to break the conditions of their licence; to employ an unlicensed security operative; or to claim to be an ‘approved’ provider of security services under the SIA, when not registered.


5 The total budget for wardens being funded by the Government amounts to £91 million. Of that, £6 million came from the original Home Office funding and £85 million has come from ODPM budgets.

6 While only local authorities and housing associations employ neighbourhood wardens, street wardens may be employed – or purchased – by other organisations (sometimes private, such as retail associations).

7 Their enforcement powers are set out in Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the Act.

8 This relates largely to the issuing of fixed-penalty notices for litter, graffiti, fly-posting and to parents for their child’s truancy. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 created the ability to issue a penalty notice for a range of disorder offences (currently £40 or £80). If the penalty notice is not paid within 21 days it is automatically registered as a fine of one and a half times the penalty amount.

9 These forces are Metropolitan Police, West Yorkshire, Lancashire, Devon and Cornwall, Northamptonshire and Gwent. CSOs’ powers came into effect on 2 December 2002 and the pilots will last for two years from that date.

10 In the first wave, central government funding was announced for 1,206 CSOs across 27 forces; by the end of October 2003, some 1,900 CSOs had been recruited.
References


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Appendix 1

Glossary of terms

Acceptable behaviour contract (ABC)
Acceptable behaviour contracts are individual written agreements by a young person with a partner agency and the police not to carry on certain identifiable acts, which could be construed as anti-social behaviour. The partner agency will usually be a housing department or association. ABCs are designed for young people aged ten to 18, although this is flexible and they can be used for over-18s if they are still living at home with their parents. In cases where a child is under ten, parents can be asked to sign up to a parental responsibility contract. This is the same as an ABC except that the parents take full responsibility for their child’s behaviour. An ABC is not legally binding but can be cited in subsequent legal proceedings. In practice, ABCs are normally effective for up to six months and arrangements are made by the partner agency and the police to monitor implementation and to keep its terms under review. Serious breach of the contract may result in action by the partner agency to evict the family from their home or proceedings leading to an ASBO.

Accredited community safety officer
Sections 40 and 41 of the Police Reform 2002 Act make provision for community safety accreditation schemes and, in certain circumstances, the granting of limited powers to accredited members of those schemes – to be known as accredited community safety officers. The power to grant accreditation lies with the chief constable in each force, who must first consult with the police authority and all the local authorities that lie within the police force area. Accredited persons may be empowered to issue fixed-penalty notices for only the very trivial offences, but they possess no detention powers. Their powers are, therefore, less extensive than those that can be conferred on CSOs. Accredited community safety officers may be employed by local authorities, housing associations or private security companies. According to the legislation, liability for the acts of accredited community safety officers rests with employers rather than the accrediting authority. A common badge for all accredited officers is being developed as are national guidelines on standards for accreditation.

Anti-social behaviour action plan
‘Tackling anti-social behaviour together’ was launched on 14 October 2003. This aims to increase the performance of agencies (police and local authorities, for example) in dealing with anti-social behaviour, encourage less tolerance of anti-social behaviour, put victims and witnesses first, tackle nuisance neighbours, create safer town centres and tackle environmental nuisance such as graffiti and abandoned cars. The plan forms part of the Government’s ongoing work, which includes new measures contained in the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.

Anti-social behaviour order (ASBO)
Introduced by section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The legislation empowers local authorities and the police to apply to a magistrates’ court for an ASBO for any person (or group) who has acted in an anti-social manner ‘that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household’ as that person. The prohibitions in the order must be such as are necessary to protect people from further anti-social acts by the defendant in the locality. The minimum duration for an order is two years; early termination requires the consent of the police and/or local authority.
Appendix 1

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)

The association representing all police officers of assistant chief constable rank and above (or their equivalent) in the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. ACPO was set up over 50 years ago so that work in developing policing policies could be undertaken in one place, on behalf of the service as a whole (www.acpo.police.uk/index.html).

Association of Police Authorities (APA)

The APA was set up in April 1997 to represent police authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, both on the national stage and locally. It influences policy on policing and supports local police authorities in their role (www.apa.police.uk).

