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Improving Statutory Paternity Leave would benefit families and the economy

More generous Statutory Paternity Leave would deliver on both household financial security and economic growth.

The model caps the maximum salary which will be reimbursed by government at £1,200 a week before tax. This cap makes the policy more affordable to the taxpayer but is set to a high enough amount that fathers take it up as they do not lose out on most of their earnings when they are on leave.

Economic gains driven by bottom and middle of labour market

The model results (costs and benefits) can be broken down from the lowest to highest earners. (See figure 2 and 3, and the more detailed explanation in the appendix).

When a father takes paternity leave, the model assumes that women in the same income group will respond by increasing their employment. The results are significant because they suggest that more of the gains of introducing the improved 6-week paternity leave policy are generated for families on lower and middle incomes.

Lower and middle-income groups show higher gains. They will see the biggest difference in take-up when this more generous entitlement is introduced, as it will offer a better incentive than the current system. These fathers also tend to work in lower-paying professions who do not get enhanced leave, whereas higher-income fathers already have a higher rate of paternity leave take-up as they get this via their employers.

As in figure 1, figure 2 and 3 set out the modelling results for the economy and for the Treasury, but this time broken down into quintiles of earners from the lowest to highest income. The overall difference between the total benefits and total costs in the model is indicated by a dot for each of the 5 income groups. For example, in figure 2 we see a net gain to the economy of £0.58 billion for the lowest group of earners and in figure 3 a net loss of £0.23 billion for the top earners.

Implications for policy design

To harness these economic benefits, we propose a paternity leave policy design which:

  • Includes support for self-employed fathers: The scale of benefits is partly down to a labour market-wide coverage of the end policy, where support is given to self-employed as well as employed fathers, who currently have no access to financial support. This could come by creating a new benefit akin to Maternity Allowance – a ‘Paternity Allowance’, for example (see below).
  • Includes a cap on fathers’ salaries: This model assumes a salary cap of £1,200 a week, which is approximately an annual salary of £62,400 (before tax). This is because the highest-earning fathers should be able to withstand the temporary salary reduction and are more likely to have access to enhanced paternity pay. This will make the policy more affordable and fairer to the taxpayer and reduce the deadweight loss of the state paying for paternity pay already paid by employers. We do not propose introducing a cap for this phase of Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) because it would weaken existing entitlements for mothers.
  • Is government-funded: This reduces the likelihood of perverse consequences in the case of an employer-funded offer, such as fathers experiencing discrimination. The economy-wide result is maximised where government bears all the costs of funding policy, that is, the income transfers to fathers in the form of SPP.
  • Is flexible: Fathers should be able to take these 6 weeks of paternity leave flexibly, splitting it up into blocks or even individual days which suit their family. This will encourage some fathers to take some leave whilst their partner has returned to work, leading to solo parenting by fathers. Recent changes to paternity leave entitlements – allowing fathers to take 2 non-consecutive weeks of paid leave – already establish a precedent for flexibility. The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) argues that even introducing this minor change in flexibility will encourage greater paternal involvement including solo parenting and the evidence suggests that there will be an economic return via mothers’ labour market participation (DBT, 2024).
  • Is pragmatic: Aligning a more generous paternity leave entitlement with the current first 6-week maternity leave entitlement is also a pragmatic option: employers and parents are already familiar with accommodating this entitlement.

Expanding number of fathers eligible for paid paternity leave

To reach the economic gains predicted by the model, we need more fathers to be eligible for paid paternity leave in the first place. The more fathers who are not eligible or cannot take up the support, the more miss out, and the weaker the impact on female labour market outcomes. Currently paid SPP is only available to fathers who are employees who have been in their current job for 26 weeks or more. Self-employed fathers or fathers who have recently started a job have no rights to financial support at all.

Support for self-employed fathers

The UK is an outlier in Europe for having sparse support for self-employed fathers. This is often justified by the lower level of National Insurance Contributions made by the self-employed compared to employed workers. However, other types of support for families are uncoupled from employment status or history for any type of working father. For example, funded childcare in England is available to self-employed parents who work enough hours and parents do not have to wait for 26 weeks before accessing funded childcare after starting a new job.

We propose introducing a (capped) 6-week earnings-related ‘Paternity Allowance’ for self-employed fathers, as an equivalent to our 6-week, earning-related Statutory Paternity Leave proposition for employees above. Given the evidence on the low take-up driven by the lack of generosity of low parental pay levels, this should be set at the higher-paid earnings-related entitlement rather than just making self-employed fathers eligible for low-paid SPP or the equivalent of Maternity Allowance. This risks replicating the same problems of inadequacy and low take-up rates with SPP (Pregnant then Screwed, 2024).

As the self-employed cannot rely on an employer to calculate their earnings-related parental pay, the Government will need to introduce a mechanism to calculate payment levels. We propose that this be built on a combination of self-assessment and verification using HMRC data to assess fathers’ income and calculate what they are entitled to in ‘Parental Allowance’.4 The planned introduction of more regular self-assessment returns from company directors and the capacity built up over the Covid-19 pandemic for administering furlough payments should make it more practical for government to accurately estimate earnings (IPSE, 2025).

Consultation with self-employed parents would be needed to get the policy design right. For example, government should consult to ascertain whether Paternity Allowance is a one-off payment to cover time off in the first year of birth; whether it is paid in arrears; what period of earnings is covered for the calculation; and whether fathers need to provide evidence they took time off. Given the unpredictable nature of self-employed work, flexibility is likely to be very important to self-employed parents (Parental Pay Equity, 2025). This could mean a responsive payment system, such as allowing self-employed fathers to change paternity leave timing at short notice to respond to new work coming in. Government will also want to ensure there are adequate protections in place to prevent fraud.

The modelling included costs and benefits of all working fathers taking up an entitlement to 90% of average weekly earnings (capped) 6-week paternity leave whatever their employment status. Therefore, the direct costs of providing this ‘Paternity Allowance’ are already included within the model costs to HMRC of £1.15 billion.

Improved support for self-employed mothers

Having a less generous offer for self-employed mothers than for fathers poses an equity problem, so government should consider turning Maternity Allowance into an earnings-related benefit for the first 6 weeks (IPSE, 2025). Self-employed mothers currently receive 39 weeks of low-paid Maternity Allowance (£184.03 per week or less) but miss out on the first 6 weeks of SMP (90% of average weekly earnings, uncapped) that eligible employee mothers receive. More broadly, Maternity Allowance urgently needs reform to support mothers on the lowest incomes. Maternity Allowance is currently treated as unearned income under Universal Credit (UC), which results in a pound-for-pound withdrawal of UC support when being paid the benefit, while SMP is treated as earned income (Maternity Action, 2025).

Making statutory paternity pay a day-one right

Finally, to ensure the maximum number of fathers are eligible for paternity support, thus giving the policy the chance to have the widest possible take-up, government should enshrine a day-one right to SPP as well as leave. A new day-one right to paternity leave will be introduced via the Employment Rights Bill, partially ending the unfairness for fathers who have recently started a new job. DBT has estimated that this change will mean that around 32,000 additional fathers will be entitled to paternity leave (DBT, 2025). However, these fathers are still not entitled to SPP. This means that they will need to take this leave unpaid or not take leave at all, which we know will limit take-up, particularly amongst low-income families. Beyond the hardship experienced by families in these situations, job moves are linked to increasing household incomes and we need to ensure there are no disincentives in parental leave policy to make those beneficial job moves (Office for National Statistics, 2019).

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