Basic command unit (BCU)

Key unit of police delivery below force level. Each BCU is headed by a superintendent or chief superintendent and generally has its own management team. They will usually have some specialist units such as Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and officers dealing with community liaison and CDRPs.

Best Value

The Local Government Act 1999 placed statutory duties on the Audit Commission, its appointed auditors and HMIC to audit, inspect and report on the discharge of the ‘best value’ responsibilities of police authorities and police forces. The legislative requirements create a rolling programme of Best Value Reviews to be conducted within each force with the aim of driving the process of continuous improvement in service delivery. These produce annual Best Value Performance Plans (BVPPs), which are then audited. The Best Value Review, audit and inspection regime challenges police forces to consider alternative ways of meeting the needs and aspirations of the service users in line with:

- challenging authorities to be clear and open on their service objectives
- consulting local people on these objectives
- comparing performance with other authorities
- competing, by demonstrating that services are competitive against alternative providers in the market place.

British Security Industry Association (BSIA)

The BSIA is a professional trade association representing about two-thirds of the private security industry. It has over 500 business members in various areas of security incorporating and extending beyond manned security. It has been active in lobbying for regulation of the security industry for over 15 years. It has also sought to promote standards within the sector, through industry codes of practice and technical documents (www.bsia.co.uk).

Community support officer (CSO)

Auxiliary patrol officers employed by the police, introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002 (s.38). CSOs are civilian staff without the full powers, equipment or training of a sworn police officer. The powers of CSOs are limited to the following: to hand out fixed-penalty tickets for minor disorders; to request the name and address of a person acting in an anti-social manner; to stop vehicles, direct traffic and remove vehicles. Detention powers for up to 30 minutes are being piloted in a small number of forces. Currently, all but five of the 43 police forces in England and Wales have opted to recruit CSOs, assisted with Home Office funding.
The extended policing family

CSOs are also referred to as police community support officers (PCSOs) to underscore the fact that they are police staff under the operational control of the chief constable.

Crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP)

CDRPs, sometimes referred to as community safety partnerships, are local partnerships established by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (s.5 and s.6). The legislation placed a statutory duty on local authorities and the police (the ‘responsible authorities’) together to develop, co-ordinate and promote local community safety partnerships. The local police authority, probation service and health authority all have a statutory duty to participate in, and co-operate with, arrangements to develop a community safety strategy in the light of community consultation. From April 2003, police authorities and fire authorities became legally ‘responsible authorities’ for the purpose of formulating and implementing crime and disorder reduction strategies. Primary care trusts will also share this responsibility from April 2004. The duty requires the ‘responsible authorities’ to:

- conduct a review of the levels and patterns of crime and disorder in the area
- prepare an analysis of the levels and patterns of crime and disorder in the area
- publish a report of that analysis
- obtain the views on that report of people and organisations in the area whether by holding meetings or otherwise
- regularly review progress against targets
- revisit the basic process every three years.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)

For over a century, Her Majesty’s Inspectors (HMIs) have been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales. The statutory duties of HMIs are described in the Police Act 1996. HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. Until recently, selection was made exclusively from the ranks of the most senior police officers. In 1993, two HMIs were appointed from non-police backgrounds. The HMIC is conducting a thematic inspection regarding ‘Civilisation of the police in England and Wales’ with implications for the future shape of the extended policing family. It will report in 2004 (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/hmic.htm).

National Intelligence Model (NIM)

Developed by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) for co-ordinating the gathering, disseminating and actioning of intelligence. Intelligence from a multitude of sources is analysed within the model to establish formulae including crime patterns, criminal market profiles (revealing key players, networks, assets and trends) and results analysis (assessing the impact of various strategies and techniques). Its assessment procedures provide the data that enable priorities for action to be set.

Key crime reduction options include the:

- targeting of offenders
- identification and management of ‘hot spots’
- identification and investigation of ‘series’
- application of the range of preventive measures.

The model was launched by NCIS in February 2000. It is being integrated into policing systems across England and Wales, and should be implemented by all forces by April 2004 (www.ncis.co.uk/nim.asp).
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy

A government strategy launched in 2001 to narrow the gap between the most deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country. The strategy focuses on addressing crime, local economies and poor services. The strategy is administered through the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) (www.neighbourhood.gov.uk).

Neighbourhood warden

Local authority and/or housing association managed wardens working in residential areas to offer a uniformed semi-official presence. Funded through the ODPM and linked to a programme of neighbourhood renewal, often with an emphasis on tackling environmental problems and caring for the physical appearance of areas.

Neighbourhood Wardens Team

The Neighbourhood Wardens Team is based within the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). The team serves to manage the warden funding, promote the concept of wardens, develop accredited training programmes for wardens and scheme managers, provide good-practice guidance and offer ongoing support to new schemes and those funded via the New Deal for Communities (NDC) and Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) (www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/nswardens.asp).

Neighbourhood watch

Popular community-based crime prevention programme, first developed in the UK in the early 1980s, aimed to reduce opportunistic crime and residential burglary. Local residents act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police, reporting incidents to them and disseminating crime prevention advice. Spawned other types of ‘watch’ schemes, including ‘farm watch’, ‘pub watch’, ‘schools watch’ and ‘cab watch’. The various watch schemes constitute a mild form of civilian policing.

New Deal for Communities (NDC)

The NDC programme, launched in September 1998, aims to bridge the gap between the most deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country in 39 areas over a ten-year period. Approximately £2 billion has been committed to the 39 partnerships. Based within distinct geographical areas, NDCs have common themes of increasing the number of people in work, improving educational levels, reducing crime, improving people’s health and improving housing (www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/ndcomms.asp).

Police authority

Police authorities are free-standing bodies, usually comprised of 17 members: nine councillors, three magistrates and five independent members. Police authorities are responsible for ensuring there is an efficient and effective police force for their area, and holding the chief officer and force to account for how well they deliver local policing services. They are responsible for appointing senior officers of the force and have specific responsibilities including consulting with communities, publishing three-year force strategy plans and annual local policing plans, and setting the budget for the force. Police authorities have the power to set their own elements of the council tax – this is known as the precept (see Association of Police Authorities).

Police force

There are presently 43 police forces in England and Wales and one in Northern Ireland. Each force is headed by a chief constable (or commissioner in Metropolitan and City of London Police). The size
and make-up of individual forces vary considerably. The Government has recently published plans in its Green Paper Policing: Building Safer Communities Together (Home Office, 2003) to amalgamate some police forces.

**Police Forum for Income Generation (PolFIG)**

PolFIG is a network of force representatives that exchanges information and ideas over the development of commercial partnerships between the police and local interest groups. Predominantly, this involves the business community sponsoring or funding local policing or crime prevention initiatives. In the light of Sir David O’Dowd’s Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce’s 50 recommendations regarding income generation issues, PolFIG has been tasked with the production of an income generation guide. It is intended that the guide will link into the Best Value for police training and the ACPO working group for charging for police services. A draft will be submitted to the Home Office at the end of 2003 (www.polfig.org).

**Police Reform Agenda**


**Police Skills and Standards Organisation (PSSO)**

The PSSO is the national training organisation for the police sector covering both operational and police staff. It was established in March 2001 as the standard-setting body for the UK police service. Its core roles are to develop national occupational standards, increase skills levels and provide the recognised voice of the police service in relation to learning, skills, training and development issues (www.pso.co.uk).

**Police Standards Unit (PSU)**

Set up by the Home Secretary in July 2001 as part of the Government’s police reform agenda. The focus of the Unit’s activities is to measure and compare basic command unit (BCU) and local partnership (CDRP) performance, understand the underlying causes of performance variations and identify and disseminate good practice (www.policereform.gov.uk/psu/index.html).

**Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce**

The Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce was established as part of the Government’s Police Reform programme, under the guidance of Sir David O’Dowd, former Chief Inspector of Constabulary. Its aim is to determine ways of releasing the time pressures and burdens on the police to increase the presence of uniformed officers in the community by:

- removing the unnecessary burdens borne by front-line staff
- providing adequate support
- revising working practices to enable them to give of their best.

(www.policereform.gov.uk/bureaucracy)

**Policing Priority Area (PPAs)**

Policing Priority Areas are closely defined areas that present particularly difficult problems and are characterised by high levels of crime and low levels of community confidence. PPAs are focused
initiatives aimed at tackling high crime and anti-social behaviour, and promoting community cohesion. The first five PPAs were announced by the Home Secretary in March 2002 in Southwark, Stoke, Bradford, Bristol and Rhyl. Since then, the scheme has been extended to another five areas in Mansfield, Salford, Easington, Hastings and Great Yarmouth (www.policereform.gov.uk/psu/policingpriorityareas.html).

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998

Section 17 requires local authorities, police authorities and national parks authorities to consider the crime and disorder implications of all their activities and decisions. The Police Reform Act 2002 added fire authorities to the list of organisations covered by section 17.

Security Industry Authority (SIA)

The SIA was established by the Private Security Industry Act 2001 to license and regulate the private security industry. The SIA will oversee the licensing regime and maintain a register of licensees and ‘approved companies’. It also aims to raise standards of professionalism and skills within the private security industry, and to promote and spread best practice. The authority will employ a number of inspectors who will have the right to enter security premises to ensure that personnel carry valid licences. Licences for three years will cost £190. The SIA will largely derive its revenue from this licence fee. The SIA is a non-departmental public body responsible to the Home Secretary. It was officially launched in April 2003 (www.the-sia.org.uk).

Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO)

SITO was founded in 1990 by the BSIA. It is a training organisation that has developed accredited qualifications, training programmes and training materials for the security industry (www.sito.co.uk).

Single Regeneration Budget (SRB)

The SRB aims to enhance the employment prospects, education and skills of local people, and to tackle the needs of communities in the most deprived areas. It has provided funding to regeneration initiatives carried out by local authorities and partnerships since 1995. Responsibility for administering SRB funding transferred from Regional Government Offices to Regional Development Agencies in April 1999 (www.urban.odpm.gov.uk/programmes/srb/index.htm).

Special constables

The Special Constabulary is a voluntary body drawn mainly from the community served by each local force. Specials have full police powers and carry out a range of police work under the supervision, and with the support of, regular officers. Specials give at least four hours per week, typically evenings and weekends. Specials wear a similar uniform to their full-time colleagues and undertake a national training package. As of March 2003, there were 11,037 specials across England and Wales, a significantly declining figure from 19,263 in 1997 (www.specialconstables.gov.uk).

Street Crime Initiative

The Street Crime Initiative began in March 2002 with the aim of cutting street crime (robbery and snatch theft) in the ten worst affected areas in England. These areas accounted for over 80 per cent of all robbery in England and Wales. An additional £67 million was made available to these areas under the initiative, which sought to bring
The extended policing family

together various local agencies to work to reduce street crime (www.crimereduction.gov.uk/streetcrime08.htm).

Street crime warden

Street wardens funded under the Street Crime Initiative.

Street warden

Extended the role of neighbourhood warden to non-residential areas, such as public spaces of towns and cities and village centres. Street wardens, unlike neighbourhood wardens, may be employed by organisations other than local authorities and housing associations, including private sector companies, such as retail associations.

Traffic warden

Traffic wardens can issue fixed-notice penalties for traffic offences and are employed by the local police authority. Wardens have their own line-management structure and operate as an almost separate organisation within the police. Their numbers have continued to fall in recent years with the increasing role of local authorities in traffic control and the decriminalisation of on-street parking in certain areas. As of end March 2003, there were 2,067 traffic wardens.
Appendix 2
Additional private security survey data

Figure A2.1 Potential growth areas over the next five years across the manned security sector (n = 139)

Respondents were presented with a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 equating to ‘not at all important’ and 10 equating to ‘fundamental’, and asked to score the importance of a number of factors generally associated with reassurance in terms of the delivery of mobile patrols. Table A2.1 shows that, while all the factors were considered important, the visibility of security officers to residents was the most important.

Table A2.1 Importance in delivering security patrols in residential areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Mean score</th>
<th>Percentage scoring 10 – ‘fundamental’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visibility of security officers to residents</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability/accessibility of security officers</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity of security officers to residents</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers’ knowledge of local people and problems</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked to identify up to three skills from a pre-selected list (see Figure A2.2).

Figure A2.2 Patrol officers’ skills (n = 40)
Appendix 3
Gated communities in England

Map A3.1 Local authorities and the number of gated communities in England, Crown Copyright acknowledged